Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project UNDER SECRETARY CHESTER BOWLES Interviewed by: Joe B. Frantz, LBJ Library Initial interview date: November 11, 1969 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mr. Johnson and Indian aid For 20 years the American people were given the wrong reasons for foreign aid Discussion with Lyndon Johnson on the aid program Speech in Nebraska on aid Believes AID's sole purpose is to help the recipient country function better, stand on its own feet, and maintain its independence President Johnson's involvement in the Food for Peace Program to India In the fifties the U.S. sent wheat to India which held down the incomes of the farmer As prices went up in '64-'66 the incentives for the farmer went up too Does not think LBJ ever quite believed the Indians were doing as well as he knew they were doing, or trying as hard India had a very big crop in '67 and '68 and he was put in a position of having to persuade India to take another three million tons President Johnson held up the wheat until the last minute India's reaction to the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia Common bond in attitude toward England America's affluence makes it impossible to understand developing nations Feels India is closer to the U.S. than Russia philosophically in matters of ideology Tendency in the State Department to generalize about Asia Difficult for a nation to look ahead and plan thoughtfully Discussion with LBJ about a need for a policy in reference to Southeast Asia South Vietnam question was a tragedy for President Johnson Lyndon Johnson as President was more liberal than he anticipated LBJ asked him to stay as Ambassador to India after he assumed office Most Ambassadors to India become a sort of Ambassador of India to the United States Changes seen in India since he first served in 1951 Birth control issue War of 1962 between India and China opened up a new situation in Asia Plan to give India one hundred million dollars of U.S. military equipment Soviet military aid and technicians Relationship with the Soviet Ambassadors in India Communists in India Shift in policy after Nehru's death Divides Indian leaders into two groups Incident when the U.S. postponed the visits of Shastri and Ayub Khan President Johnson lacked a feeling for the sensitivity of the Indian leader Reaction of the Indian people to the assassination of President Kennedy Assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy Free to go wherever he wished Marxism does not fit Asia Svetlana Alliluyeva The Kashmir problem Indian's believe most Americans are pro-Pakistani Peshawar base Offer to provide India with radios Feels the U.S. did not pay enough attention to India John Kenneth Galbraith Indira Gandhi Analysis of President Johnson INTERVIEW Q: This is an interview with former Ambassador to India Chester Bowles in his home in Essex, Connecticut, on November 11, 1969. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz. Mr. Ambassador--it's kind of hard to know what to call you, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Governor--you've had too many careers. Let's talk a bit about what you were telling me just a moment ago, and that is Mr. Johnson and Indian aid. BOWLES: You've started with a big subject. In his long record in Congress Mr. Johnson demonstrated that he was for the aid program, I think, very fundamentally. He supported it in the Senate and also in the House. I first knew him when he was elected to the House and kept in touch after he was elected to the Senate. But after he became President he seemed so focused on the problems here at home, that he did very little for the aid program. As President he continued the AID program but didn't work very hard for it. There was one aspect of foreign aid that I don't think he, as well as many other people, understood very well. For twenty years or so we gave the American people the wrong reasons for foreign aid. I'm not talking about specific programs, but it was as if we always felt we were doing "them" a favor, on a personal basis, and they ought to be grateful to us. Q: It was a kind of charity in a way. BOWLES: Yes, and that of course is not what it should be. We told the American people that the world would like us better, which it won't. Nations, like people, don't like those they owe something to. Q: No one likes the banker. BOWLES: We also told the American people that it would buy votes for us in the U.N. On the contrary, as a sensitive state when you get aid from America, you're inclined to disagree with America to prove that you're sovereign. We also told them that foreign assistance would be over pretty soon, which was not true. And finally we said that economic growth assured political stability, which it certainly doesn't do. On the contrary, economic progress creates internal conflicts over who should get what share. I remember Dean Rusk saying to me a couple of years ago, with great irritation, "Just tell me one dammed thing those Indians have ever done for us." And I said, "They've survived for twenty-two years as a democracy, as a vast common market, independent, and that's a fantastic contribution to a stable world." All you're ever going to get out of the aid program in India is the chance of a viable and independent India; maybe its leaders and people will like us, maybe they won't, but it will be free to operate as an independent nation that will resist outside pressures from any source. That's an awful lot. If you can help assure independence for one-sixth of mankind who live in India, you've done a great deal. I remember talking with LBJ on this subject one time and I said, "I'm not sure that you understand the aid program in India thoroughly, but I know your grandfather would." He asked, "What do you mean by that?" I said, "Your grandfather was a Populist, an agrarian non-Marxist radical. He believed in lower freight rates and lower interest rates; he believed in schools and more doctors and rural roads. He believed in a better break for the little guy. Now that's all our foreign economic assistance is all about. These countries don't want Communism or any other totalitarian ideology. They're much more likely to be with us than the Russians on these things. They just want a better break. They want to see their resources used to their own benefit." Johnson asked me to write a speech about this, and I agreed to do it. I heard that he wanted to give it at the Associated Press dinner in April, I think, '66 or '67, but I got through with it too late and missed my chance. It could have been a good speech though, which might have provided a fresh insight. I remember Ted Sorensen one time Jokingly told me never to speak about foreign aid in Nebraska, which is his home state. He said, "They'll lynch you out there if you talk about foreign aid." But I went there, a little nervous, to speak to a large audience in Lincoln, and I opened my speech by saying, "I'm not sure you'll understand what I am going to say, but I know your grandfathers would understand." It was the same theme I had brought up with LBJ. I went on to describe the populist Nebraskans of fifty-sixty years ago, and I concluded, "your inability to understand what I'm going to talk about indicates how far you are away from your grandparents in your perspective and ideas." In this framework, my remarks were warmly received. I think that this idea was also effective with Johnson. He didn't work for the aid program in the last two or three years; but this was chiefly because he felt there were so many other problems on the agenda. My own feeling is we don't have to choose between good programs abroad and good programs at home--we've got nearly a trillion dollar gross national income. Nevertheless, we know the difficulty of getting these domestic problems through and how difficult it is to keep Congress in line. I go back to the fact that we never really told Congress the whole story. Only on rare occasions have we really been honest about foreign aid with Congress. Each year, rather, it has been an expedient effort to get the bill through at any cost, and wild promises are made that can't be kept. Too frequently, the aid program has been in the hands of the country desks in the State Department, which have used it politically. Instead of striving for economic growth, the objective has been to quiet down this general or to buy that admiral, to avoid a revolution or to encourage whatever you're after. My own belief is that AID's sole purpose is to help the recipient country function better, stand on its own feet, and maintain its independence. There should be no assumption of gratitude expected for it. Our country has no right to say to another country, "You've got to vote with us in the UN." We would have a right, however, to say, "You've got to spend the loan or grant we're giving you in an intelligent way, not waste it; and you've got to see that it goes to the priority needs.