Elie Podeh. Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015. 424 pp. $65.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-4773-0560-7. Reviewed by Oren Barak Published on H-Diplo (August, 2016) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) Elie Podeh’s Chances for Peace presents a de‐ peace between Israel and the Arabs manifested it‐ tailed account of the missed opportunities for self, ranging from the agreement between Zionist peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period leader Chaim Weizmann and the Hashemite Emir 1919-2008. It also details the two opportunities for Faisal in 1919 to the Annapolis Conference in 2007 peace that culminated in the peace treaties be‐ and the subsequent talks between Israeli Prime tween Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan in Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President 1979 and 1994, respectively. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). In each case, The book starts off by defining what a Podeh presents a concise description of the oppor‐ “missed opportunity” is and presenting the major tunity (if it indeed was one), which is based pri‐ factors underpinning it. These include the degree marily on secondary sources. He then analyzes of legitimacy enjoyed by the political leadership; the causes for missing that particular opportunity the extent to which these leaders are willing, mo‐ according to the four factors outlined above, in‐ tivated, and determined to take bold steps in or‐ cluding the question of who was, or were, respon‐ der to change the situation; the level of trust be‐ sible for this outcome. tween the parties, which might be based on their Overall, Podeh’s book makes a significant con‐ past interactions; and the role of third parties in tribution to the study of the Israeli-Arab conflict promoting dialogue between the parties. Podeh and possibly to other conflicts where opportuni‐ suggests that the more factors that exist in a par‐ ties for peace have either been seized or squan‐ ticular episode the more plausible the opportuni‐ dered by the parties themselves and/or by outside ty is for peace. forces. It is systematic, informative, and draws on The book then sets out to explore a total of numerous sources, including Israeli, Arab, and twenty-eight cases where an opportunity for Western (mostly American) works. H-Net Reviews Some of the book’s conclusions are signifi‐ taries of state but also the various peace teams cant. This includes the argument that, contrary to that they assembled. This problematic role, Israeli leaders’ rhetoric, both sides to the conflict demonstrated in most of the episodes addressed have been responsible for missing opportunities in the book, stemmed, or so it seems, from the for peace and Israel has not been very keen on lack of sufficient knowledge about the Middle reaching peace with the Arabs, especially since Is‐ East, which resulted either in over-optimistic as‐ rael’s victory in the 1967 war. Podeh’s emphasis sessments of the region (demonstrated most tren‐ on the level of legitimacy of the political leader‐ chantly in the US debacle in Iraq and in various ship and these leaders’ willingness to take bold episodes in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in steps to transform the conflict is important. An‐ the 1990s) or in a hesitancy to get involved in other insight that he draws is that peacemakers what appeared to be an intractable conflict (espe‐ should start early. When policymakers—including cially since 2000). Indeed, as the book suggests, leaders of the parties to the conflict but also exter‐ only one US president, Jimmy Carter, was pre‐ nal actors—begin their peacemaking efforts early pared to fully commit himself to achieving Arab- in their tenure, the chances for their peace initia‐ Israeli peace, including adopting an evenhanded tives are higher, and these, in turn, are liable to position toward the parties and successfully em‐ reflect positively on these leaders’ legitimacy. This ploying both carrots and sticks so as to bring them was the case, for example, in the Egyptian-Israeli closer to an agreement. That the parties’ leaders— peace process in 1977-79, which was launched not Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime long after the rise to power of Menachem Begin Minister Menachem Begin—also became commit‐ and the Likud Party in Israel. It is worth remem‐ ted to the quest (after having demonstrated to one bering, however, that in later years, Prime Minis‐ another, and to themselves, the futility of other ter Begin adopted a more hawkish policy toward means) helped bridge the differences. But, as the Israel’s neighbors, which, in retrospect, can be book suggests, this was a rare occasion. seen as an attempt to make up for his early con‐ Reading through Podeh’s detailed account of cessions. At the same time, taking the initiative the various episodes of Israeli-Arab peacemaking when a leader’s tenure is coming to a close cre‐ and his analysis of the causes for the failure of the ates a situation whereby this leader’s success in large majority of these opportunities, I was left the upcoming elections impinges on peacemaking wondering whether the four variables identified efforts since it is not at all clear if the leader en‐ in the book, important as they are for accounting joys, or lacks, public support and whether his or for its main “puzzle,” are, in themselves, not un‐ her actions are geared toward achieving electoral derpinned by deeper factors that have been at success. The races against time during the second work in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the remainder term of US President Bill Clinton (1996-2000) and of this essay, let me focus on three types of factors the tenures of quite a number of Israeli prime —structural, cultural, and rational (or interest- ministers (e.g., Ehud Barak in 2001, Shimon Peres based)—drawing on the useful differentiation in 1996, and Ehud Olmert in 2008) are cases in presented by Mark Lichbach.[1] point. First of all, the power relations between the Another conclusion that can be derived from parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and even more the book is the problematic role played by most so between Israelis and Palestinians, seem crucial US administrations as well as other foreign actors, when accounting for the failure or success of op‐ who were involved in peacemaking between Is‐ portunities for peace between them. Thus, for ex‐ rael and the Arabs, especially since 1967. These ample, the period 1917-47 (the frst and third include not only US presidents and their secre‐ 2 H-Net Reviews episodes discussed in the book) saw the rise of the leaders the dialectic between war making and Jewish community in Palestine as a major politi‐ state building, suggested by Charles Tilly, was cal, economic, and military force in relation to the more appealing—or, at least, less threatening— local Palestinian Arab community as well as the than open-ended peacemaking.[2] region, not least due to the support extended to it But the role played by cultural factors in by the external actors (especially the British Man‐ peacemaking between long-time rivals, too, is im‐ date). This factor, in turn, affected its own posi‐ portant, and it cannot, moreover, be reduced to tion toward the various peacemaking efforts but the question of whether this or that leader had also that of the other side (or sides). Similarly, Is‐ sufficient legitimacy—a question that, by itself, is rael’s military victories in the wars of 1948 and quite different in democratic and nondemocratic 1967, which attested to its military power and or partially democratic settings—or the question boosted its leaders’ self-confidence, seems to have of trust between the parties and whether it exist‐ affected its (largely negative) reception of peace‐ ed or not. Indeed, for decades, Israeli and Arab making efforts in these conflicts’ aftermath. In‐ leaders, as well as the political, educational, bu‐ deed, it was only after the 1973 war, when Egypt reaucratic, media, and security institutions of (and, to a lesser extent, Syria) managed to create a their states, have been propagating the idea that balance of power with Israel, that Israeli leaders the other side is evil and treacherous, and is part became willing to consider trading for peace of a culture that is, essentially, belligerent. It is not some—but not all—of the territories that they had surprising that when opportunities for peacemak‐ occupied in 1967. The same is true with regard to ing did offer themselves, leaders who sought to Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, where Is‐ change course often became prisoners of their rael, the more powerful side, never accepted a own device. Noted examples include Sadat who balanced relationship between the parties, includ‐ was assassinated in 1981 and Israeli Prime Minis‐ ing during the period of the Israeli-Palestinian ter Yitzhak Rabin who was assassinated in 1995. peace process (1993-2001). In fact, Podeh’s book Whereas in the frst case the peace treaty between suggests that Israel made only one sincere peace Egypt and Israel remained intact, in the second overture to the Palestinians, in Camp David in case the peace process between Israel and the 2000, and even then its proponent, Prime Minister Palestinians was effectively derailed. Barak did not have a detailed plan and mainly im‐ Last but not least, actors—be it individuals or provised. As it is well known, the result was not groups—and the roles they play in matters of war the replication of the successful Camp David sum‐ and peace are highly important when trying to ac‐ mit between US President Carter, Egyptian Presi‐ count for the failure or success of peacemaking, dent Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Begin in including in the various episodes discussed in 1978, but, rather, an outcome that was reminis‐ Podeh’s book.