No. 118 The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry Adam Dolnik Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore 30 November 2006 With Compliments This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to: • Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues. • Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology. • Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; and organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific. Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM). Research Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute’s researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies (named after Singapore’s first Foreign Minister), to bring distinguished scholars to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt (Harvard University), Jack Snyder (Columbia University), Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Alastair Iain Johnston (Harvard University) and John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago). A Visiting Research Fellow Programme also enables overseas scholars to carry out related research in the Institute. Teaching The Institute provides educational opportunities at an advanced level to professionals from both the private and public sectors in Singapore as well as overseas through graduate programmes, namely, the Master of Science in Strategic Studies, the Master of Science in International Relations and the Master of Science in International Political Economy. These programmes are conducted full-time and part-time by an international faculty. The Institute also has a Doctoral programme for research in these fields of study. In addition to these graduate programmes, the Institute also teaches various modules in courses conducted by the SAFTI Military Institute, SAF Warrant Officers’ School, Civil Defence Academy, and the Defence and Home Affairs Ministries. The Institute also runs a one-semester course on ‘The International Relations of the Asia Pacific’ for undergraduates in NTU. Networking The Institute convenes workshops, seminars and colloquia on aspects of international relations and security development that are of contemporary and historical significance. Highlights of the Institute’s activities include a regular Colloquium on Strategic Trends in the 21st Century, the annual Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) and the biennial Asia Pacific Security Conference. IDSS staff participate in Track II security dialogues and scholarly conferences in the Asia-Pacific. IDSS has contacts and collaborations with many international think tanks and research institutes throughout Asia, Europe and the United States. The Institute has also participated in research projects funded by the Ford Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. It also serves as the Secretariat for the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Singapore. Through these activities, the Institute aims to develop and nurture a network of researchers whose collaborative efforts will yield new insights into security issues of interest to Singapore and the region. i ABSTRACT The highly lethal attacks against land transportation targets in Madrid and London have sparked considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central question addressed in this working paper. While transportation targets in general have always been a terrorist favorite, in recent years there has been an increased emphasis on attacking soft transportation targets such as mass transit. There are several distinct reasons for this development, including the increasing difficulty of successfully striking other targets, the ease of producing large number of casualties, the panic-spreading universality of the city bus or metro car, economic impact on the afflicted state by crippling workforce mobility and deterring foreign investment and tourism, symbolic value, and an overall high probability of success and a low level of risk. Indeed, since 1991 more then 42 percent of terrorist strikes worldwide were directed specifically against land transportation, producing the highest casualty rates of any type of terrorist attack. With regards to the threat to Singapore’s transit system, analysis of JI’s ideology and targeting patterns reveals an increasing preference for soft, Western, mass-casualty targets in Southeast Asia. But while Singapore’s commuter transportation system fully encompasses all of these adjectives, the recently weakened JI currently lacks to capability to strike this type of target. Still, other adjacent threats exist including a possible attack by a home-grown terror cell, attempted suicides by deranged individuals, or the disruption of service via a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or terror group sympathizers. Despite the relatively low level of threat, Singapore has made many preparations and preventive measures that other countries that have experienced surface transportation terrorism have identified as pillars of effective public transportation security. These essentially include prevention, effective response and timely mitigation, and psychological defence measures. ************ Dr. Adam Dolnik is currently Director of Research Development and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong in Australia. Formerly he has served as Chief Trainer at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, and as a researcher at the WMD Terrorism Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and at the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, Austria. Dolnik’s research has been published in over a dozen edited books and a variety of international journals, including Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, International Negotiation: Journal of Theory and Practice, Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, Yaderny Kontrol. He is also the author of Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends (Routledge, forthcoming in 2007) and Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (Praeger Security International, forthcoming in 2007). ii The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry Introduction On 11 March, 2004, ten 5-10 kilogram bombs exploded on board four trains in three Madrid stations during the morning rush hour, killing 190 people and injuring over 1,400 more in what at the time was the ninth deadliest terrorist attack in world history. Then on 7 July 2005, three suicide bombers exploded their devices within 50 seconds of each other on three London Underground trains, with a fourth bomb exploding on a bus nearly an hour later. 52 people were killed and about 700 were injured in the most lethal terrorist attack in the history of the United Kingdom.1 Both Madrid and London have sparked considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central question that this working paper will seek to address. First, the global trends in land transportation terrorism will be discussed, along with an analysis of the scope of reasons behind land transportation becoming an increasingly attractive terrorist target. Secondly, the paper will focus on threat assessment with regard to the possibility of an attack on transportation infrastructure in Singapore, with a particular focus on the al Qaida- linked al Jemaah al Islamiya (JI) organization, a group that had plans to attack the country’s transportation infrastructure in the past. And finally, an overview of measures that could be implemented to mitigate the threat will be provided. Trends in Transportation Terrorism Transportation in general has been one of the most preferred terrorist targets, consisting of more then half of all terrorist attacks overall. This trend is highly disturbing, particularly in light of the fact that attacks against transportation targets have been extremely lethal when compared to other terrorist targets. Particularly in attacks