A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur Africa Action Report Released on September 9, 2006 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was produced by Africa Action, with partial support from American Jewish World Service (AJWS). The views and conclusions expressed in this report reflect those of Africa Action, and not necessarily those of AJWS. This Africa Action report was written by Ann-Louise Colgan, with valuable contributions from Diana Duarte. Additional research support was provided by Petra Stankard. Africa Action is the oldest Africa advocacy organization in the U.S. Its mission is to change U.S. Africa relations to promote political, economic and social justice in Africa. Africa Action provides accessible information and analysis, and mobilizes popular support for campaigns to achieve this mission. http://www.africaaction.org/ Cover photos courtesy of Ruth Messinger, AJWS. Introduction to assert its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. In 1994, an estimated 800,000 people died in This Africa Action report is released on Rwanda, as the U.S. and the international September 9, 2006 to mark the two-year community failed to mount an intervention to anniversary of the Bush Administration’s stop genocide. Senior U.S. officials later acknowledgement that what is happening in expressed regret, and acknowledged that this Darfur constitutes genocide. The passage of crime against humanity should have invoked a this anniversary and the continuation of the more urgent and active response. It is reported genocide in Darfur indicate the inadequacy of that President Bush reviewed a memo on the U.S. policies in response to this crisis. Rwandan genocide early in his presidency and wrote “Not on my Watch” in the margin of that document.1 Less than a decade after the Rwandan genocide, The United States and the U.S. was faced with another unfolding Genocide in Rwanda genocide in Africa, this time in Darfur, western Sudan. In early 2003, the government of Sudan In one hundred days of genocide, beginning in and its proxy militias unleashed a scorched earth April 1994, Rwanda experienced a death toll campaign, targeting civilians from three African with a speed and magnitude unparalleled in communities in Darfur and causing untold modern history. In a carefully planned and death and destruction. nearly successful attempt to eliminate the Tutsi minority, the Hutu-controlled government More than three years later, the Darfur genocide incited masses of the Hutu population to take is continuing on the Bush Administration’s up arms against those deemed enemies of the watch. The U.S. has again failed to take the state. As a result, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi action necessary to stop the violence and and moderate Hutu were killed.2 protect civilians from genocide. The dynamics are different on the ground and internationally, Today, the world recognizes the shamefully and the level of engagement among inadequate international response to the policymakers and the public is different in this genocide in Rwanda. The United Nations (UN) case, too. But the failure to stop genocide once observes a Day of Remembrance for this again is clear, and the outcome remains the genocide’s victims, and numerous world leaders same – the loss of hundreds of thousands of have repeated the mantra of “never again.” African lives as the world looks on. However, as the violence unfolded on the ground twelve years ago, the international This report by Africa Action identifies patterns community stood silently by, and key leaders in the U.S. response to the Rwandan genocide such as the United States maneuvered to avoid in 1994 and to the current genocide in Darfur, direct engagement and to limit any robust Sudan. It explores the similarities and response to stop the killing. differences in the reaction of U.S. policymakers and the American public, and it examines the important lessons the U.S. has yet to learn. What the U.S. Knew Finally, Africa Action lays out in this report the actions needed now from the U.S. to stop the During President Bill Clinton’s trip to Africa in genocide in Darfur. It underscores the 1998, he stopped in Kigali, Rwanda, to deliver possibility and necessity of a more urgent and an apology for not having done “as much as we effective U.S. response to this genocide, and the could” to stop the genocide in 1994. He obligation of the entire international community 1 A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur Africa Action Report announced to an audience at the Kigali airport, for U.S. officials in subsequent days warned of a [A]ll over the world there were people like me massive and impending “bloodbath”.8 Though sitting in offices, day after day after day, who fully briefed on the unfolding crisis, the Clinton did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed Administration took no action to halt the with which you were being engulfed by this growing violence, and instead began to lobby unimaginable terror.”3 for the withdrawal of the UN force in Rwanda.9 In fact, there exists a great deal of evidence to As it continued to monitor the situation, the suggest that detailed information on the scope State Department convened daily interagency of the genocide was indeed available to the U.S. meetings, also featuring representatives from – both before and during the massacres in the Pentagon, the National Security Council, Rwanda. Reports suggesting a high likelihood and the wider intelligence community.10 In the of massive ethnic violence had been available following weeks, U.S. intelligence and defense even during the early 1990s. reports repeated similar In January 1994, U.S. In the face of U.S. intelligence messages, warning of a intelligence analysts had worsening crisis and predicted that in case of reports confirming the rapidly growing death toll in renewed conflict in escalating violence in Rwanda, Rwanda. On April 26, 1994, Rwanda, “the worst-case the question was not one of an intelligence memo scenario would involve one U.S. inability to respond, but named individuals 4 half million people dying.” one of a lack of political will. responsible for organizing In the final analysis, even the violence and warned of these dire forecasts proved their intent to exterminate to be conservative. the Tutsi population. On May 9, 1994, a Defense Intelligence Agency report discounted On April 6, 1994, the same day that Rwandan the notion that these massacres were President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down spontaneous and instead pointed the finger at and the crisis began to unfold, Deputy Assistant the Rwandan government, which was clearly Secretary for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell targeting lists of people for destruction.11 drafted an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. In it, she warned that the During the weeks in which the genocide assassination could prompt an outbreak of unfolded, staff within the administration and in killings, and she urged the U.S. to appeal for the intelligence community were steadily calm.5 confronted with irrefutable evidence. The U.S. made an informed decision in choosing not to Within days, Joyce Leader, Deputy Chief of act to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Mission stationed in Rwanda, realized that a pattern of clear and systematic killing of Tutsi had emerged.6 Lists of the names of Tutsi and What the U.S. Did some Hutu targets had been compiled and distributed, and blocks were being set up along In a February 2004 interview, Madeleine the roads to check people’s identification papers Albright commented on her role at the time as and separate those who would be eliminated. the U.S. ambassador to the UN. She stated, “I have reviewed the record a lot, and I don't think Recognizing the extreme danger on the ground, actually that we could have done more. I just the U.S. made the decision to evacuate all wish that it had not been something that the American citizens from Rwanda. By April 10, international community was not capable of 1994, the U.S Ambassador to Rwanda David dealing with. So it's a huge regret.”12 Rawson and 250 American citizens had been evacuated from the country.7 Memos prepared 2 A Tale of Two Genocides: The Failed U.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur Africa Action Report It is clear, however, that the U.S. could indeed tactics to lessen the death toll. One suggestion have done more. In the face of U.S. intelligence was to jam the hateful radio transmissions, clearly demonstrating the rapidly escalating which were inciting the general population to violence, the question was not one of U.S. take up arms. This proposal was rejected as a inability to respond, but one of a lack of costly endeavor that would have too little political will. A great effort was made to ensure effect.17 that the U.S. would avoid any direct involvement, and particularly any military As the weeks of violence dragged on, U.S. commitment, in Rwanda. This priority not only officials consciously and consistently evaded the led to deliberate inaction on the part of the use of the term “genocide,” for fear of invoking Clinton Administration, but also to proactive a responsibility to act. Spokespeople for the blocking of international efforts to save lives. administration were challenged repeatedly on this question. They were, in fact, instructed as Under the pretext that the reputation of to the precise language approved for use by the peacekeeping was suffering due to recent public U.S. State Department. At the same time, a failures, the U.S.