CSIS__________________________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 Phone: (202) 775-3270 Fax: (202) 466-4740 Internet: CSIS.ORG The Lessons of Desert Fox: A Preliminary Analysis Anthony H. Cordesman Co-Director CSIS Middle East Studies Program February 16, 1999 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Desert Fox: Preliminary Lessons 2/17/99 Page ii This is a rough draft of a work in progress. The author would appreciate comments, and will revise this paper extensively, as further damage assessment data become available. Please check CSIS.ORG to find the latest version . Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Desert Fox: Preliminary Lessons 2/17/99 Page iii Table of Contents THE HERITAGE OF THE GULF WAR ........................................................................................................... 2 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE GULF WAR .................................................................... 3 Table One: The Size of Iraqi Forces in the KTO Killed During the Ground War: Differences Between the USCENTCOM and GWAPS Estimates .....................................................................................................................6 Table Two – Part One: UN Coalition Air Strikes by Mission During Desert Storm ....................................................7 Table Two – Part Two: Key Munitions Used by US Aircraft in the KTO ...................................................................8 THE LIMITS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JOINT VISION 2010..................... 9 ENTER DESERT FOX........................................................................................................................................ 9 Table Three: Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, and Desert Fox.................................................................................. 11 THE NON-BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS................................................................................................................... 11 Strikes Without Adequate Political Preparation.......................................................................................... 12 The Problem of Goals and Objectives ......................................................................................................... 14 Impeachment and the Credibility Crisis ...................................................................................................... 19 POLITICAL WARFARE: THE US GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO BRIEF DESERT FOX..................................................... 20 THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF DESERT FOX: MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND TARGETING............. 23 · TAJI: MILITARY AIR BASE, MISSILE DESIGN AND PRODUCTION FACILITY ...................................................... 27 · SAMARRA: AIR DEFENSE SITES ................................................................................................................. 27 REPORTING AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ON DECEMBER 17TH ....................................................... 28 DESERT FOX AS OF DECEMBER 18TH ...................................................................................................... 31 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE US BRIEFINGS................................................................................. 32 Table Four: Description of Targets and Battle Damage Assessment Released on Friday, December 18, 1998........... 38 THE MECHANICS OF “INFORMATION DOMINANCE .............................................................................................. 39 Dealing with the Problem of Education....................................................................................................... 40 Battle Damage Assessment: Sound Bites Bite Back..................................................................................... 41 DESERT FOX AS OF DECEMBER 19TH ...................................................................................................... 42 THE PROBLEM OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................ 44 THE GROWING PROBLEM OF BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT .............................................................................. 50 THE BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DATA PROVIDED ON DECEMBER 19TH......................................................... 59 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Desert Fox: Preliminary Lessons 2/17/99 Page iv Table Five: Damage Assessment as of 0800 EST on December 19, 1998 ................................................................. 60 DESERT FOX TERMINATES ON THE NIGHT OF DECEMBER 19TH WITHOUT A CLEAR CONFLICT TERMINATION STRATEGY.......................................................................................................................... 60 THE PENTAGON BRIEFS THE END OF DESERT FOX .............................................................................................. 62 TALK SHOWS, TIMING, AND CONFLICT TERMINATION........................................................................................ 68 PLAYING AGAINST A WEAK HAND: THE IRAQI COLLATERAL DAMAGE RESPONSE EFFORT FOLDS......................... 70 ASSESSING DESERT FOX AND THE “NEW MATH” OF BDA ON DECEMBER 21ST ............................ 73 THE SUMMARY BRIEFING AND PRESS CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 21ST ............................................................. 73 THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF DESERT FOX.............................................................. 88 THE “NEW MATH” OF DAMAGE CLAIMS ON DECEMBER 21ST ............................................................................. 89 Table Six: Desert Fox Damage Assessment as of 1400 on December 21, 1998......................................................... 93 Figure One: Victory in Desert Fox: What a Difference a Change in Definitions Makes in Less Than a Day.............. 94 Figure Two: Victory in Desert Fox: Destroyed and Severe Damage on Dec 19 versus Full Success on Dec 21.......... 95 .Figure Three: Victory in Desert Fox: Success by Category of Target Announced on December 21 ........................... 96 THE UNSETTLED ISSUE OF WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS......................................................................................... 97 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC IMPACT BY TARGET SET................................................ 98 CONCEALMENT SITES FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION............................................................................. 99 Counterproliferation, Intimidation, or Destabilization................................................................................ 99 Physical Damage to Concealment Sites and the “Empty Building” Problem............................................. 101 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INDUSTRIAL TARGETS................................................................................. 103 Strikes on Missile Production Facilities.................................................................................................... 104 Strikes on Iraqi RPV Facilities.................................................................................................................. 104 Surviving Chemical and Biological Capabilities....................................................................................... 105 Counterproliferation and Strategic Bombing ............................................................................................ 106 COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES ............................................................................................................. 107 REPUBLICAN GUARDS HEADQUARTERS............................................................................................................ 110 AIR BASES AND AIR BASE FACILITIES .............................................................................................................. 117 INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES................................................................ 120 Table Nine............................................................................................................................................................ 127 INDUSTRIAL TARGETS: THE BASRA OIL REFINERY ........................................................................................... 146 THE LESSONS OF DESERT FOX ................................................................................................................ 147 Table Eight: Desert Fox: Possible US Objectives and Resulting Impact ................................................................. 149 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. We need to take a hard look at the lessons of Desert Fox. There is no doubt that the operation achieved some important successes. The strikes did degrade some important aspects of Iraqi capabilities. They demonstrated that the US and Britain were willing to use major amounts of force to maintain containment and the UN sanctions. While Gulf allies like Qatar and Saudi Arabia limited their direct support for US operations, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman provided close cooperation. Simultaneously, the US proved that it could launch major attacks from sea-based forces in the Gulf and bombers based in Diego Garcia, and that its capabilities were not tied to the support of any given combination of Southern Gulf states. The US and Britain took no losses of either men or equipment during major operation, and most