Notes Chapter 1 International Norms and the Practice of Sovereignty 1 (Kindleberger, 1987: p. 87). 2 See for example the work of Carolyn Nordstrom (Nordstrom, 2000; Nordstrom, 2003; Nordstrom, 2004). 3 For example, the case made against the Seychelles in 1995, when they passed legislation for an economic development act offering citizenship to anyone, with a provision providing immunity from criminal prosecution, if they had an investment greater than $10 million. Under intense interna- tional pressure, the legislation was rescinded (Glynn et al., 1997: pp. 24–25). 4 This perspective does not take into account another significant reason for capital mobility – return on investment. Even with equivalent taxes, some locations will continue to offer a higher rate of return on invest- ments, and capital will seek that return. 5 See below, Tables 1.2 through 1.5 for specific data. 6 Immigration moreover possesses its own version of ‘non-tariff’ barriers, for example training and education prerequisites (transferral of accredi- tation) and licensing requirements. 7 (Baines, 2002: 344, citing Ron Martin, ‘Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic Autonomy: The End of Geography?’ in S. Corbridge, R. Martin and N. Thrift (eds), Money, Power and Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)). 8 This practice helps to explain the substantial number of international business companies registered in such places as the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and the British Virgin Islands. 9 (United Kingdom. Public Record Office, 1974: folio 67) These communica- tions involved the development of a letter (dated 30 August 1974) from the British Prime Minister in reply to a letter from the Australian Prime Minister (23 July 1974) expressing the concerns of Australian Revenue authorities with their residents’ use of New Hebrides as a ‘tax haven’. 10 For a consideration of tax competition from this perspective, see (Bjorvatn and Schjelderup, 2002) And with regard to related anti-money launder- ing initiatives, see (Tsingou, 2005). 11 See for example (United Kingdom. Public Record Office, 1963). Chapter 2 Sovereignty and Taxation 1 (Ruggie, 1993: p. 162) Ruggie is citing (Wight, 1977: p. 135). 2 F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), especially Chapter 1. 165 166 Notes 3 For a discussion of the Taiwan case, and its position as a state in the Westphalian sense, but not in the international legal sense see (Madsen, 2001). 4 Hans Blix, Sovereignty, Aggression, and Neutrality (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1970), p. 10, as cited in (Fowler and Bunck, 1995: p. 71). 5 Such a ‘collective concept’ has been refined into the term ‘meme’ and a field of study known as ‘memetics.’ For one view of this phenomenon of the transfer of a cultural practice or idea from one mind to another, see (Blackmore, 1999). 6 This matter of decertification would lead to the loss of US foreign aid and a US veto on any loans and loan guarantees by international financial institutions. 7 However tax-payer activity was suggested by Lorz when analyzing the effects of tax competition for interest group lobbying; and also by Sørensen when he analyzed the impact of tax coordination relative to income (re)distribution. See (Lorz, 1998; Sørensen, 2000). 8 For a review of the tax compliance literature see (Andreoni et al., 1998). 9 Similar efforts are made with respect to determining the size of the money laundering problem, see (Walker, 1999). 10 Two Norwegian economists reached a different conclusion. In their paper they demonstrate ‘that international spillovers from public goods reduce tax competition. In fact, in the case of purely international public goods, there will be no tax competition at all. Underprovision of public goods will however prevail due to the free-rider problem.’ (Bjorvatn and Schjelderup, 2002: p. 119) 11 While a ‘benevolent maximizer’ state is not necessarily also a ‘welfare’ state, the challenge to increase (or even to maintain) tax revenue in the face of tax competition is felt to confront the welfare state more urgently, see (Tanzi, 2002). 12 There is a more fundamental question present in Alesina and Angeletos’ paper concerning public perceptions of state social welfare support. These perceptions about the level of need and quantity of state welfare provision obviously have a direct impact on levels of taxation. For this latter question on social preferences, see also (Alesina et al., 2001). For a discussion of the incorporation of morals and social aspects in economic research, see the review article by (Andreoni et al., 1998). 13 As explained by Kay and King, residence is the state where one lived in a particular tax year; ordinary residence is the state where one usually lives; and domicile is the state with which one ‘has the strongest associations’. While for many of us these are all the same, there are a number of UK citizens where it is not the case, thus the benefit of offshore banking. 14 As a starting point on this debate, see (Collison and Tiley, 2003: pp. 1197–1203). Naturally, as with all discussions of individual income tax, this comes with the standard disclaimer to consult with one’s tax professional on one’s individual circumstances. 15 While this approach reduces tax obligations to a state, it does increase the value of the firm to its owners/share holders (who are presumably Notes 167 taxed in some jurisdiction). This tactic also intersects with the question of fairness and redistribution, as it benefits the few (owners/share holders) without redistribution of income to the many (public or public goods). Though if it is a publicly traded firm, it is possible those shareholders include mutual funds and pension plans, increasing the number of citizens that compose the ‘few’. Furthermore, in a fashion similar to individuals renouncing citizenship, firms may undertake a ‘corporate inversion’, in which the firm ‘sells’ itself to an offshore affiliate for the purpose of trans- ferring corporate residence (citizenship) in order to reduce its corporate taxes. This strategy became a political issue in the US in 2002, initiated after the announcement by Stanley Works of its intention to ‘relocate’ to Bermuda (Walker, 2002; Kun, 2004; Desai and Hines, 2002). 16 At issue is the legality of enforcement beyond the borders of the state in which the law has been enacted, particularly when in this case tax evasion is not consistently considered a crime in all jurisdictions. Nevertheless, Jeffery felt that ‘To say that enforcement jurisdiction is the prime regulator in international law is to confuse theory with practice. Just because a law cannot in practice be enforced does not in any way relate to its legality or otherwise.’ (p. 117) Chapter 3 Global Financial Governance and Tax Competition 1 As discussed in the previous chapter, this is the argument made by Jeffery concerning the impact of globalization. As will be seen below, the OECD identifies globalization as a concern with respect to taxation as well. 2 In general see the work of Susan Strange and Philip Cerny. 3 See for example (Razin and Sadka, 1991; Avi-Yonah, 2000). 4 Prior to this, it was simply part of the underlying (predicate) crime that it helped serve to conceal, see (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1995: p. 3). 5 However a caution is offered by Michael Levi, ‘…it is not clear how much Russian money was related, respectively, to drugs, to organized crime, or to capital flight searching for an economically and politically safer home.’ (Levi, 2002: p. 189) 6 For more on the subject of money laundering and efforts to suppress it, see (Reuter and Truman, 2004; Gilmore, 2004; Cuéllar, 2003; Levi, 2002). 7 The argument that the OECD project is merely an extension of the long struggle within the EU to achieve tax harmonization may be overstated. Certainly, Japan and the Clinton Administration in the US were strong supporters for the project inside the OECD. For example, ‘It is therefore not surprising that Japan, the most rapidly ageing OECD country, insti- gated the OECD work against tax havens and tax competition in 1995.’ (Dwyer, 2002: p. 1) Further, it could be that government officials in Japan were concerned with the potential for increased tax avoidance by 168 Notes citizens in response to several iterations of new tax legislation imposed during the 1990s (Seabrooke, 2006: Chapter 6, ‘The Financial Reform Nexus in Japan’). Regardless, the confluence of the EU initiative with the OECD project would be too fortuitous simply to be coincidence; and the current state of play for the EU Savings Tax Directive reinforces the need for a global information exchange regime. See for example (Sharman, 2006: p. 31). 8 For an analysis of their calculations (which develops an argument that they are inflated as a result of the assumptions made in the analysis), see (Mitchell, 2001a). 9Rajiv Biswas, a Senior Economist in the Commonwealth Secretariat has suggested that the OECD ‘ring-fenced’ out of the definition of harmful economic practices such things as agricultural subsidies (for instance the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union) (Biswas, 2001). The absence of FDI however may not be critical, as discussed in Chapter 1 some research suggests that tax competition among states and sub-state entities for FDI has limited influence on business decisions. Much more important to businesses are matters of infrastructure, local workforce education and skills, political environment, etc. (a decision-making approach which has also been self-reported by major multinational corporations), see (Oman, 2000). 10 Recall the definition of avoidance – minimizing tax owed, within the letter of the law. This observation generally follows the hyperglobalist thesis as sketched out in (Held et al., 1999: pp.