From Baie-Comeau to Chicago DEFENDING CANADIAN CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY Jeremy Kinsman Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan in the Rose Garden of the White House in 1984. Mulroney’s special relationship with Reagan, writes Jeremy Kinsman, was one reason Canada secured the cultural exemption in the FTA. White House photo Even before the free trade talks began in 1986, the Mulroney government defended Canadian cultural sovereignty in areas such as the Baie Comeau Policy on book publishing. In a major 1985 speech in Chicago, Brian Mulroney himself warned the Americans: “In Canada, we cast the net of cultural sovereignty more widely than you.” Both of Mulroney’s Communications ministers in that period, Flora MacDonald and Marcel Masse, were strong promoters of Canadian cultural in- dustries. Jeremy Kinsman, who then served as assistant deputy minister in that department, recalls how Mulroney finessed the issue with the Reagan administration and within his own government. Avant même le début des important discours prononcé étaient aussi de grands promo- pourparlers sur le libre- à Chicago, Brian Mulroney teurs des industries culturelles échange, en 1986, le gouver- lui-même prévenait ainsi les canadiennes. Jeremy Kinsman, nement Mulroney défendait Américains : « Au Canada, la alors sous-ministre adjoint la souveraineté culturelle du souveraineté culturelle a une de ce ministère, décrit com- Canada dans des domaines plus grande portée que chez ment Brian Mulroney a sub- comme l'édition, protégée vous. » Ses deux ministres tilement imposé la question par la politique de Baie-Co- des Communications, Flora à l'administration Reagan et à meau. Et dès 1985, dans un MacDonald et Marcel Masse, son propre gouvernement. 36 Inside Policy ~ The Magazine of The Macdonald-Laurier Institute lora MacDonald cancelled appointments and walked MacDonald’s predecessor as minister of Communications, F the beach alone in PEI. It was the summer of 1987 and the fiery and fiercely independent Quebec nationalist, Mar- the minister of Communications had gone to Charlottetown cel Masse, had been determined to help English Canadians to try to rescue another Canadian cultural institution on the do something about it. His solution wasn’t eternal subsidies ropes. But that wasn’t what was troubling this red Tory and for our feeble cultural producers but the creation of healthy Canadian nationalist. It was her fear that in integrating the cultural industries able to compete in an identifiable market Canadian and US economies via the proposed Free Trade for rights so as to have the means to re-invest in Canadians. Agreement, Simon Reisman and his gang of continentalists would give in to US counterparts and sink Canadian culture, he Mulroney government’s own inclusive culture and with it, Canadian identity. So, the night before, she had could not have been more different than that of the T phoned Prime Minister Mulroney and tried to resign. current top-down Canadian government culture whose al- Brian Mulroney hadn’t got to be PM by not listening. Any- most invisible ministers are trusted only with a “send” but- way, MacDonald was pushing against a mostly open door. ton for PMO messaging outward. Twenty-five years ago, The trade bureaucrats didn’t get it, but Mulroney’s political ministers were strong, visible, and on “receive”, expected to instincts had, from the start. As early as December 1985, he bring to Cabinet debate the views of their portfolio constitu- had told a University of Chicago audience at a conference encies. Masse and MacDonald spoke for the cultural com- hosted by Time magazine, “You will have to understand that munity. Ultimately, the Prime Minister came down one way what we call cultural sovereignty is as vital to our national life or another, but not before there was a thrashing out of op- as political sovereignty. In the United States you cast the net posing positions. of national security over more areas than we; in Canada, we cast the net of cultural sovereignty more widely than you.” There were huge fights in Cabinet Committee over the policy proposals from ministers of Communications to shore up the It’s not that Mulroney was a culture maven himself. It’s be- health of the identity-rich cultural industries. In publishing, cause he knew he would not find support for a Canada-US the Baie Comeau Policy in 1985 became a stand-out excep- Free Trade Agreement in vastly influential Toronto cultural industry/media circles if they figured it would sink Canadian tion to the otherwise much more permissive investor-friend- identity. ly regime Mulroney introduced for foreign takeovers of Ca- nadian companies to replace FIRA reviews and restrictions. Cultural sovereignty was overwhelmingly an English Cana- The policy exception startled US mega-publishers who were dian issue. In Quebec, they already had it. People watched used to treating Canada as a minor territory they owned. homegrown TV and bought local music by recognized Que- bec stars because the French language channeled it to a They rattled Congress and the White House, which rattled ready-made audience. the nerves of the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Allan Gotlieb, who railed against it to the PMO. In English-speaking Canada, it was hard for our TV networks to compete with the production values of the ubiquitous US entertainment industry, though at least the cable system per- mitted simulcasting for Canadian holders of rights for our The notion of creating a separate but fair own market, and protection of their ad revenue entitlement competitive Canadian market for film dis- from border TV station raptors. tribution policies drove Hollywood studio executives nuts: they saw it as the thin edge of a wedge against the American brand’s In publishing, the Baie Comeau Policy in most effective export and national promo- 1985 became a stand-out exception to the tion asset. otherwise much more permissive investor- friendly regime Mulroney introduced for foreign takeovers of Canadian companies to That was just the beginning. The notion of creating a sepa- replace FIRA reviews and restrictions. rate but fair competitive Canadian market for film distribu- tion policies drove Hollywood studio executives nuts: they saw it as the thin edge of a wedge against the American brand’s most effective export and national promotion as- here was no such Canadian rights market for pub- set. This meant that Jack Valenti and company from the Mo- lishing or film. Entitlements to distribute to Canadian T tion Picture Association of America had front-door entrée to film audiences and readers foreign product which dominated our market were owned by US film distribution and publish- the White House of Hollywood’s very own president. After ing giants as part of “North American” rights. While Canadian much heat and little light, Ronald Reagan delegated US ne- publishers and film distributors were the only ones likely to in- gotiations on the toxic issue to Gulf and Western, owners of vest in the development of Canadian talent, they couldn’t earn Paramount. To placate them, Mulroney took the file from enough revenue from the foreign-owned marketplace to do so. the dangerous Department of Communications people and handed it to cautious careerists in the Privy Council Office. Special Issue – October 2012 37 President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney at the Citadel in Quebec City at the conclusion of the Shamrock Summit in 1985. Montreal Gazette archives Some kind of compromise was worked out. But a strong Ca- our interests, which Mulroney, who functioned on the world nadian cultural sovereignty point had been made over this stage as a real leader, would have welcomed doing more of. issue and was generally politically defended. Cultural industries? Overall, they are sounder. Lawyers can split hairs over whether cultural policies are actually in every t was much less important than the biggest fight of all, sense “exempted” because US interests are still entitled to MacDonald’s “fight of her life”, over the fate of Cana- I “compensation” for restrictions they may face in Canada, but da’s right to have such policies under a Canada-US Free it isn’t an issue. The US seems to get what Mulroney was say- Trade Agreement. The US side said no. Our own bureau- cratic trade negotiators couldn’t themselves see any differ- ing in Chicago in 1985 about cultural sovereignty. ence between cultural producers and manufacturing. But MacDonald knew their importance for Canadian identity and wanted exemption for the cultural industries or she would Back when Conservatives could also be pro- be gone. gressive, the Mulroney government was the John Turner called opposing the FTA in the 1988 election most generous in our history to culture and the fight of his life. But Mulroney sided with MacDonald on the arts, and committed to positioning Cana- cultural sovereignty, blunted Turner’s argument, and won a dian creators in a better place to earn a living. second majority. Outcomes? Flora MacDonald lost her parliamentary seat in Kingston where her heroic defence of Canadian identity had The centrepiece of the Mulroney Government’s cultural no sway over an Eastern Ontario political backlash for local industry policy, the Broadcasting Bill introduced by Flora reasons. She was replaced as minister by her predecessor, MacDonald in June 1988 (passed by the next Parliament), Marcel Masse, who continued to agitate and annoy on cul- strengthened the private networks and should have strength- ture’s behalf. ened CBC as the mandated central instrument to “inform, The film distribution policy died on the order paper in the enlighten, and entertain” Canadians but a lot of things went next Parliament. Cynics concluded pro-culture policies were wrong there and what we have now is a pallid mediocrity as being dumped now the election and the FTA were in the bag.