Hettyey András Living with a Failed State: Somalia and the States Of

Hettyey András Living with a Failed State: Somalia and the States Of

Hettyey András Living with a Failed State: Somalia and the States of the East African Regional Security Complex 2009-2011 Dissertation 2011 ANDRÁSSY GYULA DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE UNIVERSITÄT BUDAPEST INTERDISZIPLINÄRE DOKTORSCHULE – P OLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLICHES TEILPROGRAMM LEITERIN : P ROF . D R. E LLEN BOS Hettyey András Living with a Failed State: Somalia and the States of the East African Regional Security Complex 2009-2011 Doktorvater: Prof. Dr. Kiss J. László Disputationskommission: …………………………. …………………………. …………………………. …………………………. …………………………. …………………………. Eingereicht: Oktober 2011 1 Index Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................. 6 1. 1. The object of investigation and key questions .................................................. 6 1.2. Hypothesis.......................................................................................................... 6 1.3. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 9 1.4. Time-span......................................................................................................... 10 1.5. The structure..................................................................................................... 12 1.6. Shortcomings of the paper................................................................................ 13 Chapter 2: Theoretical framework ......................................................................... 15 2.1. Literary review and the relevance of the paper................................................ 15 2.2. The theory of “failed states”............................................................................. 16 2.3. The theory of “regional security complex”...................................................... 19 2.4. Modification of the East African security complex ......................................... 21 2.5. State failure in a regional context..................................................................... 24 Chapter 3: History of Somalia................................................................................. 29 3.1. Somalia before 1991......................................................................................... 29 3.2. Somalia 1991-1995 .......................................................................................... 33 3.3. Somalia 1995-2004 .......................................................................................... 36 3.4. 2009-2011: the “TFG 2.0” ............................................................................... 40 Chapter 4: The interaction between Somalia and the states of the East African RSC ............................................................................................................................ 46 4.1. Kenya ............................................................................................................... 46 4.1.1 Inside-out effects ........................................................................................ 46 4.1.1.1. Refugees and recruitment ................................................................... 46 4.1.1.2. The threat of terrorism for Kenya ....................................................... 52 4.1.1.3. Border clashes and incidents............................................................... 65 4.1.1.4. Economy ............................................................................................. 68 4.1.2. Outside-in effects....................................................................................... 76 4.1.2.1. Training of Somali troops................................................................... 76 4.1.2.2. Diplomatic support for the TFG ......................................................... 81 4.2 Eritrea................................................................................................................ 85 4.2.1 Inside-out effects ........................................................................................ 85 4.2.2. Outside-in effects....................................................................................... 85 4.2.2.1. Military assistance and training for anti-Ethiopian factions............... 85 4.2.2.2. Eritrea’s diplomatic isolation: Resolution 1907 ................................. 96 4.3. Ethiopia .......................................................................................................... 103 4.3.1. Inside-out effects ..................................................................................... 103 4.3.1.1. Refugees............................................................................................ 103 4.3.1.2. Threat of terrorism............................................................................ 104 4.3.2. Outside-in effects..................................................................................... 111 2 4.3.2.1. Diplomatic support for the TFG ....................................................... 111 4.3.2.2. The support for Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ).............................. 112 4.3.2.3. Border clashes................................................................................... 113 4.3.2.4. Training of TFG troops..................................................................... 121 4.3.2.5. Military assistance ............................................................................ 124 4.4. Uganda ........................................................................................................... 126 4.4.1. Outside-in effects..................................................................................... 126 4.4.1.1. Diplomatic support for the TFG and AMISOM ............................... 126 4.4.1.2. Training of Somali security forces.................................................... 129 4.4.1.3. The hosting of EUTM....................................................................... 130 4.4.1.4. Military assistance to the TFG.......................................................... 132 4.4.2 Inside-out effects ...................................................................................... 133 4.4.2.1. The threat of terrorist attacks ............................................................ 133 4.4.2.2. The 11 July bombing in Kampala..................................................... 136 4.4.2.3. Ugandan opposition to AMISOM..................................................... 140 Chapter 5: Drivers and goals of the selected states’ foreign policy towards Somalia..................................................................................................................... 143 5.1. Kenya’s foreign policy towards Somalia ....................................................... 143 5.2. Eritrea’s foreign policy towards Somalia....................................................... 146 5.3. Ethiopia’s foreign policy towards Somalia .................................................... 156 5.4. Uganda’s foreign policy towards Somalia ..................................................... 162 Chapter 6: Findings of the paper .......................................................................... 169 Chapter 7: Bibliography ........................................................................................ 173 7.1. Official documents ......................................................................................... 173 7.2. Articles and monographs................................................................................ 179 7.3. Press articles................................................................................................... 191 3 Map 1: Somalia and its neighbors (Source: ESRI) 4 Somalia is a unique place, as it provides the researcher with plenty of material to study. While it has brought terrible suffering and unspeakable sorrow to its inhabitants, the on- and-off civil war that has raged in the country since 1991 presents also a rare opportunity to the interested: here, after all, is a country which has had no functioning government, army, police force, tax collection, football league or national broadcaster for twenty years. What are the reasons for this course of history? How do the Somalis cope with the failure of their state? What can policymakers do to help fix the situation and prevent other countries from taking the same route to state failure? Questions over questions, which all warrant further research. This paper only attempts to examine a little part of the huge “Somalia picture”, namely the effects of state failure on its region. No conflict occurs in an empty space. External actors 1 are invariably affected by any given conflict in their neighborhood, be it through refugee flows, disruption of economic networks and activity, arms trade or piracy. The external actors in the Somali conflict are, however, by no means only passive players. They try to minimize the negative effects coming out from Somalia, while at the same time actively influencing the situation inside the country according to their interests. It is this interaction between the states of the region and Somalia which we will try to analyze in this paper. 1 We mostly focus on states, though there are of course other external actors, like international organizations, rebel groups, multinational corporations and so on. 5 Chapter 1: Introduction 1. 1. The object of investigation and key questions The current paper is a case study. It examines the relationship between a failed state (Somalia

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