Introduction and overview JULIE SMITH Where does Europe begin and end? At one level, this question seems facile: most children could draw a geographical outline of Europe. Yet, there are many other ways—economic, political, cultural, and religious—of defining Europe. Such definitions frequently overlap and create tensions between states, including and among existing members of ‘European’ organizations. Europe’s external borders seem far from clear, while internal borders seem increasingly complicated. For forty years, the Cold War helped to determine which countries were allied and helped to frame institutionalized Europe of East and West. NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Communities were all products of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War was met with euphoria across Europe, but brought with it a series of unforeseen problems that have yet to be resolved. New states emerged after the collapse of communism: in 1993 Czechoslovakia split peacefully into two sovereign states, and in 1991 the Soviet Union split, rather less cleanly, creating instability and security threats, albeit of a different nature from those of the Cold War. Thus, a large number of economically and *politically weak states emerged, all seeking support, with many hoping for membership of Western institutions. The war in Chechyna is a continuing sign that the situation there is far from resolved. The breakup of Yugoslavia was bloodier and repeated Balkans wars have posed severe challenges for the region as well as for NATO and the EU. The Balkan wars have highlighted problems within the NATO alliance, most notably over Europe’s contribution of less than 20 per cent of the total air sorties in the bombardment of Serbia in the spring of 1999. This has resulted in a rethink of the European contribution to NATO and moves towards the creation of a European rapid reaction corps. All the West European Cold War organizations have faced questions about institutional reform, if and when to enlarge, and those concerning their particular roles in the post-Cold War world. The end of the Cold War has also raised problems of asylum and immigration, in part associated with the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and has contributed to an increase in the number of illegal migrants as International Affairs 76, () ‒ 76_3_01_Smith 437 9/6/00, 1:29 pm Julie Smith travel across borders has become easier. This in turn has affected domestic politics in Western Europe as voters and political parties have voiced concern about the influx of foreigners. Christina Boswell discusses all these issues in her article. Political borders During the Cold War the ‘Iron Curtain’ effectively marked the eastern border of ‘Europe’ for most Westerners. A select group of six, largely Catholic states, created the European Community, and liberal democratic states in Western Europe enjoyed increasing prosperity. Coupled with a security guarantee from the Americans in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the result was a stable, secure European order, in which West Europeans could con- centrate on improving their economic situation with little consideration for questions of security or defence. The socialist, command economies to the east owed their loyalty, if not their hearts, to the Soviet Union. The borders drawn during the Cold War were always artificial. Culturally and historically central Europe belongs with those countries that began the integration process: to deny that Poland, Hungary, and the then Czechoslovakia are European is not a tenable argument. Yet, for forty years these countries, along with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria, were outside the Western sphere of influence. The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe (CEE) fundamentally altered Western attitudes towards the concept of Europe. Geographical boundaries may have remained largely unchanged, but, as William Wallace highlights in his article, organizations whose membership was fixed for decades were suddenly faced with a flood of new candidates, all seeking a ‘return to Europe’ and to demonstrate their Europeanness. Martin Walker in his article uses the idea of a variety of ‘mental maps’ to illustrate the US perspective of the complexity of Europe. Security, economic, political, cultural, religious and geographical maps together contribute to the formation of composite views of Europe, which differ from country to country. Americans, perhaps, have a rather broader vision of Europe than West Europeans and, for example, are rather more willing to envisage an EU with Turkey as a member. Institutional borders Within any defined concept of Europe, borders persist, frequently overlapping other definitions of Europe. The clearest, and those requiring the highest standards of its members, are those delimiting the EU and NATO, yet the latter contains two non-European states, Canada and the United States, and does not count some core European states, such as Austria and Sweden, among its members. In general, there is the problem of asymmetry: countries east of the Caucasus may have been included in the OSCE and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), but they are unlikely ever to be considered for European Union membership. 438 76_3_01_Smith 438 9/6/00, 1:29 pm Introduction and overview The EU sets high standards for candidate countries. The Copenhagen summit of 1993 outlined clear criteria for EU membership including stable democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, functioning market economies, and the ability to adopt and implement the full acquis communautaire. In practice, membership of the Council of Europe is often seen as the basic test for the human rights requirements of EU membership, although this hurdle does not give any guarantees about EU membership. Turkey is a long-standing member of the Council of Europe and Russia has managed to join, as have many central and east European states, including Albania, which agreed to end the death penalty in order to join. To American eyes, such standards can perhaps seem stringent, given that many US states maintain the death penalty. This can, to some extent, explain Americans’ inability to see why Turkey’s membership of the EU cannot be a foregone conclusion. Turkey is, after all, a member of NATO and the Council of Europe, and its leaders want to join the EU. Yet its refusal to relinquish the death penalty is, alongside its fragile democracy, weak economy and poor treatment of the Kurds, certainly a part of the case for those Europeans who are reluctant to envisage an EU including Turkey. If Russia and Turkey can join the Council of Europe, then surely they must be European? In some senses Russia is profoundly European, yet it is a vast country bordering China to the east, with much of it lying geographically in Asia. As Vladimir Baranovsky explains in his article: ‘Half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in Europe’. Similarly, Istanbul may lie in Europe, and Zeugma, in south- eastern Turkey, may have been a Roman city, but most of Turkey is in Asia. Thus, on purely geographical grounds, Turkey, like Russia, is often seen not to be European or, more confusingly, in the case of Russia an entirely artificial line is drawn using claims that Russia as far as the Urals is European. Yet anyone seeking a European Union reaching as far as the Urals seems to expect a remarkable change in political realities, not to mention in Russia’s borders. Borders in the mind While Europe was divided politically and constitutionally during the Cold War, attitudes and prejudices divide Europe in the twenty-first century. The idea that some states may join the EU but others not, creates hostility and alienation among those who are excluded. Ukraine is already in a difficult position, caught between the possibility of closer ties with Russia and Belarus or with the West. This creates tensions within Ukraine, although the current preference seems to be for greater cooperation with the West and ultimately membership of the EU and NATO. Yet, this also has its problems; the EU might wish Ukraine to espouse Western values, but there is little enthusiasm for Ukrainian membership of the EU in the foreseeable future. Other forms of cooperation and association are thus urgently needed in order to avoid hostility and alienation in countries that are European in geographical and historical terms, but which are not yet ready for EU membership. 439 76_3_01_Smith 439 9/6/00, 1:29 pm Julie Smith One of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century is to avoid creating impenetrable legal borders that render cross-border cooperation more difficult than at present. Such borders could easily arise between new EU member states and those countries left outside in the medium to long term. This could severely impede bilateral relationships that have been nurtured since the end of the Cold War, such as that between Poland and Ukraine. As Heather Grabbe points up in her contribution there is a very real danger that the introduction of Schengen borders and the visa requirements they can entail, will create difficulties between, for instance, Hungary and Romania. Solutions must be found to ensure that those countries remaining outside some or all of the many European organizations, do not feel unfairly excluded. Questions of ‘insiders and outsiders in the new Europe’ are extremely complex. The various European organizations are expanding at different speeds and their final memberships will undoubtedly differ. Some countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are likely to be members of all the European clubs; others, including the Baltic states, may join the EU but not NATO; others again may have to make do with PfP and the Council of Europe. (Of course, some, such as Switzerland, might well feel this continues to be as far as they want to go.) Persistent geopolitical realities and differing historical and cultural patterns, not to mention levels of economic development across Europe, account for most of these differences.