Asset Specificity and Network Control of Television Programs A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University By Daniel Lin Bachelor of Arts University of California at Los Angeles, 1994 Director: Donald J. Boudreaux, Professor Department of Economics Fall Semester 2007 George Mason University Fairfax, VA DEDICATION This is dedicated to my loving wife Lee (whose advice and support were essential to the completion of this dissertation) and to my wonderful daughter Sasha (whose unending desire for Curious George stories nearly brought this dissertation to its knees). ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the following people for helpful comments and discussion – Jerry Ellig, Russell Roberts, and participants of the Robert A. Levy Fellows Workshop at the George Mason University School of Law. Thanks are also due to my committee members – Donald Boudreaux, Peter Boettke, and Bruce Johnsen – for their suggestions and guidance. I am grateful for financial support from the Center for Market Processes, the Earhart Foundation, and George Mason University. Finally, I would like to thank Gary Galles of Pepperdine University for sparking my interest in economics and encouraging me to pursue a doctorate. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………v List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………vi Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………vii 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 1.1 Dissertation Objective………………………………………………………………………………1 1.2 Optimal Governance Structures……………………………………………………………1 1.3 Dissertation Organization………………………………………………………………………3 2. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 2.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Firm………………………………………………………5 2.2 Coase and Transaction Costs…………………………………………………………………9 2.3 Transaction-Cost Theory…………………………………………………………………………13 2.4 Alternative Theories of the Firm…………………………………………………30 2.5 Case Studies………………………………………………………………………………………………………38 3. History of the Television Industry……………………………………………………… 47 3.1 The Production Process……………………………………………………………………………47 3.2 The Rise of Television Networks……………………………………………………50 3.3 Advertiser-Controlled Programs………………………………………………………59 3.4 Network-Controlled Programs………………………………………………………………63 3.5 Regulation of Network Television…………………………………………………72 4. Historical Change and Optimal Governance Structure…………… 83 4.1 Audience Flow and Asset Specificity…………………………………………83 4.2 Illustrative Example ……………………………………………………………………………101 4.3 Evolution in Contract Design…………………………………………………………108 5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 121 5.1 Summary of Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………121 5.2 Avenues for Future Research …………………………………………………………123 List of References………………………………………………………………………………………………………126 iv LIST OF TABLES Table Page 3.1 Theatrical Admissions and Movie Theaters…………………………………… 80 3.2 Source of All Network Programs……………………………………………………………… 81 3.3 Network Shows and Number of Sponsors……………………………………………… 82 4.1 Number of Affiliate Stations Per Network………………………………… 119 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 4.1 ABC Prime-Time Network Schedule, 1960-61 Season……………… 120 vi ABSTRACT ASSET SPECIFICITY AND NETWORK CONTROL OF TELEVISION PROGRAMS Daniel Lin, Ph.D. George Mason University, 2007 Dissertation Director: Dr. Donald J. Boudreaux This dissertation uses transaction-cost theories to explain the shift from advertiser control to network control of programs in the 1950s television industry. In the late 1940s, ratings data revealed that the audience for one program tended to flow into neighboring programs. This paper proposes that the threat of ex-post opportunism discouraged advertisers from making the necessary ex-ante investments to exploit audience flow. The networks were better positioned to constrain the opportunism by consolidating the control rights to production and scheduling, increasing the contract duration with key production personnel, and placing more contractual restrictions on producers. 1. Introduction 1.1 Dissertation Objective Before the 1950s, advertisers controlled the production and scheduling of most network television programs, and contractual relationships were primarily guided by short-term contracts with few restrictions on producers. After the 1950s, networks controlled the production and scheduling of most network television programs, and contractual relationships were increasingly guided by long-term contracts with more restrictions on producers. This dissertation uses transaction-cost theory to explain the economic motivations for the changes in governance structures during in the television industry. 1.2 Optimal Governance Structures In some transactions, the parties can increase the gains from trade by tailoring the exchanged asset to each others’ needs. Such tailoring increases the asset’s value for that specific transaction, while decreasing it for all other transactions. If this tailoring requires 1 relationship-specific investments that can be costlessly recovered, then the parties make the investments without fear of being locked into an idiosyncratic exchange. Either party can respond to the threat of opportunism by recovering its investments and dissolving the relationship. However, if the relationship-specific investments are costly to recover, then the parties are vulnerable to opportunism after the investments are made. Therefore, the parties are reluctant to make the investments, and the additional gains from trade are foregone. There are two ways to encourage parties to make non- recoverable, relationship-specific investments. One is long-term contracts. Another is consolidation of control rights into a single firm (i.e., vertical integration). Relationship-specific investments encourage the exchange of specific assets rather than generic assets, which increases the gains from trade. This implies that optimal governance structures change as the degree of asset specificity changes. Short-term contracts and dispersed control rights are common with low levels of asset specificity. Long-term contracts and consolidated control rights are common with high levels of asset specificity. 2 The contribution of this dissertation is to identify the presence of asset specificity in the production of television programs, and to show how an increasing degree of asset specificity in the 1950s changed optimal contract design and organizational form in the production of television programs. 1.3 Dissertation Organization The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review of theories of the firm. This chapter describes the treatment of the firm in neoclassical theory and reveals why economists sought to develop a more detailed theory of the firm. It begins with Coase (1937) who highlights the role of transaction costs in a firm’s organizational structure. Klein et. al. (1978) and Williamson (1975, 1979) provide a fuller understanding of transaction costs. It continues with related developments in the theory of the firm, including the influence of agency costs. This chapter closes with a review of significant case studies on transaction costs. Chapter 3 describes the organizational changes experienced in the early days of the television industry. It begins with a description of the network television 3 model. Then, it explains why the network model became the dominant method of broadcasting television programs in the 1940s. It continues by examining the networks’ increased control of television production and scheduling in the 1950s. It ends with the federal government’s regulatory and antitrust responses to the networks’ actions. Chapter 4 applies these theories to the television industry by identifying the transaction costs that exist in different methods of producing and delivering television programs to the consumer. It describes the reasons for a network to pursue a strategy of exploiting “audience flow,” as well as the opportunism problems that arise. It proposes that the changes in contract design and in the allocation of control rights were attempts to constrain opportunism. Chapter 5 is a conclusion that summarizes the findings and proposes avenues for future research. 4 2. Literature Review This chapter will review the theories of the firm in order to provide context for an economic analysis of organization in the television industry. It will begin with the traditional neoclassical theory of the firm and discuss the issues that are properly within its scope. It will then describe Coase’s influential work that shifted attention to transaction costs. It will continue with attempts to refine these ideas in transaction-cost theory as well as alternative theories of the firm. It will conclude with a review of the significant empirical studies on transaction costs. 2.1 Neoclassical Theory Of The Firm In neoclassical theory, the firm performs a technological function. It is a collection of individuals who are organized to transform inputs into output. For a given level of inputs, there are many levels of output that are technologically possible – the production set. However, neoclassical theory assumes that the firm is able 5 to produce the maximum possible output for a given level of inputs. In other words, the firm always operates at the boundary of the production set – a collection of points that is mathematically expressed as the production function. By making this assumption, neoclassical theory assumes