ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 25, No. 4 (EE) Jan 2020 Estonia external relations briefing: In search for a unified foreign policy: just about time to do it… E-MAP Foundation MTÜ 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 In search for a unified foreign policy: just about time to do it… There is a certain logic of starting this briefing where the previous one was finished off: it is too good to be left out, since a particular argument needs to be made. From 1 January 2020 and for the first time in the country’s history, the Republic of Estonia joined a super-exclusive group of the UN Security Council members – it was done on the non-permanent basis, but not too worry. Not many people will dispute the fact that the UN is a direct ‘product’ of Yalta-45, which, during its existence as the core element of the post-WWII international system, was arguably not capable to be preventing a great deal of brutal invasions, aggressions, and genocides. At the same time, the UN is still the only global diplomatic platform where a serious problem of international significance can be, at least, discussed. Having become an integral part of the UN’s main executive body, Estonia, no doubts, will be doing its utmost best to be remembered as an exceptional performer. Indeed, repeating after a representative of the country to the UN, Estonia “will use all of [its] know-how and allied relations to cover the topics that matter to [it]”, and it is very much understandable that “[e]very foreign policy move, every vote or statement can affect how countries see and feel about Estonia”1. In the context of foreign policy, however, there is something that Estonia might need to commence fixing as soon as possible. As it was evidently argued by Toomas Sildam, a high-profile local reporter, there are noticeable traces of a few major foreign policy directions declared in the country, and those are making the process extremely confusing not only for the outsiders, but also for intra-Estonian dialogues to be clear and effective. Having attentively listened to a high number of speeches delivered during the numerous celebratory events on the occasion of the Treaty of Tartu’s centennial (predominantly, within the first week of February 2020, but also before), Sildam noted that “one might be tempted to ask how many foreign policies does Estonia have and who are the people who shape them”2. Without any reasonable doubts, the occasion was truly great to generate a discussion of the same magnitude – the Treaty of Tartu is a ‘jewel’ in the field of conventional diplomacy, and, in accordance to the document, the Soviet Russia under the Lenin-led Bolshevik Government recognised the Republic of Estonia and its sovereignty over a certain territory. For both 1 Gert Auväärt in Margus Parts, ‘Estonia has know-how to share with the world’, Postimees, 6 January 2020. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/6865342/estonia-has-know-how-to-share-with-the-world]. 2 Toomas Sildam, ‘Once more, how many foreign policies does Estonia have?’ in ERR, 6 February 2020. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1032178/toomas-sildam-once-more-how-many-foreign-policies-does-estonia-have]. 1 countries, it became the first diplomatic recognition, and Estonia was naturally ‘over the moon’, thinking that the same status quo will be forever. Unfortunately, Russia was not on the same page with the Estonian side, and the occupation of the Baltics proceeded in 1940, forcefully ‘converting’ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into another lot of ‘titular’ republics of the USSR. On the top of that, in 1944, a significant part of Estonia (including the sizeable towns of Jaanilinn and Petseri) was brutally detached from it to be ‘added’ to the Russian Federation where these areas are situated now. Speculatively speaking, for some powerful countries that are very much into historic documents and treaties (China or Japan, for example), an equivalent of the Treaty of Tartu would have become the treaty to remember for centuries to come. Estonia does not have the same geo- strategic leverage, which the aforementioned two Asian giants can easily exhibit. After all, Russia had to be softening its approach in regards of the locality that Japan understands as its own ‘northern territories’, and China also managed to regain control of 4.7-square-kilometers of land, which was previously ceded to Russia in the aftermath of the Second Opium War. But what should Estonia do? Toomas Sildam picked up the following three major lines on the issue, correspondingly represented by the country’s President, the Speaker of the Riigikogu, and the Estonian Government. Visiting Tartu on the Treaty’s anniversary day, President Kersti Kaljulaid delivered a passionate speech, stating that the celebrated document “symbolises the achievement of a great miracle […] that most people could not have imagined until a few years ago […] [–] [t]he Estonian nation had won, successfully defending its freedom in a bloody war against a most powerful enemy”3. At the same time, the President seemingly felt that she would not need to take herself out from the debate on how to understand the Treaty’s legacy today, and she clearly expressed her opinion on the issue: The Tartu Peace Treaty not only formalised the victory both legally and diplomatically, but it also laid the foundations for the wider recognition of Estonia as an independent and sovereign state. Our country became a subject of international relations instead of an object. […] And [the Treaty] is valid. Estonia did not join the Soviet Union voluntarily. We were occupied. And we restored our independence on the basis of legal continuity. At the same time, 3 Kersti Kaljulaid in ‘President: Treaty of Tartu is the birth certificate of the Estonian state’, ERR, 3 February 2020. Available from [https://news.err.ee/1030865/president-treaty-of-tartu-is-the-birth-certificate-of-the-estonian- state]. 2 we must respect the international consensus on refraining from any further redrawing of the post-war borders in Europe. Arguments to the contrary only create unnecessary confusion.4 If one attempts to convert the abovementioned presidential expression into a policy, – for example, the way Toomas Sildam did, – it will end up with an understanding that the previously specified areas in and around Jaanilinn and Petseri should be remaining in the Russian Federation, and “Estonia should not bother trying to reclaim them”5. There is, however, a diametrically different opinion on the issue, and, in its most explicit from, it is associated with Henn Põlluaas (EKRE), the Riigikogu’s President (or, sometimes, he is also called as Speaker). Openly contesting the official position of Russia that the Treaty of Tartu is a document that belongs to history, Põlluaas stated the following: Hats off to all who fought bravely for our freedom both on the fronts of the War of Independence and at the negotiating table. […] May they be an example to us, because today, too, we must have the same ideals and commitment. All that we do must be done for the good of our fatherland. […] Both the 1932 Non-aggression Pact between Estonia and the Soviet Union, and the military bases agreement of 1939 directly refer to the Tartu Peace Treaty. No period of validity or terms of withdrawal have been provided for in this Peace Treaty. […] International law says that the Tartu Peace Treaty is valid also now, in the 21st century.6 Essentially, as it was commented on the Speaker’s message, the idea he expressed is very simple – the Republic of Estonia does not really need any new border agreement with Russia if the document effectively negates the Treaty of Tartu7. Characteristically, Henn Põlluaas is not alone in challenging the Kremlin’s view on what happened to Estonia in 1940. This is where he is very much on the same page with the President, the Government, and vast majority of the Estonian society. In a way, objectively, it is justifiably difficult to agree with Maria Zakharova, the Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, that “[t]he Tartu treaty has long belonged to history […] [and] [i]ts action, as well as other international agreements, which had existed, including with Soviet Russia in the period of 1920-1940, ceased on Aug. 6 1940, after entering into the structure of the Soviet 4 Kaljulaid. 5 Sildam. 6 Henn Põlluaas in ‘President of the Riigikogu Henn Põlluaas: Tartu Peace Treaty is the symbol of continuity’, Riigikogu, 2 February 2020. Available from [https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/press-releases/board-of-the- riigikogu/president-riigikogu-henn-polluaas-tartu-peace-treaty-symbol-continuity/]. 7 Sildam. 3 Union”8. Consequently, for the Russian side, their understanding is based on the argument that “Estonia is a new country formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – unlike Russia that is the Soviet Union's successor”9, but, one could easily counterargue, it is the other way around. Getting back to Henn Põlluaas, what is really the main distinguishing feature of the Riigikogu Speaker’s position, however, is that he is seemingly prepared to go all the way in defending the rights for Estonia to claim the annexed areas back. Absolutely, considering the high-profile status of the Speaker, it represents a different stream in the context of foreign policy making. What about the Government? In May 2019, Prime Minister Jüri Ratas (Centre) was quoted recommending to exercise “a bit of realpolitik in the matter”10.