CATASTROPHE AND STATE BUILDING: LESSONS FROM CHILE´S SEISMIC HISTORY Magdalena Gil-Ureta Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2016 © 2016 Magdalena Gil-Ureta All rights reserved ABSTRACT Catastrophe and State-Building: Lessons from Chile´s Seismic History Magdalena Gil-Ureta Catastrophes are usually seen as a threat to a country’s stability and progress. Some countries are regarded as prepared to face them and ready to deal with the consequences, but still, a disaster is always presented at the very least as an inconvenience. Contrary to this line of thinking, this dissertation shows that catastrophes can present an opportunity for state-building. Catastrophes, and the profound sense of insecurity they cause, force institutions to demonstrate their adeptness, or change. Specifically, catastrophes challenge state power because they test its basic role as protector from physical harm. Consequently, when disaster happens the state is put to the test. States that arise triumphant from this challenge may use the opportunity to increase its strength and develop new capacities. However, I will start by acknowledging that the state has not always been regarded as responsible for catastrophe and its consequences. Before modernity, responsibility for catastrophe was in God´s hands. But as culture evolves, this responsibility has been transferred from God to society, and specifically to the state. Today, we understand that disasters are a consequence of our own decisions, and therefore we are responsible for its consequences. In this context, demands to the state in terms of risk management and recovery have increased steadily during the twentieth century. And as a result, the state has been forced to find new ways to respond to these new challenges. With this in mind, this project explores the relationship between catastrophes and the development of the Chilean state. I understand catastrophe as a type of event, usually unexpected and sudden, that prompts widespread destruction in a significant part of the territory of a state; sharply affecting most, if not all, everyday social, economic and political functions. I understand state-building as the process of increasing the administrative, fiscal and coercive capacity of states to interact constructively with their societies and to pursue public goals more effectively. My argument is that catastrophes and the process of dealing with their consequences can unleash mechanisms of state-building similar to what has been argued for the case of Western Europe and the effects of war (Tilly 1985, 1990). To prove this, I use historical methods to look closely at Chile’s history of repeated catastrophes prompted by earthquakes using theories of wars as an analogy. This allows me to build a theory based on cross-case comparison, finding structurally equivalent pairs, instead of classical historical comparison that search for similarities and differences across similar cases (Vaughan 2014). Catastrophes are similar to wars in that they constitute a threat to the population; and also, because they both leave destruction and victims in their wake. Since the basic role of the state is to control internal and external threats protecting their citizens from harm both wars and catastrophes demand state´s intervention. Paraphrasing Tilly, I show that “states make catastrophe and catastrophe makes states.” First, the sociology of risk allows us to understand that catastrophes are not an external event but one created by society, and specifically, by decisions taken by states. And then, I show that both risk management and the process of dealing with disaster´s consequences can led to state building. In my example, it is clear that earthquakes have caused the Chilean state to organize, to improve the capacity of its administration, to strengthen its control and establish new relationships with Chilean society. Overall, I argue that in the Chilean case catastrophe has led to an increase in state capacities; and these institutional developments work for the benefit of the Chilean state not only in case of emergencies but in everyday life. This happens because catastrophes are windows of opportunity to effect change. They present themselves as momentous occurrences; events where decisions matter more than in normal times. Destruction means that some things have to start from scratch and, in this context, efforts to go “back to normal” rarely mean exactly that. Instead, power-holders have the possibility to set institutions in new directions and define the path that the state is going to take in the next period. In this line, it is another conclusion of this dissertation that ideas do matter. They matter because they define problems, and as a consequence they determine the solutions that are open to decision makers. Consequently, the notions and ideologies of power-holders are of great importance to determine what happens after disaster, even if they cannot always do as they please. Also, the ideologies of money-lenders matter a great deal. As Leander (2003) has shown, international organizations have affected the way wars are being held in the developing world. Similarly, my research shows that they can have an important role in setting the path reconstruction is going to take. Taking all this into account, I argue that the effect of catastrophe on state building can work through at least two mechanisms: imposing certain needs and being invoked to achieve political goals. For one side, the catastrophe has its own agenda. Because of the tragedy, a strong state is needed; or as a minimum, a state that is able to manage the emergency and oversee reconstruction. Also, the earthquake creates new needs in the areas of infrastructure, health, transportation, among others. And this is, most of the times, a task for the state. On the other side, the second mechanism is political; catastrophes are used by the government as an excuse to push all kind of agendas ahead. And it is when these two mechanisms work together in the same direction that the effect of the earthquake in state capacities will be significantly greater. Nevertheless, we know that it takes a minimally strong state to profit from wars; weak states might just disappear into chaos. Similarly, if the state cannot survive catastrophe it will not be able to strengthen afterwards. For example, this is the case of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince. It can be argued, then, that more than a stimulant wars and catastrophes are a test for the state. They challenge state power and at the same time generate a strong necessity for state intervention. Weak states might just disappear into chaos, but minimally strong states can profit from that situation, using it to increase its capacities in order to both prevent and manage disasters. Table of Contents List of Charts, Graphics and Illustrations……………………………………………….ii Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….iii Dedication……………………………………………………………………………...iv Introduction | Catastrophe and the State: Lessons from Chile´s Seismic History……..1 Chapter 1 | Theorizing Catastrophe and the State…………………………………..21 Chapter 2 | Cultural Shifts…………………………………………………………..51 Chapter 3 | Political Aftershocks……………………………………………………82 Chapter 4 | Institutional Legacies………………………………………………….150 Chapter 5 | Epilogue: the 2010 Maule Earthquake………………………………...202 Conclusions | Catastrophe and the State……………………………………………...223 References…………………………………………………………………………….231 i List of Charts, Graphics and Illustrations Chart 1: Major Disasters and Catastrophes in Chilean History 17 Chart 2: Structure of fiscal income 1905-1912 192 Chart 3: Structure of fiscal income 1938-1943 194 Chart 4: Structure of fiscal income 1959-1964 197 Chart 5: Fiscal Roads 1903-1912 200 Chart 6: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 201 Chart 7: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 202 Graph 1: Number of Police 1985-1941 157 Graph 2: Number of Police 1956-1962 158 Graph 3: Fiscal Roads 1903-1912 200 Graph 4: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 201 Graph 5: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 202 Illustration 1: Distribution of earthquakes in space 15 Illustration 2: Distribution of earthquakes in time 16 Illustration 3: Theoretical Model 46 Illustration 4: Different plans for Valparaíso 102 Illustration 5: Different plans for Chillán 124 Illustration 6: Different plans for Valdivia 142 Illustration 7: Resilience en Chilean Imaginary 221 Illustration 8: Mechanisms linking Catastrophe and State Building 228 ii Acknowledgements This dissertation benefited from the help of many academics, colleagues, family and friends. I thank specially to my adviser, Karen Barkey, without her nothing of this would have been possible. During this time she has been my professor, my cheerleader and, I hope, my friend. I also own thanks to the members of my committee; Diane Vaughan and Josh Whitford who were always there for me. I am similarly grateful to my classmates for their comments at the Graduate Students workshop. To my friends in New York, without you I would have gone crazy in a month. To my friends in Chile, without you I would have finish much sooner (but less happy). And finally I need to thank my family, who have not only supported me one hundred percent but have also put up with me in my darkest dissertation moments. Gracias totales! iii To Vlad iv INTRODUCTION | Catastrophe and the State: Lessons from Chile´s Seismic History “Earthquakes alone are sufficient to destroy the prosperity of any country. If beneath England the now inert subterranean forces should exert those powers, which most assuredly in former geological ages they have exerted, how completely would the entire condition of the country be changed! (...) England would at once be bankrupt; all papers, records, and accounts would from that moment be lost. Government being unable to collect the taxes, and failing to maintain its authority, the hand of violence and rapine would remain uncontrolled. In every large town famine would go forth, pestilence and death following in its train.” Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle, 1909: 323.