ANALYSIS PREFACE The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT), signed in Ottawa in 1997, intends to eliminate a whole class of conventional weapons. The fact that over 140 countries have consented to be bound by the Treaty constitutes a remarkable achievement. The progress registered with the putting the Treaty into effect is of great credit to all those involved – governments, civil society and international organizations. Nevertheless, in some of the most seriously mine-affected countries progress has been delayed or even com- promised altogether by the fact that rebel groups that use anti-personnel mines do not consider themselves bound by the commitments of the government in power. Such groups, or non-state actors (NSAs), cannot them- selves become parties to an international Treaty, even if they are willing to agree to its terms. Faced with this potential “show-stopper”, Geneva Call came forward with a revolutionary new approach to engaging NSAs in committing themselves to the substance of the APMBT. Geneva Call designed a Deed of Commitment, to be deposited with the authorities of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, which NSAs can formally adhere to. This Deed of Commitment contains the same obligations as the APMBT. It allows the lead- ers of rebel groups to assume formal obligations and to accept that their performance in implementing those obligations will be monitored by an international body. The success of this approach is illustrated by the case of Sudan. In October 2001, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to give up their AP mines and signed the Deed of Commitment. In Septem- ber 2002, the Government of Sudan, the SPLM/A and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understand- ing to create a single national program of mine action in the country, and in October 2003, the Government of Sudan ratified the APMBT. It is clear from conversations with senior officials of the Government, that they would not have felt able to ratify the Treaty, if the SPLM/A had not already made a formal commitment to observe its provisions in the territory under its control. Not only did the initiative of Geneva Call stimulate the Government and the SPLM/A to work together, and with the United Nations, to deal with the problem of landmines, but the contacts made through this process were a valuable building block for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Nairobi in December 2004, the Review Conference of the APMBT approved a challenging Plan of Action for the period up to 2009 when the first group of countries are due to have completed clearance of all mined areas. A major obstacle to accession to, and successful implementation of, the Treaty in some of the “hardest” coun- tries is the refusal of NSAs to abandon AP mines. The approach pioneered by Geneva Call of engaging these groups in dialogue and persuading them to commit themselves to the provisions of the Treaty offers the best hope of stopping the use of mines in these countries. It is an approach that deserves our full support. In order for this approach to have the best chance of success, Geneva Call needs to understand what motivates each group to continue using mines, how they are using them, and what initiatives stand the best chance of persuading them to stop. The research contained in this volume will help to provide the basic information that Geneva Call and others need to build effective advocacy campaigns, and thereby hasten the day when anti- personnel mines will be weapons of the past. The lessons learned by Geneva Call in this process should also be valuable to other organizations seeking to obtain commitments from NSAs on other issues, such as the need to respect human rights. Martin Barber Director of United Nations Mine Action Service, 2000-2005 October 2005 NSAS AND LANDMINES 1 ANALYSIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was made possible by the support of the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN), the Swed- ish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Government of Italy through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as well as the continued support of Switzerland. We gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance provided by these organizations and governments, and wish to express our gratitude for the help received. The report was coordinated by Anki Sjöberg, Research Coordinator and Principal Researcher, under the super- vision of Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey (Project Coordinator), Pascal Bongard and Katherine Kramer. Framework, direction, oversight, quality control and regional expertise for the overall project were provided by Dr. Daniel Warner of the Program for the Study of International Organization(s) of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. The principal research team was composed of Cyril Amberg, Matthew Pountney, Anki Sjöberg, Yasmina Sonderegger, and Helena Ziherl. Other research contributors were the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (Colombia), the NGO Horizón Kiné (Democratic Republic of Congo) and the Geneva Call Consultant Major (rtd) Mohamed Noor Ali (Somalia). Ruxandra Stoicescu wrote the section on transfer. Important contributions were made by Mehmet Balci, Veronique Barbelet, Martin Damary, Laurent Perell and Tamara Saphir. Technical sup- port was provided by Stefano Campa, Michelle Hearly and Sylvette Louradour. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining contributed its technical and operational exper- tise and helped solve different queries. UNMAS Geneva Office provided overall advice and expertise. Professor Andrew Clapham of the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Professor Marco Sassoli of the Univer- sity of Geneva contributed legal expertise on specific questions. The report received expert input from many individuals and organizations, including Landmine Monitor re- searchers, national campaigns of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, other locally based organiza- tions and UN Mine Action experts. Particularly warm thanks go to Narine Berikashvili, Hugues Laurenge, Davide Naggi, Hans Risser, Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal and the Small Arms Survey. Special thanks also go to the armed non-state actors who shared valuable information with us. 2 NSAS AND LANDMINES ANALYSIS ABSTRACT Although armed non-state actors (NSAs) have always existed, in the last twenty years the international com- munity has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel (AP) landmines. This report, which builds on an analysis published in 2004, maps the role of NSAs in the landmine problem (2003-2005). The report investigates and analyzes how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines through a presentation of individual group profiles. This report has recorded a global occurrence of AP and anti-vehicle mine planting by NSAs, whether activated by a victim, a vehicle or at a distance by command-detonation. Around 60 NSAs have deployed landmines in 24 countries in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Over 40 groups made use of some type of victim-activated devices. The mines employed were both factory-made and handmade, indicating both involvement in mine transfers and production. One of the main findings of this report is that there is a need to discuss the mine issue not only with states, but also with NSAs. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the long-term perspective of the consequences of mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the international community to find channels of communication with NSAs on the AP mine issue. This report argues that only by understanding NSA and region specific dynamics is it possible to address the - current and future - landmine problem caused by NSAs. NSAS AND LANDMINES 3 ANALYSIS CONTENT ANALYSIS 1 Introduction 8 1.1 Structure of the Report 8 1.2 Background and Rationale of the Report 9 1.3 Definition of Landmine and Use 9 1.4 Definition of NSA 10 1.5 Methodology and Material 11 2 Mine Use by NSAs 14 2.1 Extent of the Problem 14 2.2 How and Why NSAs Use Landmines 15 2.3 Sources of Mines 25 2.4 Stockpiles 28 2.5 Regional Disparities and Preliminary Strategies 29 2.6 NSA Mine Use versus State Mine Use 30 2.7 Impact of NSA Mine Use 31 2.8 The Flip Side of the Coin: The Role of NSAs in Mine Action 34 3 Conclusions 35 4 Sources Analysis 38 Tables Table 1. NSA Use of Mines per Region 2003-2005 14 Table 2. NSA Use of Factory-Made and Handmade Mines (IEDs) per Region 19 Table 3. NSA Use of AP and AV Mines per Region 22 PROFILES Africa 42 Burundi 42 Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL) 42 Democratic Republic of the Congo 44 Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) 46 Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) 47 Eritrea 49 Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement/Islamic Salvation Movement (EIJM) 49 Senegal 51 Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) 51 Somalia 53 Somali National Front (SNF) 54 Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) 55 Somali Patriotic Movement- Faction of General “Morgan” (SPM) 56 Uganda 59 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 59 Landmine Use by Other Non-State Actors: Individuals, Clans, Criminal Groups, Paramilitaries, Self-Defense Groups and Private Companies 48 Stockpiles of Landmines under the Control of NSAs: the