Completion of the General Alliance (–) members of the Quadruple Alliance convened the Con- gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, they had agreed upon the basic legal principles of I European order. e diplomatic accords signed at the congress completed the settlement begun in Vienna and Paris by restoring France to its natural posi- tion as a great power in Europe. Since , much had been accomplished, and hopes ran high. Yet even as the French monarchy returned to full membership in European society, political uncertainty persisted in France and the German Confederation. Other un nished business that demanded the attention of the allies included mechanisms to retire the French debt and settle private claims against the French government, French claims against the supply o cers (com- missaires) of foreign governments, and claims of French citizens against foreign governments. Territorial and nancial arrangements between German rulers, particularly the dispute between the Kingdom of Bavaria and the Grand Duchy of Baden, also needed resolution, as did disagreements between Sweden and Denmark arising from the Treaty of Kiel (). e prisoner status of Napoleon Bonaparte, still considered a potential military danger, continued to arouse gen- eral concern, while the rights of Jews and reform of Jewish life largely a ected Britain and Germany. Finally, the slave trade, both legal and illegal, and threats to European peace and commerce from the Barbary states, technically under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte but regarded as pirates by the Europeans, remained on the allied agenda. In the protocols of the conferences held in Aix- la-Chapelle in the fall of ( September– November), the allies addressed all of these issues. By the time the allies met, di erences over the organization and obligations of the codi ed international order already had arisen, including the legal au- thority for the congress itself. e British government supported a narrow basis for the meeting, article of the Second Treaty of Paris, which called for a review of allied relations with France aer three years. A second source of authoriza- tion, reportedly preferred by British foreign secretary Robert Stewart, Viscount Completion of the General Alliance (–) Castlereagh, was article of the Quadruple Alliance, which provided for the convening of conferences and congresses to ensure the general repose of Europe. According to Henry Kissinger, British foreign policy, at least in the European arena, remained defensive and committed to the principle of non-interference in the internal a airs of other countries. Austrian foreign minister Clemens von Metternich, by contrast, opposed any changes to the restored order, and Emperor Alexander I, hoping to include second-order powers in future nego- tiations, favored a “treaty of guarantee” or Alliance Solidaire that would trigger collective action in the event of territorial aggression or internal revolutionary upheaval. e General Alliance of European States During the years of active warfare and diplomacy from to Emperor Alexander I never lost sight of the hard work and harsh realities of peacemaking in Europe. Despite moments of self-doubt and spiritual abandon, the Russian monarch showed himself to be a determined and pragmatic realist committed to military victory and security. An illustration of these dynamics appears in a report of June/ July , prepared for Alexander by Ioannis Kapodistrias, the co-minister of foreign a airs, and one of the liberals said to have inuenced his diplomacy. Aer describing the diplomatic principles followed by the Rus- sian government since the treaties of Paris had completed the work of paci - cation, the report analyzed critical questions to be discussed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Russian policy, Kapodistrias wrote, sought to preserve “the political relations of the European association under the conservative [conserva- teur] empire of the law of nations [le droit des gens].” Based on principles of truth, benevolence, moderation, and justice, the allied powers acted to enforce estab- lished treaties under the auspices, at least publicly, of concord, friendship, and trust. e meetings in Aix-la-Chapelle continued the political process begun in Vienna and Paris, the ultimate results of which could not be doubted. Simply put, the allied governments, enlightened by radiant experience, aimed to ensure the peace and prosperity of the world. In preparing the report, Kapodistrias claimed familiarity with all the o cial correspondence exchanged among the allies since , including the treaties and acts that preceded and accompanied these communications. In addition, the minister had reviewed the instructions sent to Russia’s diplomats and their reports to Saint Petersburg. Based on these sources, the author analyzed the relationship between Russian and allied pol- icies, particularly di erences in their understanding of the European system. Whereas Austria and Britain wanted to conduct negotiations on the author- ity of the Quadruple Alliance, Emperor Alexander predicated his positions on the fraternal and Christian alliance (a reference to the Holy Alliance, the general or European alliance, and the grand alliance). According to Kapodistrias, the monarch strove for unanimity, while insisting on strict adherence to treaty pre- scriptions. In order to appear impartial and disinterested, he preferred to hold diplomatic deliberations in regular and public forums. In other words, although Austria and Britain sought to limit decision making about general European policy to the Quadruple Alliance, Alexander envisioned a more inclusive process with the broad participation of all European states. e tension between Russia’s pursuit of unanimity and the allies’ tendency toward exclusivity appeared in discussions of multiple issues: participation of the Baden court in deciding the question of the Main-Tauber circle, the matter of Parma, and the accession of Spain to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. Another problem that Russia wanted to see addressed within the framework of the general alliance was the abolition of the slave trade. At conferences in London, Portugal and Spain had reached agreement with Britain on speci c measures to limit the trade. Russia adopted a similar approach by inviting the ministerial conference in Paris to negotiate liquidation of the French debt and reductions in the size of the occupa- tion force. By contrast, Austria, Britain, and Prussia all preferred that the four al- lies decide these matters before the opening of the congress in Aix-la-Chapelle. e consultations illustrated the critical question posed by Kapodistrias: did the exclusive Quadruple Alliance or the more inclusive general alliance consti- tute the foundation of the European political system? Kapodistrias believed that Austria and Britain favored the Quadruple Alliance and that Prussia’s policy remained uncertain. Russia, by contrast, supported a more open system rooted in legality and publicity. Why, Kapodistrias continued, did Vienna and London maintain such close relations? Russia’s enormous power and active role in European politics provided the principal explanation. During earlier negotiations in Vienna and Paris, the liberal ideas of Emperor Alexander had proven decisive in reconciling the French population to legitimate royal authority. e monarch’s inuence also had helped to solidify the independence and neutrality of Switzerland, restore the national existence of Poland, and ensure a better future for Europe. ese successes, combined with the Treaty of / September , had convinced the Austrian and British governments that Alexander sought and continued to seek universal domination. Although clearly absurd, this hypothesis encouraged the allies to separate Russia from France, Germany, Spain, and all the second-order Completion of the General Alliance (–) states. Action in the name of the Quadruple Alliance would make it easier to isolate Russia. For the moment these e orts had failed, and the allies had ac- cepted that France would participate in the meetings of Aix-la-Chapelle. Still, Kapodistrias concluded that while Austria’s interpretation of the Quadruple Alliance obligated Russia to accept allied policies, the governments of Berlin, London, and Vienna remained free to contract separate obligations and act in- dependently of the alliance. To bolster this argument, the co-minister described the goals of Austrian and British foreign policy as long-term subordination of France and Spain, dependence of the Netherlands and Portugal on Britain, and subjection of the Italian states to Austrian authority. Other actions designed to block Russian power included arming the German Confederation against Russia’s alleged projects of encroachment, the establishment of direct relations between the German Confederation and Ottoman Porte, intervention in the northern states, and nally, interference in Russia’s relations with the Persian and Ottoman empires. But, Kapodistrias insisted, despite the allies’ policies of distrust and jealousy, Russia’s intentions remained pure, its orientation merciful, and the conduct of its government frank and loyal. Kapodistrias also believed that at least until March Prussia had avoided the alliances of distrust and seemed committed to the principles of the Holy Alliance. A memorandum written by Prussian state counselor Johann Ancil- lon depicted the Treaty of / September as the source of a proposed general alliance. e general alliance would establish a collective