Book. Submitted to Open Behavioral Genetics December 25, 2014 Published in Open Behavioral Genetics June 20, 2015 The Nature of Race John Fuerst1 Abstract: Racial constructionists, anti-naturalists, and anti-realists have challenged users of the biological race concept to provide and defend, from the perspective of biology, biological philosophy, and ethics, a biologically informed concept of race. In this paper, an onto- epistemology of biology is developed. What it is, by this, to be "biological real" and "biologically meaningful" and to represent a "biological natural division" is explained. Early 18th century race concepts are discussed in detail and are shown to be both sensible and not greatly dissimilar to modern concepts. A general biological race concept (GBRC) is developed. It is explained what the GBRC does and does not entail and how this concept unifies the plethora of specific ones, past and present. Other race concepts as developed in the philosophical literature are discussed in relation to the GBRC. The sense in which races are both real and natural is explained. Racial essentialism of the relational sort is shown to be coherent. Next, the GBRC is discussed in relation to anthropological discourse. Traditional human racial classifications are defended from common criticisms: historical incoherence, arbitrariness, cluster discordance, etc. Whether or not these traditional human races could qualify as taxa subspecies – or even species – is considered. It is argued that they could qualify as taxa subspecies by liberal readings of conventional standards. Further, it is pointed out that some species concepts potentially allow certain human populations to be designated as species. It is explained why, by conventional population genetic and statistical standards, genetic differences between major human racial groups are at least moderate. Behavioral genetic differences associated with human races are discussed in general and in specific. The matter of race differences in cognitive ability is briefly considered. Finally, the race concept is defended from various criticisms. First, logical and empirical critiques are dissected. These include: biological scientific, sociological, ontological, onto-epistemological, semantic, and teleological arguments. None are found to have any merit. Second, moral-based arguments are investigated in context to a general ethical frame and are counter-critiqued. Racial inequality, racial nepotism, and the “Racial Worldview" are discussed. What is dubbed the Anti-Racial Worldview is rejected on both empirical and moral grounds. Finally, an area of future investigation – the politics of the destruction of the race concept – is pointed to. Keywords: natural division, race, biology 11Corresponding author: [email protected] 1 Contents Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..4 I. Biology – A Philosophical Clarification……………………………………….………………..5 I-A. Existing Views: Confusions Abound I-B. Biological Concepts in General I-C. The Validity of Biological Concepts I-D. Biological Kinds I-E. Natural Biological Divisions I-F. Races as Natural Biological Divisions I-G. The Intraspecific Natural Division as Type of Biological Variation I-H. The Natural Division as a Taxonomic Unit I-I. Natural Divisions and Intraspecific Variation with Regards to the Subspecies Category I-J. Biologically Meaningful Race Concepts I-K. Biological Reality I-L. Biologically Important Differences I-M. Concepts of Biological Race II. The General Biological Race Concept………………………………………………………..25 II-A. The Genealogy of the Concept II-B. Semantic Complexities and the Evolution of the Race Concept II-C. Biological Race II-D. What the Core Biological Race Concept Does Not represent II-E. Races, Clines, Clusters? II-F. Clarification on the Meaning of "Arbitrary" and "Objective" in Context to Natural Divisions II-G. Regarding Different Definitions of Biological Race: What Races Need Not Be II-H. Genomic-Genealogical Complications II-I. Estimated Genomic Similarity: Some Ambiguity II-J. Race: Mixed and Undifferentiated II-K. Essential and Cluster classes; Fuzzy and Discrete Sets II-L. Sociological Clarifications III. The Ontology of Biological Race……………………………………………………………62 III-A. Other Defenses of Biological Race III-B. Biological Races and Biological Reality III-C. Thin Biological Racial Essentialism IV. The Races of Man…………………………………………………........................................81 IV-A. A Very Brief Historical Review IV-B. Human Biological Races and Scientific Consensus IV-C. Racial Classifications and Biological Race Concepts IV-D. Traditional human Races IV-E. THRs and Biologically Objective Races IV-F. THRs and Migration, Intermixing, and Ancient Admixture IV-G. THRs and Cluster Discordance 2 IV-H. THRs and Taxonomy IV-I. THRs and Subspecies IV-J. Are There Human Species? IV-K. "Significant" Racial Differences IV-L. Human Biodiversity (HBD) and Society IV-M. Race and Intelligence V. Critique of Anti-Biological Race Arguments……………………………………………….126 V-A. Anti-Biological Arguments V-B. Biological Scientific Arguments V-C. Sociological Arguments V-D. Unnaturalistic Arguments and the Numbers Game V-E. Onto-epistemology Arguments V-F. Semantic Arguments V-G. No-True-Race Arguments V-H. Teleological Argument: The Future of Race V.I. Can a Good Argument be Made Against (the) Race (concept)? VI. A Troublesome Inheritance?..................................................................................................148 VI-A. The Social Destruction of a Biological Reality VI-B. A Not So New Morality for Race VI-C. The Moral Critiques: Arguments based on Outcome Differences VI-D. The Moral Critiques: Arguments based on Racial Classification and Identity VI-E. The Moral Critiques: Arguments based on Racial Favoritism VI-F. The Moral Critiques: Arguments based on the “Racial Worldview” Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...169 References……………………………………………………………………………………...170 Fragaria virginiana ssp. virginiana & Fragaria virginiana ssp. grayana (Britton and Brown, 1913) 3 The task for race naturalists, then, is to develop a “biologically informed but non-essentialist concept of race – Hochman (2013) Introduction It is frequently asserted: firstly, that the word “race” is meaningless; secondly, that races are not, biologically speaking, real; thirdly, that while there do exist biological races in other animal species, there are none in ours; and finally, that any biological differences between the human races are meaningless in the grand scheme of things. It is infrequently acknowledged that the first through fourth statements can not all be true at the same time: if "race" is meaningless, it makes no sense to say that it is non-biological; if it is non- biological, it can not exist in nonhuman animals; and so on and so forth. Nevertheless, these four contrary claims, individually flawed as they are, are thought by many to constitute, in composite, an ironclad argument against any attempt to characterize certain divisions of Homo sapiens as biological races. (Presumably it is not yet considered „scientifically racist' to study biodiversity in other animal species, though we can not be sure. 2) There is, of course, an element of truth to all four of the stated claims: the word “race” indeed has no unique definition; anyone can deem that whatever genetically based differences exist between human populations are unimportant; there are race concepts which are fundamentally non-biological; and there are biological race concepts (frequently made of straw) by which there are no human biological races. All of this is true, and rather trivial, but since the statements are so often taken to mean something true and nontrivial – that there is no robust sense in which human biological races exist - we feel compelled to provide a precise conceptual framework for biological race. 2We use single quotes to signify that a term is unclear; some of the quoted passages, however, use double quotes to signify the same. We use double quotes to call to attention that we are referring to a term, not a concept. 4 Still, in the same way as we classify races and degenerations of horses and poultry, of pinks and tulips, so also, in addition, must we classify the varieties of mankind – Blumenbach (1806) I. Biology – A Philosophical Clarification I-A. Existing Views: Confusions Abound We must start by carving out a conceptual space for biologically real race. Regarding the panoply of existing views on race (and its biological reality, if any), we must confess to deep confusion. The least bewildering account may be that of philosopher Quayshawn Spencer (2012), which we quote simply to give a sense of the depths into which we are getting: Historically, “biological racial realism” has been interpreted in either one of two ways. One is “race is a natural kind in biology,” and the second is “race is a real biological kind.” However, race theorists adopt at least four different views about what a natural kind is. Let me begin with the natural kind views. First, some race theorists – such as Anthony Appiah (1996, 40), Robin Andreasen (2000, S655- S657), and Naomi Zack (2002, 4) – define a natural kind as an objectively real kind. A paradigm example is Andreasen‟s view. According to Andreasen (2000, S655), race must be a “natural kind” in order to be biologically real… Second, some race theorists – such as Edouard Machery (2005, 446) and Glasgow (2009, 81) – define a natural kind as an inductively useful kind in science. For example, Machery (2005, 445, 446)