ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM: FROM CHAOS TO FORMAL DIALECTIC The method of dialogue-tableaus as a tool in the theory of fallacy E.M. BARTH and J.L. MARTENS Introduction Surveying the field o f extant theories o f fallacy, under the guidance of C.L. Ha mb lin , (sent authors. I t became obvious to us that in this field in tu i- <tions reign supreme wh ile well-defined scientific distinctions )a reh raare,d an d suach d istinctions as are to be found are v e ry svagoue bindeed.e r Ai s nit tgurn s out, the problem is not that too little ehas bfeenf writeten cabout t fa llacies (wh ich was o u r first hunch), obut rathern that what has been writte n is quite unsystematic. tIn order hto get ane impressio n of the chaos that prevails here it pis sufficier nt t o cehoose a number o f introductory text-books -on logic and to compare their discussions of fallacies. Fo r an up-to-date a n d comprehensive description o f th is chaos le t us also refer to Hamblin's book, Fallacies, wh ich contains a wealth o f material. However, except f o r its last chapter fa l- lacies, too, contains little by way of theory, and only few sug- gestions of a historical nature as to how one might go about it developing one. A t th e outset th e fo llo win g considerations seem to us to be of the utmost importance: (1) Painstaking h isto rica l investigations o f t h e v ie ws o f fallacies which are to be found in philosophical literature from Aristotle till the present moment are needed, fo r the systematic suggestions th e y offer and also because con- temporary uses o f language are, as Russell said, ( 2 ( ) q s h o t ma1l d i a l )(2 ) Bertrand RUSSELL, Wis d o m o f t h e Wes t, Mac donald, London, 1959. e cCt i c » . i Ls t .a k He n A f M r B o L m I t N h , i F s a b l o l o a k c . i e s , M e t h u e n , L o n d o n , 1 9 7 0 . T h e e x p r e s s i o n « f o r - ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM 77 through wit h the fading hues o f past philosophic theor- ies» (p. 309). The questions that have to be asked there- fore co mp rise t h e fo llo win g : « I n wh a t w a y does (author) use the expressions 'argumentum a d hominem', 'petitio principir, 'non sequitur' ?» No realistic theory con- struction concerning fallacies i s t o b e expected i f th e history o f fallacies is bypassed. A n important contribu- tion t o th is historical wo rk as a p re limin a ry t o theory construction is th e above mentioned wo rk b y Hamblin. (2) Th e re is a lack of analytical tools for the task of analysing and classifying fallacies. That we have not yet got much in the wa y of a theory of rational argumentation is at least partly due to the shortage of instruments suitable for this task. Ou r contention is that in the field o f argumentation generally and mo re especially i n the sphere o f fa lla cy theory construction can profit from certain tools developed in (modern) f o rma l logic, viz, i n th e th e o ry o f the so - called logical constants. O u r wo rkin g hypothesis w i l l be that especially the dialogical set-up o f first-order predic- ate logic that we owe to P. Lorenzen (and in d ire ctly to E. W. Beth) w i l l be ve ry suitable as a starting point fo r further theory construction in the field o f argumentation. In fact the method of dialogue-tableaus is the first success- ful fragment o f a th e o ry o f discussion, since o th e r a t- tempts a t developing such a theory do n o t contain a n y definition of what it means to win or to lose a critical dis- cussion. In this paper we shall use these ideas as wo rkin g hypotheses in order — first goal — to cla rify what various authors have meant when saying that an argumentum ad hominem has been employed in a certain discussion. The following pages contain: I. an attempt to map the terminological differences we have found in the uses of the expression 'argumentum ad hominem'. We shall t ry to point out some constants in these uses and in the views that are expressed b y means o f them, an exposition of the main elements in the history of this 78 E. M. BARTH and J. L. MARTENS expression, b y means o f the framework offered in Lorenzen's dialogue-theory of logical constants, a conclusion, and IV. suggestions for further research. I. I n the literature we have investigated, at least four differ- ent meanings of the expression 'argumentum ad hominem' can be discerned: I. B y 'argumentum ad hominem' is meant a purely personal and direct attack; this is the wa y in which Beardsley, ( 3ney and Scheer, (4) Kahane, ( )5th eC exaprres-sion. I n the words o f Carney and Scheer (o.c., p. 2) 0):M i c h a l o s ( ' ) a Thne ad dhomin em fallacy (fallacy directed to the man) is P cuommrittetd whi enl thel con clusion of an argument states that ( a vie w is mistaken, and the reasons given f o r this con- 7 clusion amount to no more than a criticism of the person ) or persons maintaining the view. u s e Copi, ( 8'abusive argumentum ad hominem'. ) R e ( s1953c0. h )(e rNe M4w York, 1964. ( o)( CoJ5mp., Belmont, 1971. 9 n ra)( )woomH6o d Cliffs, 1970. a eo)( 1972. n CswA7 .Cal)( ' ) I rv ing M. Copi, Introduction t o Logic, second edition, Mac millan, Ne w dYork, 1 961. BAreR G ( ERdxi uYo9rk, 1969. ANKCc )( ") S.D. GUTTENPLAN and M. TAMNY, Logic, Basic Books, Ne w York , 1971. t REA.h t N e DYHMa i n SaAIr c LnNCd p h EdHL l o YR,A. l a ,iLP a n PcoOU s a rhgSR R ai,T n E crcI d S tdamL T C iSnpL U a cCdr, E maHCoL R n lEov , LEnig y I oRtni ( n g,egc t 1 iFmYa r 5 cupol o ) ,nouT d Pdrh c u raaRi a c emren l t neyak i l tnRsi o t ithon n h caeng t elti, i o -sonH s L Horga o a afi,r g n lLcPp i lo,re c ,gWer , Eian S ncdtn t g,sid . lMwcR M eaoe a wcr- r oMtH, t oihaN i dlPle n Clulw ' lab,Y s in!Eo P f,.nr r fgk e sl, s ,e -s , N e w ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM 79 2. B y 'argumentum a d hominem i s meant a n indirect o r direct attack on the person: Copi, ( a8nd Tamny. ("). E.g. (Copi, oc., pp. 54f): ) R e s c h e r ( D We may designate this fallacy on the first interpretation ) as tahe «anbusivde» va riety. I t is committed when, instead G uof trtyintg teo dnisprpovel thae tru th o f what is asserted, one n attacks the man who made the assertion The other interpretation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem, the «circumstantial» variety, pertains to the re- lationship between a person's beliefs a n d h is circu m- stances. Wh e re t wo men are disputing, one ma y ignore the question of whether his own contention is true or false and seek instead to prove that his opponent ought to ac- cept it because o f his opponents special circumstances. 3. A ve ry wid e meaning is assigned t o th is expression i f one says (in the words o f Whately, (") p. 200) th a t an argu- mentum a d hominem « is addressed t o th e peculiar circu m- stances, character, A V O WE D OPINIONS, o r past conduct o f the individual». To this definition corresponds the language used b y Whately himself (oc.), Hyslop ( 1 4. B y 'argumentum ad hominem' is meant an argument e x 1co ncaesnsis:d cp . JSchoophennhausert, ("o) Lnoceke (") and Perelman and (Olbre"chts-)Tytec. a (1. Locke says (o.c., Bk. 4, Ch. 17, §§ 19-21): (II )( YoR1rk, 1905. i2(") Henry W . JOHNSTONE J r., Philos ophy a n d Argument, Penns y lv ania Stac)t e UP., 1959. hJ(") A rt h u r SCHOPENHAUER, 'Eristische Dialek t ik : I n: De r Hands c hriftlic he Naachlass, vol. III, Waldemar Kramer, Frank furt 1 9 7 0 . rm( 1963. de1 Ws5(1 ts) Ch . PERELMAN a n d L . OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, Th e N e w Rhet oric — A TreH) atise on Argumentation, Univ ers ity of Not re Dame Press, Not re Dame, 196AYJ9. Trans lation of: Trait é de l'Argumentation, Presses Univ .