218 † Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina grave is our farthest and most persisting faith. We are still swearing solemnly to bones and graves because we are still not having steadiest pillars, better remedies, nor more powerful convictions.”70 The logic of such events—which will be discussed in more detail in the next chap- ter—helped to set the stage for the carnage that was to eventually follow in Croatia and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. the jewish community Only one-fifth of Yugoslavia’s thriving prewar Jewish community sur- vived the war. Of the 12,495 Jews residing there in 1946, 7,578 emigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1952.71 According to Jewish sources, 1,292 survived the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1,871 were there in 1948, 1,285 in 1958, and 1,292 in 1965. Their suffering during the war helped reduce the difference between Sephardim and Ashkenazi within the Jewish community. Although formally organized as the Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, it never regained the vitality and influence it enjoyed before the war. However, it is difficult to estimate the correct number of Bosnian Jews after the war because official censuses and data provided by the Jewish community differ considerably. Many Jews moved to other parts of Yugoslavia or declared themselves as members of other national groups. So, officially there were only 310 in 1953, 381 in 1961, 708 in 1971, and 343 in 1981. According to data from the Jewish com- munity, about 1,100 Jews lived in Sarajevo in 1984 and 1,200 in 1992.72 In Sarajevo alone there were 1,413 Jews in 1946 and 1,304 in 1964—all served by a single rabbi. the muslim religious community The Muslim religious community fared little better under Socialist rule than its Orthodox and Catholic counterparts. Muslim schools were mostly closed, religious orders were banned, and vakuf property was na- tionalized. Islamic courts, religious education in public schools, tax col- lection, and cultural-religious organizations and associations were abol- ished. The religious press was shut down, and orthodox Muslim women were forbidden to wear the veil. Islam was forced to retreat to the private sphere. Among the associations that were banned was the Young Mus- lims. Although it at first “succeeded in re-establishing around the same three founding groups a network,” it was soon severely attacked and prac- tically disappeared.73 Many of its members and leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Some were condemned to death. The persecution of this stu- M or m? † 219 dent body, which openly opposed the regime’s moves against Muslim re- ligious organizations, took place from March, 1946, to August, 1949. One of its members, Alija Izetbegovic´, was sentenced to six years’ im- prisonment in 1946. Three year later, a number of defendants received much harsher sentences, and four of them—Hasan Biber, Nusref Fa- zlibegovic´, Halid Katjaz, and Omer Stupac—were executed. In 1947, the Socialist regime formalized its relations with the Islamic Religious Community (Islamska zajednica vjernika [IZV]). Irwin de- scribes it as a passive and patriotic organization, loyal to the regime, and with a politically correct leadership. This enabled it to freely manage its property according to Islamic law. The IZV’s 1947 constitution defined its highest body as the “Vakuf Sabor of the Muslim Religious Community in SFRJ” and was chaired by the reis-ul-ulema. It included the sabors of four administrative provinces in Yugoslavia with headquarters in Sara- jevo (for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia), Skopje, Prisˇtina, and Titograd. In 1957, Hadzˇi Sujleman efendi Kemura, known for his loy- alty to the state, became the new reis-ul-ulema. The IZV was again re- organized by the constitutions of 1957 and 1959, which allowed it to control its own spiritual and secular matters and broadened access to re- ligious education and religious material.74 It adopted yet another consti- tution in 1969 and changed its name to simply the Islamic Community (Islamska zajednica [IZ]). There was a high level of trust between the Communist authorities and the Muslim community. This was confirmed by the reis-ul-ulema, who stated that the Muslims recognized both secular authority and “So- cialist science.” The Socialist regime lauded Kemura for preventing “re- actionaries” from infiltrating the Islamic Community’s leadership. The Muslim religious press in Yugoslavia was not as critical of the authorities as were the Orthodox and Catholic newspapers, and Muslim religious leaders did not figure as prominently in public life as their Orthodox and Catholic counterparts.75 This benevolent attitude toward Islam later changed considerably. The rise of Muslim national self-awareness con- tributed to a religious revival as well. The result was that religious insti- tutions became the legitimate representatives of their national identity. There is scant and inaccurate data on the number of mosques and Muslim religious institutions in Socialist Yugoslavia. In 1945, there were some 1,022 mosques and mesdzˇids. Some 900 mosques were built in the country after the Second World War, bringing the total to 1,985 in the 1970s. Of those, 1,092 were in Sarajevo’s province (plus 592 mesdzˇids), 445 were in Prisˇtina’s, 372 were in Skopje’s, and 76 were in Titograd’s province. According to some estimates, there were 2,000 to 3,000 220 † Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina mosques in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, most of which were in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Muslim religious publications, periodicals, and schools were also widespread (three regional madrasahs). Although the “Faculty of Islamic Theology” was established in Sarajevo in 1977, many Yugoslav Muslim students were educated in Islamic countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Sudan.76 The Yugoslav Islamic community nurtured strong ties with the Is- lamic world, from Indonesia and Pakistan to Algeria and Morocco. It sent its delegates to the World Islamic Conference, the Soviet Congress of Muslims, Muslim youth congresses, and Islamic scientific seminars. The community also received financial assistance from wealthy Islamic countries and other countries that supported the development of Islam, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, and Sudan. In 1977, the reis- ul-ulema, Hadzˇi Naim efendi Hadzˇiabdic´, declared that the material po- sition of the Muslim community and clergy “had never been better.”77 As was the case with Yugoslavia’s other religious communities, the Muslim religious community was subjected to internal conflict. A new order of dervishes, which had an especially large following in Kosovo, ap- peared in Yugoslavia in 1974. The IZV banned the order, which was led by Sheikh Jemali Hadzˇi-Sˇehu, forcing it to register as an independent or- ganization.78 On the other hand, the beginning of construction in 1981 on the Zagreb mosque also stirred considerable commotion. Although it suffered several setbacks, including a fire in 1984 and a lot of red tape, the mosque opened in 1987. Muslim authorities also publicly supported the Albanian Muslims in their conflict with Serbian authorities in Kosovo. the muslims as a nation Pointing at the interdependence of Islam and Bosnian Muslims (Bosni- aks), sociologist Ibrahim Bakic´ notes, “Islam was needed by Bosniaks to come into being and to constitute themselves, while Bosniaks secured Is- lam its subsistence.”79 The secularization of Bosnia’s Muslims began under the Austro-Hungarians and continued through both prewar and postwar Yugoslavia. The confusion and differences of opinion regarding the Muslims’ identity as a nation and religious community also was ev- ident in the first three postwar population censuses. At first, Yugoslav Communists were convinced that Muslims would opt for either Serb or Croat national identity since only five constitutive nations were recog- nized. The table 8-2 shows the results (in absolute figures) for all six censuses conducted in Socialist Yugoslavia. The ensuing paragraphs present the M or m? † 221 table 8-2 Population of Bosnia-Herzegovina by national identities, 1948–91 Census Muslims Serbs Croats Yugoslavs Total in B-H 1948 788,403a 1,136,116 614,142 0 2,563,764 1953 0 1,264,372 654,229 891,800b 2,847,459 1961 842,248c 1,406,057 711,665 275,883 3,277,948 1971 1,482,430d 1,393,148 772,491 43,796 3,746,111 1981 1,629,924e 1,320,644 758,136 326,280 4,102,783 1991 1,905,829e 1,369,258 755,895 239,834 4,364,574 a Muslims, undetermined. b Yugoslavs, undetermined. c Muslims in ethnic sense. d Muslims in sense of nationality. e Muslims. table 8-3 Self-identification of Bosnian Muslims, 1948 Muslim Serbs 71,125 Muslim Croats 24,914 Muslims, Undetermined 788,403 Total Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina 890,094 chronology of events and the changing status and statistics of Bosnia’s Muslim Slavs.80 The Muslims, who represented about 34.5 percent of Bosnia- Herzegovina’s total population, had three options in the first census of 1948: they could identify themselves as Serbs, Croats, or “nationally undeclared” Muslims. Banac notes that “this was the time of Serb pre- dominance in Bosnia-Herzegovina” and most of the high-level Bosnian Muslim leaders—including Avdo Humo, Hajro Kapetanovic´, Sˇefket Maglajlic´, and Hakija Pozderac—identified themselves as Serbs, although others, including Dzˇemal Bijedic´, Osman Karabegovic´, and Pasˇaga Mand- zˇic´, identified themselves as Yugoslavs.81 Unlike their counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim Slavs in other republics identified themselves with the predominate nation. An- other process must be mentioned at this point: the migration of Yugo- slavia’s Muslim population—Slavic Muslims, Turks, and Albanians— into Turkey during the first two decades after the war.