On Sidgwick’s Demise: A Reply to Professor Deigh ANTHONY SKELTON The University of Western Ontario In ‘Sidgwick’s Epistemology’, John Deigh argues that Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics ‘was not perceived during his lifetime as a major and lasting contribution to British moral philosophy’ and that interest in it declined considerably after Sidgwick’s death because the epistemology on which it relied ‘increasingly became suspect in analytic philosophy and eventually [it was] discarded as obsolete’. In this article I dispute these claims. In a recent article in this journal, John Deigh1 argues that Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics2 ‘was not perceived during his lifetime as a major and lasting contribution to British moral philosophy’ (438), and that interest in it declined considerably after Sidgwick’s death because the epistemology on which it relied ‘increasingly became suspect in analytic philosophy and eventually [it was] discarded as obsolete’ (439). In this article I dispute these claims. I Deigh argues that Sidgwick’s Methods ‘was not perceived during his lifetime as a major and lasting contribution to British moral philosophy’ (438). However, this is far from clear. First, to make his point Deigh relies on an article in Encyclopaedia Britannica and an obituary in Mind by Leslie Stephen.3 These are not decisive. Stephen announces at the outset of his obituary that he is not concerned to provide an estimate of Sidgwick’s work in philosophy, though he notes that Methods is a ‘great book’ and that Sidgwick’s work in ethics gave ‘the most important of all modern contributions towards a clear realisation of the conditions of approaching the problems involved’.4 The encyclopaedia article does not deny that Methods is a major contribution; instead, it merely fails to single it out.5 Second, a number of important philosophers were sent copies of Methods when the first edition was published in 1874, 1 John Deigh, ‘Sidgwick’s Epistemology’, Utilitas 19 (2007), pp. 435–46. All bare parenthetical references in the text are to this work. 2 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907). Hereinafter ME. 3 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th–10th edns. (London, 1903), vol. 32, p. 618 and Leslie Stephen, ‘Henry Sidgwick’, Mind 10 (1901), pp. 1–17. 4 Stephen, ‘Henry’, pp. 7 and 15. 5 I owe the point in this sentence to Robert Shaver. © Cambridge University Press 2010 Utilitas Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2010 doi:10.1017/S0953820809990392 On Sidgwick’s Demise: A Reply to Professor Deigh 71 including John Caird, J. E. Carines, Alexander Bain and T. R. Birks. All praised the book. In a letter thanking Sidgwick for a copy of Methods, Bain claimed that ‘no work in Ethics ever impressed me so much’ and that what will make the work ‘live’ is the ‘triumphant way that Utility is erected in the basis of Common Sense’.6 Although he had not read Methods in its entirety, when Cairnes wrote to thank Sidgwick for his copy he claimed that the writing was a ‘rare treat’.7 Third, the praise continued in various reviews. Henry Calderwood declared that despite his misgivings about Sidgwick’s account of intuitionism the latter had ‘rendered a great service to Intuitionalism by the line of criticism he has followed in treating of the several virtues’ and that he admired ‘the ability manifest everywhere throughout the book’.8 Alexander Bain maintained that it is ‘one of the best volumes of the present generation’ and that it is a ‘great work’.9 To an article on Methods by Alfred Barratt in Mind the editor attached a note stating that the interest that ‘continues to be excited by The Methods of Ethics ...is a notable fact in English philosophy at the present day, and there should remain due record of it in the pages of this Journal’.10 In his critical notice of the third edition of Methods, Hastings Rashdall claimed that the work ‘has long been recognised as a philosophical classic’ and that It is one of those books of which it is safe to prophesy that no advance in philosophic doctrine will ever render them obsolete. It is not merely a piece of acute and subtle philosophical criticism but a work of art with a unity and beauty of its own as much as a Dialogue of Plato or of Berkeley.11 In his review of the fourth edition of Methods, G. von Gizycki writes that ‘few books deserve to the same degree as this to be recommended to students of ethics; for few to a like degree constrain us to clear and exact thinking’.12 Fourth, during Sidgwick’s lifetime a number of important moral philosophers took pains to come to grips with Methods. T. H. Green devoted considerable attention to Sidgwick’s views in Prolegomena to Ethics.13 F. H. Bradley devoted both a small part of Ethical Studies 6 Sidgwick Papers, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge University, Add.Ms.c.93.22. 7 Sidgwick Papers, Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge University, Add.Ms.c.93.71. 8 Henry Calderwood, ‘Mr. Sidgwick on Intuitionalism’, Mind 1 (1876), p. 206. 9 Alexander Bain, ‘Mr. Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics’, Mind 1 (1876), pp. 185 and 195. 10 Alfred Barrett, ‘The “Suppression” of Egoism’, Mind 2 (1877), p. 167n. 11 Hastings Rashdall, ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism’, Mind 10 (1885), p. 200. 12 G. von Gizycki, Review of The Methods of Ethics,4thedn.,International Journal of Ethics 1 (1890), p. 120. 13 T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. David Brink (Oxford, 2003). See especially §§ 364–82. 72 Anthony Skelton and a whole pamphlet, Mr. Sidgwick’s Hedonism,toMethods.14 Herbert Spencer dealt at length in The Data of Ethics with some of Sidgwick’s views.15 F. Y. Edgeworth did the same in New and Old Methods of Ethics, and in his Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences he writes that Methods is a ‘great work’ in which ‘the distinction between egoism and utilitarianism has been drawn with matchless skill by Mr. Sidgwick’, and that his aim in part is to ‘confirm Mr. Sidgwick’s proof that Greatest Happiness is the end of right action’.16 II Deigh claims that ‘attention to and interest in the ideas and arguments in Methods greatly diminished after Sidgwick’s death’ (438). This is, however, hard to accept. In 1901, F. H. Hayward opined that If thoughts and suggestions can be regarded for the moment as entities capable of enumeration, the Methods of Ethics probably contains a greater number than any other ethical work of the size that has ever been written. It is a rich mine of thought from which moralists will borrow (with or without acknowledgement) for years to come.17 He was right. G. E. Moore cited Sidgwick more than any other philosopher in Principia Ethica.18 Moore went so far as to claim that ‘only one ethical writer’, i.e. Sidgwick, avoided committing the naturalistic fallacy.19 In Ethics, he reproduced (without acknowledgement) Sidgwick’s arguments against definitional or analytical naturalism.20 J. M. E. McTaggart wrote the now underappreciated and little read ‘The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick’.21 Hastings Rashdall devoted considerable attention to Sidgwick’s view in his The Theory of Good and Evil.22 He was particularly impressed 14 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1876) and Mr. Sidgwick’s Hedonism (London, 1877). 15 Herbert Spencer, The Data of Ethics (London, 1879). 16 F. Y. Edgeworth, New and Old Methods of Ethics (Oxford, 1877) and Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences (London, 1881), pp. 104, 102 and vii (italics in original). 17 F. H. Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick: Nine Essays, Critical and Expository (London, 1901), p. 15. 18 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903). 19 Moore, Principia, p. 17; see also p. 59. The truth of Moore’s statement will not concern me here. 20 See G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1912), chs. 2–3. W. D. Ross (with acknowledgement) and A. J. Ayer (without acknowledgement) do the same. See W. D. Ross, The Right and The Good (Oxford, 1930), pp. 7–8 and A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1936), ch. 6. For Sidgwick’s arguments, see ME, pp. 26–35. 21 J. M. E. McTaggart, ‘The Ethics of Henry Sidgwick’, Quarterly Review 205 (1906), pp. 398–419. 22 Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1907). See also Hastings Rashdall, Ethics (London, 1913), where much attention is paid to Sidgwick, On Sidgwick’s Demise: A Reply to Professor Deigh 73 by Sidgwick’s discussion and evaluation of common-sense morality. ‘The loose statements of Intuitionists as to the clearness, certainty, adequacy, and self-evidence of the ordinarily received rules of conduct have never been subjected to so searching, so exhaustive, and so illuminating an examination.’23 In 1908, in a paper comparing aspects of Green and Sidgwick, G. F. Barbour described both Green and Sidgwick as ‘rival leaders of English ethical thought’.24 H. A. Prichard began writing about him in the 1920s, though in work that was not at the time published.25 In 1928, E. F. Carritt described ME as ‘The best exposition of the rationalist or altruistic utilitarian theory.’26 In 1934, W. D. Lamont maintained that ‘Any criticism of Utilitarianism would be more incomplete than need be, if it neglected to take account of the development of the principles of that school by Professor Sidgwick.’27 Lamont chastises C. D. Broad for the derogatory statements he makes about Sidgwick in comparing him to Green: ‘No worthy follower of Green would so under-rate Sidgwick’s influence’.28 He adds that Sidgwick has ‘many distinguished disciples, past and present’.29 He goes on to discuss the quality that gives Sidgwick’s work a ‘permanent disciplinary value for students of philosophy’; he does not impugn Broad’s positive claims about Sidgwick.30 In 1939, Ross suggested that he is the ‘clearest-headed of the hedonists’.31 In the same work Ross cites Sidgwick nearly as many times as he cites Aristotle, Kant, Broad and Moore.32 So, pace Deigh, Broad was not the only Englishman who admired Sidgwick’s work (439).33 and Is Conscience an Emotion? (Boston, 1914), in which Rashdall expresses agreement with many of Sidgwick’s doctrines; see pp.