UCRL-ID-142036 CGSR-2001-001 Verifying the Agreed Framework April 2001 The Center for Global Security Research The Center for International Security (CGSR), established in 1996, brings together and Cooperation (CISAC) is a multidiscipli- diverse expert communities to address com- nary community dedicated to research and mon challenges with significant policy implica- training in issues of international security. The tions. The Center studies how technology can Center, part of the Institute for International enhance national security and expand knowl- Studies (IIS) at Stanford University, promotes edge of the policy–technology interface. The a creative and collaborative environment in CGSR draws strength from its affiliation with which scholars, scientists, government offi- the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory cials, military officers, and business leaders (LLNL), a Department of Energy national lab- can produce policy-relevant research to oratory managed by the University of address complex international problems. California. By supporting research that explic- itly considers both technical and policy factors Center for International Security and Cooperation involved in defense programs, arms control, Stanford University nonproliferation, peacekeeping, and related Encina Hall international issues, the Center contributes to Stanford, CA 94305-6165 national and international security. Phone: 650.723.9625 Fax: 650.723.0089 Center for Global Security Research Web: http://cisac.stanford.edu Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory P.O. Box 808 (L-189) Livermore, CA 94551 Phone: 925.422.6141 Fax: 925.422.5252 Web: http://cgsr.llnl.gov UCRL-ID-142036 CGSR-2001-001 Verifying the Agreed Framework April 2001 Michael May, General Editor Chaim Braun George Bunn Zachary Davis James Hassberger Ronald Lehman Wayne Ruhter William Sailor Robert Schock Nancy Suski GLOSSARY AF neutrons. The most common of these Low-enriched uranium (LEU) Agreed Framework, signed in 1994 materials are uranium-235 (235U) and uranium containing more than 0.71 between the US and the DPRK, to plutonium-239 (239Pu). Uranium-233 percent and less than 20 percent urani- negotiate nuclear issues on the Korean (233U) is also fissile. um-235 (235U). Most modern light- peninsula water power reactors use 3–5 percent Fuel-fabrication facility/plant LEU. LEU is insufficiently enriched in Agreement for Cooperation facility where nuclear materials (e.g., 235U to be used for nuclear explosives. what US law requires the US govern- enriched or natural uranium) are fabri- ment to negotiate with countries cated into fuel elements to be inserted Magnox (including the DPRK) before US into a reactor uranium nuclear fuel with magnesium- nuclear materials or US nuclear com- alloy cladding. Because this cladding ponents can be provided for reactors Fuel-grade plutonium corrodes easily, this type of fuel is diffi- for those countries, including the ROK plutonium containing less than 80 per- cult to store safely for a long period of reactors which KEDO plans to send to cent plutonium-239 (239Pu) and 7 to 18 time or dispose of in a geologic reposi- DPRK pursuant to the AF percent plutonium-240 (240Pu) tory. Typically, irradiated magnox fuel is reprocessed shortly after it is BOL Gas-graphite reactor removed from the reactor core. Beginning of Life, generally used with a nuclear reactor cooled by a gas and BOL fuel, the first cycle in a reactor moderated by graphite MW(e) Megawatt-electric, used in reference to Burnup Highly enriched uranium (HEU) a nuclear power plant, equals one mil- a measure of the thermal energy pro- uranium in which the percentage of lion watts of electricity duced per mass of fuel (usually meas- uranium-235 (235U) is raised ured in megawatts-thermal-days per (“enriched”) from a natural level of MW(th) tonne [MWth-d/t]) 0.71 percent to greater than 20 percent. Megawatt-thermal, one million watts All HEU can be used to make nuclear of heat Control rods explosives, although a very large rods of neutron-absorbing material quantity is required for HEU enriched Natural uranium inserted into the core of a reactor to to only 20 percent. uranium containing 0.71 percent urani- control its operations. Pushing in the um-235 (235U) rods decreases the rate of reaction, IAEA while removing the rods increases the International Atomic Energy Agency NPT rate of reaction. Non-Proliferation Treaty INFCIRC Core Information Circular, a series of IAEA Nuclear fuel cycle the central part of a nuclear reactor documents regarding safeguards, etc. the entire life cycle of nuclear fuel, containing the fuel rods, moderator, including the front end (initial mining, and control rods, where the nuclei of IRT reactor milling, conversion, enrichment and the fuel fission and release energy Soviet-designed research reactor fuel fabrication), reactor irradiation fueled with enriched uranium and (and resulting power generation), and DPRK moderated with water the back end (including spent-fuel Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, storage, reprocessing and recycling, commonly called North Korea KEDO and disposal) Korean Peninsula Energy Enrichment Development Organization ROK the process of increasing the concentra- Republic of Korea, commonly called tion of one isotope of a given element KSNP South Korea (in the case of uranium, increasing the Korea Standard Nuclear Plant concentration of uranium-235). Also, the Safeguards Agreement An agreement resulting concentration of that isotope. Kumho site of a country having nuclear activities location where the KEDO-supplied with the IAEA providing for safe- EOL reactors are being built in North Korea guards (nuclear material accounting End of Life, generally used with EOL and control plus periodic inspections) fuel, the third cycle in a reactor Light-water reactor (LWR) to assure that nuclear material is not a reactor that uses ordinary water as a diverted to nuclear explosives Fissile material moderator and coolant and low- material composed of atoms that fission enriched uranium as fuel when irradiated by slow (“thermal”) CONTENTS Introduction: Verification and the Challenges to Constructive Engagement with North Korea . 1 Technical Questions, Strategic Implications . 1 Nuclear Cooperation: Two Sides of a Coin . 2 Means Versus Ends . 3 Program Management, IAEA Interaction, and Challenges to Preventive Diplomacy . 3 Dynamics of Technology–Policy Interaction . 4 By What Standard Shall We Judge, and When? . 5 Verifying the Agreed Framework: Executive Summary . 7 Safeguarding the Nuclear-Power Reactors Provided by KEDO . 7 Verification of the DPRK’s Declaration and of the Disposal and Dismantlement of Identified or Suspect Nuclear Facilities . 8 Verification of DPRK’s Declaration . 8 Verification of the Disposal and Dismantlement of Identified Yongbyon Facilities . 9 Verification Regarding Other Suspect Facilities . 10 Possible Adverse Developments . 10 Further Delays . 10 Non-Cooperation with the IAEA’s Verification of Compliance . 10 Need for an Amended DPRK Declaration . 11 Disagreements Over Material To Be Transferred from the DPRK . 11 Disagreements Over the Site of Ultimate Disposition . 12 Disagreements Over the Extent of Safeguards for KEDO Reactors . 12 Interference with Safeguards for KEDO Reactors . 12 Abrogation of AF or NPT after the KEDO Reactors Are Installed . 12 Executive Summary Conclusions . 13 Organization of Report . 13 Authors and Sponsors . 13 Chapter 1 A Brief History of the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons-Related Efforts . 15 1.1 Early History . 15 1.2 Attempts To Restrain the DPRK From Making Nuclear Weapons . 16 1.3 Agreed Framework of October 1994 . 17 Notes to Chapter 1 . 20 Chapter 2 Currently Applicable Safeguards and Related Agreements . 23 2.1 The Existing IAEA–DPRK Safeguards Agreement . 23 2.2 New Information That the IAEA May Ask of All States Under INFCIRC 153 Safeguards . 24 2.3 Additions to INFCIRC 153 Safeguards for States Willing To Agree to a New INCFIRC 540 Safeguards Protocol . 24 2.3.1 Safeguards on Existing ROK LWRs—Models for the DPRK LWRs . 25 2.4 Major Challenges Ahead to the Implementation of the Agreed Framework . 26 2.4.1 Completion of a “Significant Portion” of the First Reactor in the ROK and Reactor Buildings in the DPRK . 26 2.4.2 Financing . 26 2.4.3 Nuclear Liability . 26 2.4.4 US–DPRK “Agreement for Cooperation” and IAEA Inspection of Undeclared Facilities . 26 2.4.5 Improving North Korea’s Electricity Distribution System . 27 Notes to Chapter 2 . 27 Chapter 3 The KEDO Reactors and Associated Facilities and Activities . 29 3.1 Introduction . 29 3.2 The KEDO Site . 29 3.3 Nuclear-Power Development Along the Shores of the East Sea . 30 3.4 Site Work to Date . 31 3.5 Nuclear-Fuel Shipments Into and Out of the Site . 33 3.6 Electricity Transmission Issues . 35 3.7 The ROK’s Energy Development Issues . 37 Notes to Chapter 3 . 39 iii Chapter 4 Safeguards on the KEDO Reactors . 41 4.1 Introduction . 41 4.2 Project Organization To Supply the KEDO Reactors . 41 4.3 Description of the KEDO Reactors . 42 4.4 Refueling Operation in the KEDO Reactors . 45 4.4.1 The Special Problem of the Beginning-of-Life and End-of-Life Fuel Discharges . 49 4.5 IAEA Safeguarding of Nuclear Fuel in the KEDO Reactors . 50 4.5.1 The Safeguards Goals for Quantity and Timeliness . 50 4.5.2 The Safeguards Accounting Process . 51 4.5.3 Material Balance Area in KEDO-type Reactors . 51 4.5.4 The Containment and Surveillance Process . ..