Note: This is a draft of a chapter that should eventually appear in a collection deriving from Symposium Hellenisticum XI (2007), at which Michael Frede so tragically lost his life. The ‘proceedings’ are being edited by Keimpe Algra and Katerina Ierodiakanou and published by CUP. 2. Cause (M IX.195-330) I. Introduction Sextus Empiricus’s primary interest in philosophical arguments is in their psychological effect. As a Pyrrhonist, he regards arguments, at least those pertaining to obscure or non-evident (a)/dhla) matters, not as the means for achieving a (more) adequate philosophical understanding of the matters in question but, rather, as so much argumentative material to be weighed on one side of a balance-scale–against competing arguments on the opposite side–in achieving the psychological equipollence of pro and contra considerations pertaining to a particular issue (i)s os qe/neia). This equipollence is intended to be propaedeutic to suspension of judgment concerning the matter (e)poxh/). When such a procedure is extended to all obscure matters, the ultimate result should be tranquility (a)taraci/a), which is the Pyrrhonian summum bonum. In the first book of the Hypotyposeis or Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus explicitly states that, with respect to the investigation of nature or ‘doing physics” (fus iologi/a) the Pyrrhonist aim is not to establish by reasoning and ‘with firm confidence’ any dogmas but, with respect to every matter transcending the immediate deliverance of the sense (that is, every non-evident or obscure matter), to oppose a conclusion established by argument to a contrary and “equal” conclusion 1 established by argument with an eye toward achieving tranquility (PH I.18). This approach lends itself to a rather quantitative or additive view of arguments–according to which the sum of many rather unimpressive arguments might well ‘count’ just as much as a single rather impressive argument. It can also yield what may appear to the contemporary philosopher to be a not very discriminating attitude on Sextus’s part: any port in a storm, any argument for the sake of constructing a formal antinomy (e)/legxoj). He is also quite willing to produce a jumble-sale of arguments, with such arguments and their underlying assumptions drawn from diverse “dogmatic” sources. At the heart of Pyrrhonian praxis is the assumption that suspension of judgment, rather than ascertaining the truth, is the path to tranquility. In the words of Myles Burnyeat, [t]he great recommendation of Pyrrhonism is that suspension of judgment on all questions as to what is true and false, good and bad, results in tranquility–the tranquility of detachment from striving and ordinary human concerns, of a life lived on after surrendering the hope of finding questions on which happiness depends (Burnyeat 1998, 112). It seems that the Pyrrhonian assumption was that suspension of judgments pertaining even to theoretical issues that seem most removed from mundane practical affairs (such as those involved in physics or the investigation of nature–fus iologi/a) is necessary for the attainment of ‘happiness’ (i.e., tranquility: a)taraci/a). Thus, Burnyeat’s claim about Sextus’s attitude toward suspension of judgment concerning the existence of motion also applies to suspension of judgment concerning the existence of causation: ‘Sextus’ concern is to ensure that the arguments against [causation] are no less, but also no more, effective than the arguments in favour of it’ (Burnyeat 1998, 108). It seems to me that, apart from the commitments involved in Pyrrhonian 2 praxis, Sextus’s arguments will not be seen in quite the way that he sees them. From a different historical and philosophical perspective, those arguments may strike us in a very different way: features of the arguments that perhaps would not have been thought to be of great significance by Sextus catch our attention. This, I submit, is what happens when we examine his discussions of aitia (variously translatable as ‘causes’, ‘reasons’, ‘explanations’). The thesis that I attempt to develop in what follows is a multipartite one. First: Sextus derives rhetorical advantage, when developing his contra case with respect to the existence of aitia, from conceiving of cause and effect in terms of the Stoic category of ‘things that are relatively disposed’ (ta\ pro/j ti/ pw j e)/xonta). As we shall soon see in more detail, this is the genus of what we might call external relations. Second: From Sextus’s perspective, this argument is simply one part of an additive whole the ultimate point of which is to develop a contra case with respect to the existence of causes and effects that is sufficiently strong to match the psychological effect of pro arguments–and, perhaps more importantly, our natural propensity to believe in the existence of causes and effects–and thus to produce equipollence of pro and contra considerations and suspension of judgment with respect to the existence of causes and effects. The ultimate goal, of course, in the case of the application of skeptical praxis to causation—as it is with respect to its application to any other issue–is the summum bonum of tranquility (a)taraci/a). Third: From a different philosophical perspective, e.g., the contemporary one, the core of Sextus’s contra argumentation concerning causation may seem to be not so much a convincing refutation of the existence of the causal relation but, rather, an anticipation of the empiricist reconceptualization of the causal relation that was a part of the anti- metaphysical, Way of Ideas program of classical British empiricists such as John Locke and 3 David Hume. II. The Structure of Sextus’s Discussion of Causation in Hypotyposeis III and Adversus Mathematicos IX Sextus concludes the preceding section of Adversus mathematicos IX, which has dealt with the gods and ‘the divine’ by claiming (M IX.194) that he has reached the point of suspension of judgment ‘with respect to active principles’ (peri\ tw =n dras thri/w n a)rxw =n). It is clear that he thinks of divinities as preeminent instances of active principles causes; and he here announces that he will proceed to show in a ‘more skeptical’ (s keptikw /teron) discussion that the account of both an ‘active cause’ and ‘the passive’ matter are both open to doubt. While it is far from clear to me what he means by ‘more skeptical’ discussion, one possibility is that he intends to emphasize that the following discussion will have wider and deeper skeptical implications concerning causation, in general–not just the sort of active causal principle represented by god or the deities. He begins this discussion at IX.195. However, it is worth noting that parallel to this discussion of aitia in M IX is a much shorter discussion at Hypotyposeis III.17-29. In both places the pro arguments, in favor of the existence of causation, are given much less space than the contra arguments. The obvious explanation for this fact is Sextus’s assumption that we have a much greater propensity to believe (in some sense of ‘believe’) in the existence of aitia (in some sense of ‘aitia’) than we do to deny the existence of ‘causes’ tout court. So less argumentative material is needed on the pro side to achieve the balance of equipollence or i)s os qe/neia with respect to the pro and contra positions concerning the existence of causation. 4 Both the Hypotyposeis and Adversus mathematicos contain an argument that is presented as the final, capstone argument of the relatively brief pro sections in the discussions of causation of the respective works . The argument is dialectical in the sense that it assumes an opponent who denies the existence of aitia and then attempts to refute this opponent’s negative claim by reductio. Crucially, the argument equivocates on two substantive terms often translated as ‘cause’ (or ‘reason’, or ‘explanation’). It employs both the feminine abstract noun ‘ai)ti/a’ and the neuter adjective ‘ai)/tion’ (plural, ‘ai)/tia’) used substantively. Exactly what this linguistic distinction amounts to–indeed, whether it has any semantic force at all–seems to depend on the particular Greek writer and is, in many contexts, not clear.1 In what follows, it seems most natural to translate forms of the noun ‘ai)ti/a’ as ‘reason’ and to translate the substantive neuter ‘(to\) ai)/tion’ as ‘cause’. The argument as it appears at PH III.19 goes as follows: ‘Someone who says that there is no cause (ai)/tion) will be refuted. For if he says this “categorically” 1I am indebted to Malcolm Schofield for urging me to pay close attention to this linguistic distinction. In (Frede 1980), Michael Frede points out that the Stoic Chrysippus is reported by Stobaeus to distinguish the two terms: an ai)/tion is an entity ‘in the world’ (a ‘cause’ in one common modern sense), whereas an ai)ti/a is a logos or account of an ai)/tion. As Frede says, Aristotle does not observe such a distinction in the meaning of the two terms, and Galen explicitly says that he uses the terms interchangeably (223-3). In both the PH 3, 19 and the M 9, 204-205 passages, Sextus seems to be conforming, more or less, to the reported Chrysippean usage. 5 (a(plw =j) and without any reason (a)/neu tino\j ai)ti/aj) , he will not be credible (a)/pis toj e)/s tai). But if [he makes his assertion] for some reason (dia/ tina ai)ti/an), he posits a cause (ai)/tion) while wishing to do away with it, since he has given a reason (ai)ti/an) on account of which there is not any cause (ai)/tion).’ Sextus’s argument is a destructive dilemma, which depends on its proponent’s finding an opponent who is willing ‘dogmatically’ to deny the existence of any aition.