THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE SPUTNIK/Alamy Stock Photo/B9A599 Photo/B9A599 Stock SPUTNIK/Alamy Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin greet each other in the Kremlin. “A black cat in the dark room”1: Russian Quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – ‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful by Sergey Sukhankin Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Research Fellow at the Jamestown (PMSCs) – a phenomenon of great complexity and outreach. Foundation in Washington. He is also currently employed as a This article will discuss Russian quasi-PMSCs from different Lecturer at the University of Alberta, MacEwan University, and aspects, concentrating upon the following key themes: Concordia University in Edmonton. • Emergence, evolution, and development of Russian Introduction PMSCs/irregular forces through the lens of history; • Main disadvantages characteristic of and associated with n event that took place in early-February 2018, Russian PMSCs; near Deir el-Zour, a city in eastern Syria, result- ing in the decimation of between 60 and 200 • Key functions and missions performed, depending upon Russian mercenaries2 fighting on the side of the the geographic theatre; and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, brought into • The nascent ‘division of responsibilities’ between various Athe limelight the issue of Russian private military contractors Russian quasi-PMSCs. – a tool of power politics allegedly increasingly relied upon by Moscow. A seemingly-local incident in a far-flung Syrian From a methodological point of view, this article will make province uncovered unsavory details pertaining to activities extensive references to Russian-language sources, as well as to of Russian quasi-Private Military and Security Companies the results of the author’s own research on the subject. Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019 43 Continuity and Tradition: Why History Still Matters Alexandr Ageev “…as a state-controlled system of coer- cion (including a reliance upon limited-scale military ussia’s employment of private military groups and non- conflicts, if necessary) aimed at realizing economic R state actors has had a long historical tradition that dates goals.”8 Examining utilization from this perspective, the back to the late-16th Century. Summarizing this experience first state-sponsored instances of using non-state actors from this perspective, and up until 2013-2014, the following can be traced to the expedition of Yermak Timofeyevich usages or functions were ascertained:3 (1582–1584), which was handsomely-financed by the virtually-omnipotent Stroganov family, but was de-facto 1) Geo-political functions with the Livonian War procured by the Russian state. In effect, Russia’s subse- (1558–1583)4 and the Time of Troubles (1598–1613)5 quent colonization of Siberia and the Far East followed serve as first examples. These practices, which first this pattern. The gap that emerged after 1917 (the col- occurred within the pre-1917 period, also blossomed after lapse of the Russian monarchy) lasted until the end of the the outbreak of the Cold War, which gave rise to multiple USSR, and re-appeared in a different form only during regional conflicts that erupted in parts of Southeast Asia, the late-1990s, with the emergence of quasi-PMSCs such Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. After the dis- as Antiterror-Orel, Antiterror, Redut-Antiterror, the RSB solution of the USSR in 1991, state-sponsored/controlled Group, and the Moran Security Group9 that attempted to use of non-state actors6 was replaced by private initiatives act as Western PMSCs, yet did not become competitive and ‘volunteerism’ (Transnistria, South Caucasus, and in global markets. the Balkans). Despite limited scope (1991–1995), this 3) Para-military functions resting upon non-linear forms interim usage period was important from an operational of warfare – an element of Russian/Soviet traditional prospective,7 resulting in the emergence of a large group strength. Within this domain, some distinctions should of individuals further sub-divided into: (a) ideology- be introduced: driven militants (“adventurists”) guided by anti-Western • The Imperial period (1721–1917), when the devel- sentiments, ready to participate as militants in other opment and active employment of irregular mili- regional conflicts for little-or-no pecuniary stimuli (Igor tary forces was premised upon eastern and south- Strelkov/Girkin participated in the Balkan War, and ern expansion of the Russian Empire, and the would later use this experience in Ukraine); and (b) need to integrate the non-Russian peoples within profit-driven militants (“mercenaries“) that either joined the architecture of the Russian state.10 Therefore, domestic criminal groups and/or offered their services this trend – irregular formations were primarily to foreign PMCs. composed of the non-Russian peoples (“inoro- 2) Geo-economic functions fitting the “power economy” dcheskiye wojska”) – survived all major regional concept (silovya ekonomika) described by Professor conflicts fought by the Russian Empire until 1917. Heritage Image Partnership Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo/MPWM8M Stock Ltd/Alamy Heritage Image Partnership Lenin’s Arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, on April 16, 1917. 44 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019 The Print Collector/Alamy Stock Photo/A4K1KH Stock Collector/Alamy The Print German infantrymen following a tank towards Moscow in the snow, Russia, 1941. (Artist unknown). THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE • The Soviet period (1921–1988) ushered in a new basis that determines other elements. A second key difference milestone in the development of irregular forms is the issue of status. From a legal prospective, Russia does not of warfare, which greatly owed their development have PMSCs, organization of/participation in such entities is to the Russian Civil War (1917–1921), and the classified as “mercenary” and is punishable by the Russian Great Patriotic War (1941–1945). In effect, Criminal Code (Article 359). Yet, these de-jure non-existent lessons gleaned from these entities do de-facto exist, and factually, two debacles would be used in are occupying an increasingly-important the creation of Special Forces role in the Kremlin’s policies. This dis- (Spetsnaz).11 Further, the “Non-military functions crepancy can be explained by so-called 14 Soviets would, through so- were used in the “plausible deniability,” – the ability of called ‘military advisers’ sent the Russian state to remain a stakeholder to the Third World countries, pre-1917 period to in areas of strategic geopolitical/economic successfully confront the extinguish what is now interests without direct participation therein, thereby preserving a ‘close-to-zero’ level of United States during regional known as ‘hybrid conflicts in Africa, Asia, and accountability to both the domestic and the Latin America, while in the threats,’ and they international audience. This is by no means Middle East, active implemen- appeared to be new to Russia or the USSR. In effect, its continuity irrespectively of the epoch or tation of the Soviet experience regaining their former of non-linear warfare, via the political regime is best underscored by the 15 KGB, gave boost to the rise of importance after 2011.” “Grechko – Grachev – Zakharova pattern.” contemporary terrorism.12 There is every reason to believe that it is the advantage of “plausible deniability” that has 4) Non-military functions were actively stood behind Russia’s unyielding determina- used in the pre-1917 period to extinguish what is now tion to deny legal status to PMSCs, in spite of the fact that an known as “hybrid threats,” and they appeared to be intensive debate regarding the subject has been dragging on regaining their former importance after 2011. It ought since at least 2012, and the Russian General Staff even started to be noted that Russian/Soviet traditions with respect to entertain the idea in 2010.16 to using irregulars and non-state actors also received a boost after 2010, due to the influence of hectic shifts in The lack of legal status does not mean to imply the absence the Middle East – the so-called Arab Spring of late-2010. of these entities. In effect, quasi-PMSCs are pieces of a larger puzzle that fully complies with Russia’s changing perception of PMSCs à la russe warfare frequently ascribed to Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov.17 Nonetheless, these ideas had, mployment of non-state military/security-related actors by in one form or another, been discussed by such prominent military ERussia sharply contrasts with Western practices. In the West, thinkers as Evgeny Messner, Vladimir Slipchenko, and Nikolai the key objective boils down to a reduction of employment and Ogarkov, and theymerely received fresh impetus by virtue of operating costs, gaining efficiencies, and creating economies of the influence of the developments in the Middle East between scale.13 In Russia, military-political considerations serve as the and 2010–2013. Therefore, Russia’s growing interest and Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019 45 At this juncture, it must be noted that the year 2013 was of crucial importance. It signified practi- cal implementation of previously-elab- orated theoretical precepts fully com- plying with the “new generation warfare” con- cept promoted by General Gerasimov. This process took a double-track form, reflected in the cre- ation of the