RUSSIA VS GEORGIA: THE FALLOUT Europe Report N°195 – 22 August 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE VIOLENCE......................................................................... 1 II. MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE AND KEEPING PEACE .................................... 4 III. IMPLICATIONS FOR GEORGIA ................................................................................. 7 A. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY .............................................................................................................7 B. NATO MEMBERSHIP .................................................................................................................10 C. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ...............................................................13 1. Energy..................................................................................................................................13 2. Economy..............................................................................................................................14 3. Politics .................................................................................................................................15 IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA.................................................................................... 16 A. RUSSIAN MOTIVATIONS BEYOND GEORGIA ..............................................................................17 B. POINTS OF LEVERAGE WITH RUSSIA...........................................................................................19 V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU AND U.S................................................................... 21 A. THE EU APPROACH ...................................................................................................................21 B. THE U.S. POLICY OPTIONS ........................................................................................................25 VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE............................................................................................................. 26 A. THE UNITED NATIONS ...............................................................................................................26 B. RUSSIA’S R2P JUSTIFICATION....................................................................................................28 C. ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY.....................................................................................................29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GEORGIA ............................................................................................................................31 B. MAP OF SOUTH OSSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIAN AND OSSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ................................................................................................32 C. JPKF AND TBILISI MAPS OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTH OSSETIA PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ................................................................................................................33 D. MAP OF GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT ZONE PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 ........................................34 E. 15-16 AUGUST CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND SIDE-LETTER.............................................................35 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................39 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2005....................................................40 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................42 Europe Report N°195 22 August 2008 RUSSIA VS GEORGIA: THE FALLOUT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the con- ity for the humanitarian consequences of the violence, temporary geopolitical world, with large consequences as tens of thousands of civilians in South Ossetia, for peace and security in Europe and beyond. Mos- Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been displaced cow’s initial moves into South Ossetia as large-scale amid disturbing reports of atrocities. violence broke out there on 7-8 August were in part a response to a disastrous miscalculation by a Georgian Western nations must eschew the worst of the Cold leadership that was impatient with gradual confidence War mentality that would further isolate Russia, but building and a Russian-dominated negotiations proc- engagement, as UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband ess. But Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with has put it, has to be “hard-headed”. Russia cannot be movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into allowed to maintain a military force in Georgia except Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction as part of an international peacekeeping mission with of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy non-Russian command, with a clear and mutually ac- and disruption of communications and movement ceptable mandate in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The between different regions of the country, constitutes ceasefire signed on 15-16 August must be respected, a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations. It has and Russian troops must return promptly to the posi- undermined regional stability and security; threatened tions they held on 7 August, honouring the spirit of energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims a loosely worded agreement. International monitors with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities should be deployed in Georgia proper to observe Rus- that could be used to destabilise other parts of the sian withdrawal and return of displaced persons former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; (IDPs) and then serve as an interim measure to help and shown disregard for international law. maintain the ceasefire in South Ossetia and Abkhazia until a peacekeeping mission can be created. Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion Russian participation is probably necessary as a prac- of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from tical matter in the peacekeeping mission, although the independence of Kosovo to the placement of serious questions should be raised about the motives missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a of the Russian forces that Moscow describes as peace- concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet keepers. Command and composition should be genu- states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness inely international. All Georgian and Ossetian civilians in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the displaced since 7 August need to be immediately allowed personality and world view of Russia’s predominant to return to their homes. The Russians and Georgians leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. should agree to and cooperate with investigations to establish responsibility for human rights abuses during Georgia, too, has mishandled its relationships with the conflict, including by the International Criminal Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2004, Court (ICC) and perhaps the Organization for Secu- abandoning real confidence building and often fol- rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). lowing confrontational policies towards the conflict regions. With patience it might have demonstrated None of this will be easy or even possible without a that the regions would be better served by enjoying combination of significant pressures and pragmatic extensive autonomy within an increasingly prosper- incentives to gain essential Russian approval. Mos- ous and democratising Georgia. Instead, President cow must be made to understand the advantages for Mikheil Saakashvili and a small inner circle of belli- its prestige, power and economy of being a partner in cose officials used menacing and arrogant rhetoric ensuring security in Europe rather than an outlier, that made the dispute with Moscow and the conflict subject to threats of exclusion from such institutions regions bitter and personal. All sides bear responsibil- as the G8 and World Trade Organization (WTO). Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout Crisis Group Europe Report N°195, 22 August 2008 Page ii The crisis also reflects serious mistakes by the U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS and the European Union (EU) in Georgia since 2004, most significantly failing to adequately press Presi- To the Russian and Georgian Governments dent Saakashvili to abandon a quick-fix approach to- and the De Facto South Ossetian and Abkhazian ward restoring Georgian control over South Ossetia Authorities: and Abkhazia. The Georgian army was trained and sold weapons without ensuring that these would not 1. Implement immediately and fully the six-point be used to recover the conflict territories, and Russia’s ceasefire agreement signed on 15-16 August 2008. anger over these actions and other perceived post- 2. Assist monitoring of compliance by a strength- Cold War slights was misread. Instead of concentrat- ened OSCE Georgia Mission, with full freedom ing on democratic institutions and rule of law, the of movement throughout the country, until a more U.S. too often focused its support on Saakashvili per- permanent and substantial international peace- sonally, even as he engaged in reckless and authoritar- keeping mission can be authorised and deployed. ian behaviour. As the long-frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to heat up, Georgia’s 3. Allow and