DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY, 1948 - 1954: FROM NEUTRALITY TO COMMITMENT Submitted by William David Eustratios Mallinson for the Degree of PhD. London School of Economics and Political Science 1990 UMI Number: U048314 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U048314 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 This thesis aims to explain why and how the Netherlands came to form part of the post-war Western security system and to support he rearmament of West Germany. It looks critically at how major post-war developments in Europe affected Dutch foreign policy, traditionally one of abstentionism, and considers the extent of Dutch influence in post-war Western co­ operation. The Dutch attitude towards the process of German rearmament and to the Netherlands’ own security needs is described and analysed. The considerable problems the Dutch had with Britain and the Unites States over Indonesia and the German question, and with Britain and the “European question”, are set out and analysed, as are important aspects of Dutch-German relations, particularly the “annexation question” and trade. Important landmarks, and how the Dutch approached them, are dealt with. These are the Marshall Plan, the Bmssels Treaty Organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan. The different attitudes of two Foreign Ministers, Dirk Stikker and Willem Beyen, towards the question of European integration, are analysed. The thesis concludes that Beyen laid less stress on the Atlantic partnership than did Stikker, and considerably more on European integration. Its final conclusion is that the Netherlands, although it decided to be a part of an alliance, still retained sufficient independence to influence events. Tm eses F 676 ^ (V THANKS My thanks are due to my supervisor, Alan Sked (for his sense of timing and objectivity), Messrs. Robert Bos, Poulisse and other members of the Archive Department of the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for their friendliness and co-operation), Mr Sierk Plantinga of the Royal Archives (for his contacts, help and sense of humour), Mrs van Anrooij, also of the Royal Archives (for her thoughtfulness), Mr Khan at the Second Chamber Archives (for his interest), Friso Wielenga (for access to his newspaper cuttings). Professor Spits (for some early and important guidance), J M and W Drees (for their memory, brotherhood and sense of family), K H Beyen (for his memory and sense of family). Professor Ernst van der Beugel (for his eclecticism and sense of humour). Dr H N Boon (for his earnestness), Jan Hoffenaar (for his powers of analysis). Dr Luns (for his consistency and frankness), Anne Mackintosh of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (for her patience and dexterity), Anne Amboorallee of the Dorset Business School, Bournemouth Polytechnic (for her tolerance, dexterity and professionalism). Dr Bruning of Swansea University (for her fine balance of detailed scholarship and social understanding), and Heather Yasamee of Library and Records Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (for her sense of political balance). I also thank the Netherlands for being a country of contrasts in harmony, and Catherine and David Mallinson for their perfect mixture of tolerance, patience, understanding, artisticness and loyalty. DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY, 1948-1954: FROM NEUTRALITY TO COMMITMENT Page INTRODUCTION 8 CHAPTER I SETTING THE SCENE 1.1 The Nature of Netherlands Neutrality 12 1.2 The German Problem and the Effects of the War 17 1.3 The Commercial Question 23 1.4 Dutch Territorial and other Claims on Germany 25 1.5 The Indonesian Factor 34 1.6 The Role of National Characteristics 40 1.7 Conclusion 42 CHAPTER 11 EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS AND THE GERMAN QUESTION: THE DUTCH APPROACH 2.1 Introduction 51 2.2 The Netherlands and Europe 51 2.3 Marshall Aid and the Dutch Dilemma 5 3 2.4 Dutch Claims and Frustrations 60 2.5 European Unity 67 2.6 Conclusion 69 CHAPTER m THE QUESTION OF SECURITY AND THE BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANISATION 3.1 Introduction 74 3.2 The Indonesian Thom 76 3.3 The Path to the Brussels Treaty 79 3.4 The Brussels Treaty - a way of being heard? 83 3.5 Conclusion 86 CHAPTER IV THE NORTH ATLANTIC ROAD 4.1 Introduction 91 4.2 Lip Service - The Dutch Position on NATO? 94 4.3 The Indonesian Complication 99 4.4 The Dutch Atlantic Attitude 105 4.5 Conclusion 107 CHAPTER V FROM THE ATLANTIC TO EUROPE 5.1 Introduction 114 5.2 Dutch Restraint 115 5.3 The British Information Campaign 118 5.4 Slow Realisation of Harsh Realities and Defence Problems 123 5.5 Trade before Ideology 132 5.6 Germany and NATO 134 5.7 The European Angle 141 5.8 Conclusion 144 CHAPTER VI WHOSE EUROPE? 6.1 Introduction 154 6.2 The Council of Europe - a weak beginning. 155 6.3 The Schuman Plan 160 6.4 The Stikker Plan and the British 168 6.5 Conclusion 171 CHAPTER Vn - WHOSE DEFENCE? 7.1 Introduction 179 7.2 The Pleven Plan 182 7.3 The Dutch View 185 7.4 The British Disappointment 194 7.5 Conclusion 199 CHAPTER Vm - THE ROAD TO A STANDING ARMY 8.1 Introduction 206 8.2 The Resignation of the Government 207 8.3 External Pressures and Dutch Indignation 213 8.4 Stikker’s Crisis 216 8.5 The British and American View 218 8.6 Conclusion 222 CHAPTER IX - TOWARDS COMMITMENT 9.1 Introduction 228 9.2 Reluctant Participants 229 9.3 The Dutch Blindness 231 9.4 Germany and NATO 235 9.5 A New Enthusiasm for Europe 237 9.6 Defence - Less Enthusiasm 244 9.7 Conclusion 245 CHAPTER X - THE EUROPEAN ANSWER 10.1 Introduction 251 10.2 Germany and Commercial Precedence 251 10.3 Dutch - British Relations 253 10.4 EDC Enthusiasm - The Shining Example 256 10.5 Security through Europe 259 10.6 No Divorce because of the Children 263 10.7 Conclusion 264 CHAPTER XI - THE LAST LAUGH 11.1 Introduction 270 11.2 The Dutch, Europe and the EDC 271 11.3 The German Angle 274 11.4 Between EDC and NATO 278 11.5 Back to NATO 281 11.6 Conclusion CHAPTER XII - CONCLUSIONS 291 APPENDIX A. List of missing and unavailable files in the Public Records Office 302 ARCmVALIA 303 INTERVIEWS 305 PUBLISHED MATERIAL 306 PUBLISHED ARTICLES 307 BACKGROUND READING 312 DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY, 1948-1954: FROM NEUTRALITY TO COMMITMENT INTRODUCTION This thesis aims to explain why and how the Dutch came to form part of the Western security system and to support the rearmament of West Germany. Its starting point is that the Netherlands - that is, the area remaining after the secession of Belgium in 1831 - has never been neutral in the strict sense of the word, but has rather tried to pursue independence in its foreign policy, by playing a balancing game. It will describe and evaluate the main influences, internal and external, that led the Dutch towards direct involvement in military alliances. Finally, it will evaluate the extent to which Dutch membership of NATO has affected the country’s traditionally independent stance and freedom of action. Large and strong powers sometimes oversimplify and misunderstand the foreign policy objectives of small ones; on occasion, they even ignore them. At various times in their history, right up to today, the Dutch have been labelled obstinate, greedy, naive, religious-minded and idealistic. Quite often, the labels have been attached to explain away behaviour which the critic has not fully understood. The Dutch certainly do appear contradictory to outside observers. In the words of one eminent non-Dutch observer, the Dutch are fond of freedom, yet servile to convention, republican by nature and yet monarchy-loving, tolerant but fanatic, and both materialistic yet religious.' It is puzzling that a country that pursues independence in its foreign policy, despite post-war security constraints, still pays homage to the Spanish king in its national anthem^ , an example of yet another apparent contradiction; being both traditional and progressive. Perhaps, as one respected Dutch authority has said, the Dutch are caught between dreams and reality.^ Their foreign policy is certainly no exception; subsequent chapters will illustrate clearly numerous examples of how the Dutch, in their foreign policy formulation, have been caught between ideals and realities; more directly put, between love of law and religion, and love of trade and money. The thesis will explain many apparent foreign policy contradictions; why did the Netherlands, humiliated and badly treated by Germany, come to push for German rearmament? Why did the Dutch, on the one hand, set an example to Europe through the establishment of the Benelux Customs Union, an example that caught the imagination of the Americans,'* yet, on the other, fight against anything that smacked of supra-nationalism? Why were they the first country to ratify the EDC treaty, when they had been against the idea at the beginning? The thesis will attempt to assess the extent of external pressures. The Indonesian question, insofar as it affected Dutch foreign policy formulation, will be analysed, particularly since there is evidence that it adversely affected relations between the Netherlands and the UK and USA on the one hand, and between the UK and USA on the other.