THE GETTIER PROBLEM IAN M. CHURCH Forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck In Plato’s Theaetetus, we are asked to consider the difference between knowledge and mere opinion. Knowledge, we learn, must be about something that is true. While you might have a false opinion, you cannot be said to properly know something when it’s false. And drawing from imagery in the Meno, we might add that knowledge is “tied down” in a way that a mere opinion is not—if you know that p then you have reason or justification for believing p. Mere opinions are fragile in a way that knowledge is not. Mere opinions might be swayed via rhetoric or persuasion. Knowledge, it’s thought, is gained via education and is far less fragile. In sum, then, mere opinions are beliefs that are supported by little or at least insufficient justification and may or may not be true. And knowledge, in contrast, is a belief that is true and sufficiently justified. Belief, sufficient justification, and truth were considered, since time immemorial (or so the story goes), to be necessary conditions on knowledge. In his seminal 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Edmund Gettier argued that, while justification, truth, and belief may be necessary for knowledge, such conditions are not (when taken together) sufficient for knowledge. In other words, Gettier argued that a belief could be justified and true and yet fail to be an instance of knowledge. CLASSIC CASE: Smith and Jones are applying for the same job. Smith has very strong evidence for thinking that Jones will get the job (e.g., the employer tells Smith that he will hire Jones, etc.), and for thinking that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket (e.g., Jones emptied his pockets in front of Smith and then clearly, slowly, in good lighting, and perhaps even counting out loud, placed 10 coins in his pocket). As such, Smith forms a belief in the general proposition that “the man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.” As it turns out, however, Smith gets the job and he happens to also have 10 coins in his pocket. (paraphrased from Gettier, 1963, p. 122) In this case, Smith seemingly has a justified true belief that “the man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket,” but, as almost everyone agrees, surely Smith’s belief is not knowledge.1 Again, while justification, truth, and belief might be necessary for belief, such conditions do not seem to be jointly sufficient for knowledge. 1 The project of trying to define knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions—conditions that are assumed to be to be conceptually more primitive than the concept of knowledge—is what I’ll call in this chapter the reductive analysis project.2 And the specific reductive analysis in terms of justification, truth, and belief is sometimes called the traditional analysis of knowledge or the tripartite analysis of knowledge. For philosophers who were interested in giving a reductive analysis of knowledge, Gettier’s counterexamples posed a serious problem. As such, epistemologists quickly tried to find ways to save or repair the traditional analysis of knowledge—typically by trying either to strengthen the justification condition or by adding more conditions (i.e., justified true belief plus some fourth condition). What ensued was a wide array of theories of justification (e.g., justification as evidence, justification as reliability, internalist justification, externalist justification, etc.) and additional conditions on knowledge (e.g., safety conditions, sensitivity conditions, defeasibility conditions, etc.). All of this sought to understand knowledge via reductive analysis, all of which assumed something like a warranted true belief analysis of knowledge (where “warrant” stands for “whatever turns true belief into knowledge”). Unfortunately, none of these proposals (in any combination) seemed to achieve lasting success against Gettier counterexamples—either falling into further Gettier-style counterexamples or leading to unpalatable conclusions (such as radical skepticism). After over 50 years of proposed solutions being met with serious challenges, a viable reductive analysis of knowledge, it might seem, is a Sisyphean endeavor. At heart of the problem posed by Gettier is the incompatibility of a certain species of epistemic luck with knowledge. Consider again the CLASSIC CASE above: The truth of the target belief is incredibly lucky, given the way was formed, and as such that belief is precluded from being rightly called knowledge. Epistemic luck, at least of a certain sort, seems to be incompatible with knowledge. And almost every proposed solution to the Gettier Problem has tried to develop a viable analysis of knowledge that is immune to that kind of epistemic luck. In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge. In §1, we will consider the specific species of luck that is at issue in Gettier counterexamples, then, in §2, I will briefly sketch a diagnosis of the Gettier Problem and try to explain why the relevant species of luck has proven to be extremely difficult to avoid. And finally, in §3, I will consider a prominent objection to the proposed diagnosis of the Problem. §1: Understanding the Luck at Issue in Gettier Counterexamples 2 As Duncan Pritchard noted in his seminal book, Epistemic Luck (2005), there seemed to be a near universal intuition within the contemporary epistemological literature “that knowledge excludes luck”—what he calls the “epistemic luck platitude”—however, as Pritchard is quick to point out, we have to be careful here; not all instances of luck preclude knowledge (2005, p. 1). In this section, we’re going to briefly elucidate the different kinds of epistemic luck identified by Pritchard so as to better understand the specific kind of luck at issue in Gettier cases.3 Once we know what kind of luck plays a role in Gettier cases, we will hopefully be better positioned to diagnose the Gettier Problem.4 Let’s start by considering the kind of luck that’s not at issue in Gettier counterexamples by considering some species of luck that are epistemically benign, that do not preclude knowledge. Although it is almost universally agreed that the lesson to be learned from Gettier cases is that knowledge is incompatible with luck—that luck is the central and fundamental component of all Gettier cases—Pritchard goes on to show that there are at least four species of epistemic luck that do not preclude knowledge. The first of these is: Content Epistemic Luck: It is lucky that the proposition is true. (Pritchard, 2005, p. 134) For example, Eli is walking down Placid Lane, a calm suburban road, and sees a car crash into a tree. To be sure, there are hardly ever car accidents on Placid Lane. It may be a matter of luck that a given car accident occurred; this, however, does not prevent agents from knowing that it occurred. Eli’s belief that the accident occurred is warranted and only luckily true, but the luck at issue is epistemically inconsequential. Pritchard identifies the second species of benign luck as: Capacity Epistemic Luck: It is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge. (Pritchard, 2005, p. 134) If it is somehow lucky that a given agent has the capacity to know a given belief, this does not prevent that agent from knowing it. Using Pritchard’s example, say Jones is walking through the forest and only narrowly avoids being smacked in the face with a branch that would have blinded him (perhaps he bent down to tie his shoe right when the branch swung by); it is, therefore, lucky that Jones has the capacity to see, but this luck does not thwart Jones’s future perceptual beliefs from being known (Pritchard, 2005, p. 135). The third species of benign epistemic luck that Pritchard identifies is called: 3 Evidential Epistemic Luck: It is lucky that the agent acquires the evidence that she has in favour of her belief. (Pritchard, 2005, p. 136) Smith just so happens to walk by his employer’s door and overhear that he is going to be fired, which, let us say, is true. It is, then, a matter of luck that Smith has the evidence that he has in favor of his belief that “I am going to be fired,” but such luck does not preclude Smith from knowing such a belief.5 Finally, the fourth species of benign epistemic luck that Pritchard identifies is: Doxastic Epistemic Luck: It is lucky that the agent believes the proposition. (Pritchard, 2005, p. 138) Not only is it lucky that Smith overhears that he is going to be fired when he just so happens to walk by his employer’s door, it is also lucky that he forms the belief that he is going to be fired. He would not have formed the belief that he is going to be fired in relevant nearby possible worlds. As Pritchard notes, it does not look like a given event can exhibit Evidential Epistemic Luck without exhibiting Doxastic Epistemic Luck and vice versa, at least not without being contentious.6 As with Evidential Epistemic Luck, Doxastic Epistemic Luck too seems epistemically benign—Smith can know he is going to be fired even if he exhibits Doxastic Epistemic Luck. Gettier cases, according to Duncan Pritchard and many others, are caused by a specific species of luck (see Pritchard, 2005, pp. 145–148). As such, the lesson to be learned from Gettier cases is not so much that knowledge is incompatible with luck simpliciter, but rather that knowledge is incompatible with a particular species of it.