Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection 2000-12 þÿThe Enemy s Access Denial System: Potential Competitor Exploitation of U. S. Military Vulnerabilities. Harney, Robert C. Monterey, California: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/13858 THE ENEMY’S ACCESS DENIAL SYSTEM POTENTIAL COMPETITOR EXPLOITATION OF U. S. MILITARY VULNERABILITIES Dr. Robert C. Harney NPS-JW-01-014 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) The Naval Postgraduate School mission is to increase the combat effectiveness of U. S. and Al- lied armed forces and enhance the security of the U.S.A. through advanced education and re- search programs focused on the technical, analytical, and managerial tools needed to confront defense-related challenges. Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis (IJWA) The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis was founded in 1994 with the mission of addressing the problems of the joint defense arena with the academic disciplines resident at NPS. It sponsors a wide ranging research program, curriculum development focused on joint warfare, and interac- tion with numerous services and DoD organizations. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or any other U. S. Government agency. Institute of Joint Warfare Analysis Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, 93943-5000 2 NPS-JW-01-014 THE ENEMY’S ACCESS DENIAL SYSTEM POTENTIAL COMPETITOR EXPLOITATION OF U. S. MILITARY VULNERABILITIES Dr. Robert C. Harney NAVSEA Chair of Total Ship Systems Engineering (Combat Systems) 7 December 2000 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943 3 Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send com- ments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to: Washing- ton Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202- 4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES blank) 7 December 2000 COVERED Technical 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS The Enemy’s Access Denial System: Potential Competitor Exploitation of U. S. Military Vulnerabilities 6. AUTHOR(S) Robert C. Harney Not Applicable 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZ- Naval Postgraduate School ATION REPORT NUMBER Monterey CA 93943-5000 NPS-JW-01-014 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/ None MONITORING AGENCY RE- PORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) As part of an experimental approach to “red teaming” that is studying the problem of enemy access denial systems, the author performed a detailed investigation of the vulnerabilities of the U. S. military’s power projection capabilities. The primary purpose of this document is to facilitate out-of-the-box thinking by future “red teams”. Thirty-six separate areas of vulnerability relevant to access denial were identified The vulnerabilities span all ranges from tactical to strategic, from weapons to logistics, and from military to societal. The agreement between this “list” of vulnerabilities and a previous list prepared independ- ently by the Defense Science Board is striking. There is additional strong support for this list in the specific weapons systems that the three different “red teams” involved in the access denial study (all of whom preceded the completion of this study) opted to develop for their 2020 epoch force structures. Each of the 36 vulnerabilities identified here is examined in detail to define the nature of that vulnerability, its causes, and the things that affect it. In addition, specific ways in which a potential “near peer competitor” could exploit those vulnerabilities to enhance his access denial capability are discussed. In addition to it future use in “red teaming”, it is expected that this analysis can aid: • U. S. military staff in their long-range planning activities, • the military R&D community in determining areas that need additional research, and • intelligence professionals in identifying out foreign activities that might indicate a competitor’s intent to create an access denial capability. It can also be used as a starting point for other vulnerability studies. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Vulnerability, Access Denial, Force Projection, Threat, Cruise Missiles, 15. NUMBER OF Ballistic Missiles, Submarines, Mines, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Operations, Sealift, PAGES 426 Airlift, Basing, Pre-positioned Equipment, Logistics, Intelligence, Surveillance, Disruptive Tech- nologies 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLAS- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION SIFICATION - REPORT CATION - THIS PAGE TION – ABSTRACT – ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 5 SUMMARY 9 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION – THE AREA DENIAL STUDY 17 CHAPTER 2. VULNERABILITIES & RESPONSES 21 CHAPTER 3. ATTACKS USING WMD 27 Attack by Nuclear Missiles (ICBMs) 27 Attack by Weapons of Mass Destruction 32 CHAPTER 4. DIRECT ATTACKS AGAINST FORCES 37 Attack by Cruise Missiles 37 Attack by Ballistic Missiles or Superguns 41 Attack by Transatmospheric Aircraft 47 Attack by Naval Mines 49 Attack by Advanced Torpedoes 53 Attack by Advanced Non-nuclear Submarines 55 Attack by Unmanned Air Superiority Vehicles 57 Attack by Infrared Anti-Aircraft Missiles 59 CHAPTER 5. COUNTERS TO OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES 61 Reliance on Stealth 61 Jamming of GPS and GPS-Dependent Systems 64 Jamming of Precision-Guided Weapons 66 CHAPTER 6. ATTACKS ON C4I ASSETS 69 Attack by Electromagnetic Weapons 69 Attack by High-Energy Lasers 71 Attack by Information Warfare 74 Attack by Antisatellite Weapons 77 Reliance on Long-Range Airborne Surveillance 84 Susceptibility to Strategic Deception 86 Excessive Intelligence-Response Latency 89 CHAPTER 7. UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS OF ATTACK 91 Attack by Special Operations Forces 91 Limited Adverse Weather Operations Capability 96 Attack by Nonlethal Weapons 101 5 CHAPTER 8. ATTACKS ON LOGISTICS RESOURCES 105 Limited Strategic Sea/Air Lift Capability 105 Reliance on Limited Overseas Basing 109 Reliance on Pre-Positioned Equipment 111 Reliance on Underway Replenishment 114 CHAPTER 9. ATTACKS ON SOCIETAL VULNERABILITIES 117 Civilian Intolerance of Casualties 117 Restrictive Rules of Engagement 120 Civilian Intolerance of Unnecessary Hardships 124 Need for Coalition Support 127 Unequal Societal Transparency 129 Treaty Limitations 132 CHAPTER 10. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 135 Technological Surprise 135 Technological Atrophy 137 Disruptive Technologies 143 CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS 149 APPENDIX A. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 153 Nuclear Weapons 154 Biological Weapons 162 Chemical Weapons 168 Radiological Weapons 173 WMD Delivery Mechanisms 182 Proliferation of WMD 191 APPENDIX B. ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE DEFENSE 193 APPENDIX C. MISSILE NOMENCLATURE 197 APPENDIX D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 201 APPENDIX E. RADAR PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION 205 APPENDIX F. THE 3x ACCELERATION HEURISTIC 215 APPENDIX G. PRINCIPLES OF MISSILE GUIDANCE 217 Introduction 217 Navigational Guidance 220 Radio-Frequency Guidance 225 Infrared Guidance 233 APPENDIX H. STEALTH 247 6 APPENDIX I. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 253 APPENDIX J. INFORMATION WARFARE 259 APPENDIX K. NONLETHAL WEAPONS 269 APPENDIX L. RELEVANT ARMS CONTROL TREATIES 279 Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, and Agreements 279 The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocol 285 Chemical Weapon Convention 290 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 298 Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Safeguards 301 Nuclear Test Ban Treaties 312 Nuclear-Free Zones and Other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements 315 The Missile Technology Control Regime 324 ABM Treaty 327 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) & Reduction Treaties (START) 329 Environmental Modification Convention 336 Open Skies Treaty 338 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 340 APPENDIX M. POTENTIAL DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 345 REFERENCES 385 INDEX 409 BIOGRAPHY OF AUTHOR 413 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 415 7 8 SUMMARY INTRODUCTION As part of an experimental approach to “red teaming” that is studying the problem of en- emy access denial systems, the author performed a detailed investigation of the vulnerabilities of the U. S. military’s power projection capabilities, as they are likely to exist in the year 2020. The primary purpose of this document is to facilitate out-of-the-box thinking by future “red teams”. Thirty-six