PolicyBrief Policy Brief | 06.2017 The Visegrad Countries and “Post-Truth” Who is Responsible for Delivering the Kremlin’s Narrative to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland? Łukasz Wenerski Introduction style propaganda. On the contrary, the Russian propaganda machine has been The Russian Federation’s disinformation operating for years. The Kremlin had never campaign, implemented to justify its really decided to drop it entirely, and by aggressive policy towards Ukraine, has implementing new methods and tools (such made many analysts, politicians and regular as social media), propaganda has evolved citizens aware that the Kremlin has been to a whole new level. deliberately and cleverly exploiting propaganda mechanisms for its own The Kremlin’s disinformation methods create purposes. Incidents and occurrences such an effective model of geopolitical influence. as the Crimean annexation propaganda and Russian propaganda distorts the perception the war in Donbas have led to the eye- of people, events and even entire institutions opening conclusion that the Kremlin’s (the EU, NATO). The results are impressive: activities are not a return to typical Soviet- propaganda has created an alternative The Visegrad Countries and “Post-Truth“ | page 2 version of events at the Euromaidan (the Poland seizure of power by fascists), the war in In general, the Russian narrative does not Donbas (internal conflict in Ukraine) and have a substantial influence on the views of Syria (Americans supporting ISIS to mainstream Polish politicians and the media, eliminate Bashar al-Assad). This and consequently, on society. More disinformation destabilizes the political specifically, it fails to generate positive situation in many countries by supporting attitudes toward the Kremlin’s domestic and one political faction and simultaneously foreign policies, and toward Vladimir Putin in discrediting others. Recent cases included particular. It has also failed in convincing the presidential elections in the United Poles en masse that Russia is not to be States and France, as well as the blamed for the conflict in Ukraine. parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. Similar disinformation campaigns are Due to the fact that Russian propaganda expected for the German parliamentary cannot make any significant progress in elections later this year. improving the image of Putin or Russia among Poles, improving the Kremlin’s image The following report describes Russian is not high on Russia’s agenda. Instead, the disinformation in the Visegrad countries. priority lies in introducing and moderating The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and topics which, at first glance, might not seem Slovakia, all formerly part of the Eastern to have anything to do with Russia, but Bloc, have all become the targets and which ultimately serve to strengthen victims of the Kremlin’s information warfare. Russia’s position in the region and weaken Putin’s regime exploits various narratives to Poland’s by provoking internal arguments achieve its goals in the Visegrad countries. It within society and tensions with neighboring elicits hatred towards the EU, USA and countries. Polish-Ukrainian relations are the NATO, encourages conflict with bordering number one topic being exploited as part of nations and perpetuates the negative image the general Russian media strategy in of the “other” (the Roma minority, Poland after the Crimean conflict. Though Ukrainians, refugees). complex, the Russian narrative tries to The text of this policy brief presents the reduce those relations to the level of main narratives of the Kremlin’s propaganda primitive disputes revolving around historical among the Visegrad countries, but first and guilt and the way that historical differences foremost, it reveals important entities surface today. The Russian narrative also (people and organizations) that stand behind attacks Ukrainian migration to Poland, the Kremlin’s narrative in each of the threatening Poles with Ukrainians taking respective countries. Although some of them their jobs and causing wage stagnation. may, indeed, be Moscow agents, many Other topics include anti-Americanism, simply follow the Kremlin’s agenda because criticism of NATO and the EU and they actually believe the propaganda that resentment towards Germany. they share and/or create. The people, political parties, NGOs, paramilitary movements and media mentioned in this Politics report do not constitute the full list of entities The pro-Russian narrative in the Polish that may be considered pro-Russian. In political system is mostly present outside the many cases, however, they are among the Polish parliament. The most obvious most recognizable ones. example of Russian influence is the work of the Change (Zmiana) party. The self- The Visegrad Countries and “Post-Truth“ | page 3 proclaimed (on its website) “first non- Russia, and even considers Ramzan American political party” (the Polish court Kadyrov, leader of the Chechen Republic, to has not allowed it to register as a political be a “reasonable person” with liberal party) was established by Mateusz economic views – which are always Piskorski, a former member of the Polish appreciated in Korwin-Mikke’s political parliament from the Self-Defence party environment. He is not considered an agent (Samoobrona). Piskorski aligned himself of the Kremlin or a monetary beneficiary of closely with the Kremlin’s agenda during the Russia, but his political views in many cases Crimean conflict. As he stated in 2014: perfectly reflect Russia’s standpoints. [Ukraine] is a collapsed state. Once the West, including Poland, backed Organizations and paramilitary Bandera’s supporters in Ukraine, the country was thrown into chaos […] The movements people of Crimea have been pro-Russian The pro-Russian narrative is propagated in for a long time, and they are afraid of the Poland by organizations that operate on Banderists. We should be afraid as well. many levels to communicate with their Piskorski became very popular in the audiences. The European Center of Russian media and was invited under Geopolitical Analysis (ECAG) is a Polish friendly circumstances as a prominent Polish think tank that has repeatedly been accused politician or political expert to comment on of propagating the Russian narrative in events in Ukraine from a “Polish” Poland. The recent “Laundromat” scandal perspective. He also participated in revealed that ECAG received €27,685 from monitoring the election in Crimea. In May the UK company Crystalord Limited for 2016, Piskorski was detained by Polish “consulting services,” proving a direct prosecutors under the suspicion of spying financial link between Russian stakeholders for Russia and possibly China. (or “dirty money”) and the organization’s activity between 2012 and 2014. Members Another figure representing a pro-Russian narrative is Janusz Korwin-Mikke, MEP of ECAG organized or participated in and the leader of the Freedom party. In the monitoring missions in the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, Ossetia, Transnistria, last election, Freedom (at the time known as and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in KORWiN) received 4.76% of the vote, only Belarus and Syria, countries governed by 0.24% away from entering the Polish authoritarian regimes. In 2011, ECAG parliament. Korwin-Mikke, as a member of members (including Piskorski) visited Libya the European Parliament, has libertarian and took part in a propagandist conference economic views and strong anti-EU organized by Muammar Gaddafi. In 2013, sentiments. He openly claims that his they went to Syria (on the invitation of the mission in the European Parliament is to Assad regime) to monitor the civil war destroy the European Union. When it comes situation in the country. Officially to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Korwin-Mikke representing ECAG, Piskorski gave supports the annexation of Crimea. He also interviews to the Russian media in which he considers Ukraine to be a threat and an attempted to convince the Russian audience enemy of Poland, while claiming that that the Euromaidan was a provocation by Russia, “being an enemy of our enemy (i.e., Ukraine), is now our ally.” Korwin-Mikke has Western politicians and NGOs. expressed his positive attitude towards Putin Outside of the mainstream, numerous fringe by claiming that he is a great leader for organizations also spread the Russian The Visegrad Countries and “Post-Truth“ | page 4 narrative in Poland. Most of these groups political scene. Praising not only communist are ideologically far-right, though some Poland, but even Stalinism in the Soviet extreme-left groups exist as well. Union, this organization tends to represent a fringe ideology that has extremely little Falanga is a Polish organization that took its support among Poles. However, the name from the Polish fascist movement that Communist Youth of Poland were also existed in Poland before the Second World among the founding members of the War. Falanga is notable for its anti-NATO Change political party. The only potentially views, including its stance against deploying noteworthy member of the organization is NATO or US troops in Poland. The head of Ludmiła Dobrzyniecka, leader of the group. the organization is Bartosz Bekier, who used She holds a favorable view of Stalin’s to visit the occupied territories in Donbas dictatorship and sees him as a great leader. presenting himself as a journalist who Most importantly, Dobrzyniecka has left strongly supported the separatists. Some of Poland to fight in Donbas on the side of pro- his actions include giving a speech at a rally Russian separatists in the Luhansk People's in Donetsk back in 2014, in which he Republic. She is currently a member of the claimed to represent “free Poles who are Interunit international brigade. against the ‘terrorist’ NATO bases in Poland.” He protested at the Ukrainian embassy in Warsaw surrounded by flags of Media the DNR and the LNR, boasting the slogan “Save the people of Novorossiya from the Facebook and other designated websites Ukrainian army.” Falanga has a quasi- are the main channels used to reach the paralimitary unit with which it organized anti- Polish audience.