IRRI-KIIB - AFRICA POLICY & RESEARCH NOTES - #1 – THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN THE DRC – 18 OCTOBER 2006 1 IRRI-KIIB CENTRAL AFRICA PROGRAM AAFFRRIICCAA PPOOLLIICCYY && RREESSEEAARRCCHH NNOOTTEESS THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN THE DRC #1 - HANS HOEBEKE - 18 OCTOBER 2006 1. INTRODUCTION The Transition in the DRC, in line with the institutional architecture adopted during the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun City, known as the ‘1+4’, will officially end with the installation of newly elected national political institutions at the end of 2006. In December 2005 a new Constitution was adopted by popular referendum and a first round of national elections was held on 30 July 2006. On 22 September the newly elected Parliament was inaugurated and the preparations for the second round of the Presidential elections, programmed for 29 October 2006, got under way. These crucial, positive achievements notwithstanding, several events during these last months pointed at some of the key weaknesses and challenges for the political process in the DRC. These include mainly security and fundamental political issues that will have to be resolved for the DRC to begin the long process of reconstruction. The high level of complexity of the DRC conflict is a result of a number of factors, including: the regional setting, the size of the territory, the various dynamics in different parts of the country, the abundance of easily exploited natural resources and the nature of politics in the country. All too often analysis focused on the negative role of the neighboring countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda. Even if it is abundantly clear that their role has not always been in support of the transition, the main ground for the continuing problems in the DRC would rather be the nature of politics in the country. This covers a range of issues, such as: a lack of institutional and technical capacity, the neo-patrimonial nature of politics, the institutionalization of corruption, and a splintered political party landscape. While none of the current mainstream political/military groups in the DRC has an interest in renewed full-scale war, the present situation of ‘no war, no peace’, in different parts of the country, offers considerable political and economic opportunities and advantages to several elite groups. The main challenge in the DRC therefore rests with the political and business elites, in the domains of governance (anti-corruption) and the delivery of basic security. From this perspective, the experience of the Transition period might offer some indications on the future behavior of some of the key actors. A key uncertainty concerns the level of engagement of the international community in the DRC. Of key importance are both the presence of the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) and the operation of a political mechanism with the ‘Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition’ (CIAT). The newly elected government is likely to project its full sovereignty and political legitimacy, which will limit the influence the international community can exert on the Congolese authorities. The international ‘stick and carrot’ will mainly consist of the financial instrument, a stick difficult to wield since the social needs are huge and the process remains fragile. Especially in the Eastern provinces, MONUC remains of key importance both as a source of security for the civilian population and as an instrument to contribute to the IRRI-KIIB - AFRICA POLICY & RESEARCH NOTES - #1 – THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN THE DRC – 18 OCTOBER 2006 2 operational capacity of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC1). It is also a way of access and information for the international community on the humanitarian and security conditions in these provinces. This note presents an outline of a decade of politics in the DRC, with a focus on the Transition period (2003-2006). It identifies the crucial role played by the international community in the preparation of the key challenges of the Transition: SSR/DDR and the preparation of the elections. Through an assessment of the result of the first elections the prospects for the future political situation in the DRC and the key risk and vulnerabilities for the post-transition period are identified. 2. THE CHALLENGES Compared to similar complex post-conflict settings (i.e. the Sudan), the DRC Transition period was kept relatively short at 2 years with the possibility for two 6- month extensions2. The 2002 ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC’ listed the following main challenges for the Transition Government3: • Reunification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of peace and the restoration of territorial integrity and State authority in the whole of the national territory; • National reconciliation; • The creation of a restructured, integrated national army; • The organization of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing for a constitutional and democratic government to be put in place; • The setting up of structures that will lead to a new political order. Progress has been achieved on all fronts, but a lot of ground will have to be covered by the future government. The daily lives of a considerable part of the population have not fundamentally altered since the start of the Transition and there is a lack of national institutions with a capacity to shoulder the reconstruction efforts. As UN SRSG Swing stated in an interview following the first round of the elections: “The transition will finish with the installation of an elected President, but the tasks of the transition will continue, because at least 40 percent of the tasks are not completed.4” So far, in the course of 2006, the focus on the electoral process has overshadowed the urgent need for progress in the fields of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the reform of the security sector (SSR) (as was again demonstrated in the events following the publication of the electoral results). 3. THE ENGINE OF THE PROCESS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 1 Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). 2 These extensions proved necessary and even too short since the newly elected institutions will be installed at the end of 2006. 3 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, Pretoria, 16 December 2002. 4 Interview with SRSG Ambassador Swing on Saturday 9 September 2006, Radio Okapi as published on www.monuc.org. IRRI-KIIB - AFRICA POLICY & RESEARCH NOTES - #1 – THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION IN THE DRC – 18 OCTOBER 2006 3 Somewhat cynically, the main success of the transition government is its survival. The process was marred with a high number of political and security crises and had to operate in an exceptionally difficult institutional context. Keeping the transition on track has required a continuous reinforcement of the UN military presence throughout the country, mainly in the East. At crucial times, MONUC has received back-up by the EU (ARTEMIS5 and currently EUFOR RDC). Concepts for an additional African force (AU and CEEAC6) are on the shelf but remain largely theoretical, owing to practical and financial considerations. The main force behind the effective organization of the elections has been the often hands-on involvement of the international community, mainly through CIAT. The massive material support and the political pressure have proven fundamental. The registration of almost 26 million voters is rightly considered something of a miracle, considering the practical and logistical challenges that had to be met. The key factors pushing towards the elections were: the pressure of a population tired of 15 years of political crisis and the insistence of the international community. At least in the highly politicized capital of Kinshasa, this ‘partnership’ between the population and the international community had become increasingly strained in the tense period before the elections, as there was an increasing impression of partiality of the international community in favor of President Kabila. This feeling was strengthened and actively entertained by candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba and by the radical opposition around the UDPS. The EU and France were especially targeted by these accusations. The presence of EUFOR in Kinshasa remains ambivalent in this environment. The EU’s image seems to have ameliorated following the intervention in August, but the mood could swing quite rapidly. Unified on the strategic goals for the DRC transition, the international community demonstrates a lack of unity in the way and means to achieve these goals. The lack of unity and the competition between several of the major international players has caused considerable problems (and continues to do so). These divisions create the necessary room for the Congolese political class to play one partner against the other. It also diminishes the impact and spills a considerable part of the mobilized resources with a myriad of (coordination) structures, policies and concepts that are often contradictory, therefore blocking progress in several domains, including DDR and SSR. These divergences are likely to increase following the installation of the new government. The massive MONUC presence remains fundamental as the FARDC, PNC7 and several militia groups remain a very unstable factor and both SSR and DDR in the 5 The importance of the ARTEMIS operation cannot be overstated. The operation was deployed in Ituri District, where, although its area of operations was limited to the capital city of Bunia and immediate surroundings, it considerably augmented the stability. By its intervention ARTEMIS created the necessary time for the UN to reinforce the MONUC presence in the area and thus maintain its credibility in the region as MONUC ran the risk of being forced in the role of bystander during large scale human rights violations. The situation in Ituri, with its potential critical impact on the role and credibility of the UN came furthermore at a crucial moment in the peace process with the Transition authorities installed in June 2003.