The investigative function of the European parliament : holding the EU executive to account by conducting investigations Citation for published version (APA): Syrier, C. N. (2013). The investigative function of the European parliament : holding the EU executive to account by conducting investigations. Wolf Legal Publishers. https://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20130411cs Document status and date: Published: 01/01/2013 DOI: 10.26481/dis.20130411cs Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Please check the document version of this publication: • A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. 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If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement: www.umlib.nl/taverne-license Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at: [email protected] providing details and we will investigate your claim. Download date: 02 Oct. 2021 THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Holding the EU executive to account by conducting investigations Christian Syrier a The investigative function of the European Parliament Holding the EU executive to account by conducting investigations Christian Syrier ISBN: 978-90-5850-959-8 Published by: aolf Legal Publishers (WLP) PO Box 313 5060 AH Oisterwijk The Netherlands E-Mail: [email protected] www.wolfpublishers.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Whilst the authors, editors and publisher have tried to ensure the accuracy of this publication, the publisher, authors and editors cannot accept responsibility for any errors, omissions, misstatements, or mistakes and accept no responsibility for the use of the information presented in this work. © The Author, 2013 THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Holding the EU executive to account by conducting investigations Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Maastricht, op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, prof. dr. L.L.G. Soete, volgens het besluit van het College van Decanen, in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 11 april 2013 om 14.00 uur door Christian Nicolas Syrier Promotiecommissie Promotores Prof. mr. L.F.M. Verhey Prof. dr. E.I.L. Vos Beoordelingscommissie Prof. dr. B. de Witte (voorzitter) Prof. dr. J.Th.J. van den Berg Prof. dr. mr. M.A.P. Bovens (Universiteit Utrecht) Prof. dr. M.L.H.K. Claes Prof. dr. W.J.M. Voermans (Universiteit Leiden) This research project is subsidized by the Montesquieu Institute. voor mijn ouders ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In summer 2007 Luc Verhey asked me whether I was interested in writing a doctoral thesis in Maastricht. “Yes I am”, was my answer, “but first I would like to go to Berlin for a study period”. I am grateful that Luc agreed. After six great months in Berlin I spent four pleasant years writing my doctoral thesis at the law faculty of Maastricht University. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to everyone who contributed. First of all I am thankful to my supervisors, Luc Verhey and Ellen Vos, for the congenial and inspiring guidance and for the freedom they gave me while writing my thesis. In this case, ‘freedom’ is definitely not a euphemism for indifference. Quite the contrary; I cherish fond memories of our discussions and I am sure that we will meet again in the future. I am grateful to Bruno de Witte, Joop van den Berg, Mark Bovens, Monica Claes and Wim Voermans, who have not only agreed to sit on the thesis committee, but who have also provided valuable comments on the manuscript. My thanks also go to the Montesquieu Institute for financing the doctoral project and to the ‘Verfassung jenseits des Staates’ graduate school at the Humboldt University in Berlin, where I spent five months in 2010 conducting my research in an inspiring environment, quite literally ‘Unter den Linden’. Furthermore, I would like to thank my former colleagues at the law faculty of Maastricht University for making the time I spent writing this thesis very agreeable. Special thanks go to the colleagues at ‘jong publiekrecht’ with whom I spent numerous coffee breaks and lunches. Particular thanks go to Danielle and my former roommate Mira. As of April 2012, I have been working with great pleasure at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice in The Hague. I am particularly grateful to the head of Constitutional and Administrative Law of the Directorate of Legislation and Legal Affairs, Anneke van Dijk, for giving me the opportunity to finalize my thesis. As a matter of course, life has much more to offer than just work. I am lucky to have family and friends who are always there if I need them. Special thanks go to my parents, Remy and Adje, to my brothers, Gilles and Raoul, to Meryl, and - last but definitely not least - to my great friends, of which I mention my ‘paranymphs’ Tim and Tum in particular. The Hague, 27 December 2012. I II TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The alleged accountability deficit in the EU 2 1.3 The concept of accountability 3 1.4 Holding the executive to account by conducting investigations 8 1.5 Research questions and methodology 11 2. INVESTIGATIONS BY TEMPORARY COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.2 The right of inquiry prior to Maastricht 15 2.3 The right of inquiry since Maastricht; legal framework 18 2.4 Proceedings and powers of committees of inquiry 24 2.5 The right of inquiry in practice: inquiries since 1993 54 2.6 The future shape of the right of inquiry 112 2.7 Conclusion 123 3. INVESTIGATIONS BY TEMPORARY SPECIAL COMMITTEES 129 3.1 Introduction 129 3.2 Special committees prior to Maastricht 129 3.3 Special committees since Maastricht; legal framework 130 3.4 Proceedings of special committees 133 3.5 Practice of special committees since 1993 136 3.6 Accountability investigations by special committees 149 3.7 Gathering of information 183 3.8 Conclusion 187 4. INVESTIGATIONS BY STANDING COMMITTEES 191 4.1 Introduction 191 4.2 Standing committees of the European Parliament 192 4.3 Gathering information: legal procedures and informal practices 197 4.4 Accountability investigations by special committees 203 4.5 Conclusion 224 5. CONCLUSION 227 5.1 Three types of committees 227 5.2 Formal investigative powers; status quo and future perspectives 231 5.3 Beyond formal powers; incentives to investigate and to cooperate 236 5.4 Mutual influence between stages of accountability 239 5.5 Strengthening the investigative function of the Parliament 240 5.6 Outlook 245 SAMENVATTING 251 BIBLIOGRAPHY 257 CURRICULUM VITAE 271 III IV TABLE OF CONTENTS (EXTENDED) 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 THE ALLEGED ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT IN THE EU 2 1.3 THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 3 1.3.1 Defining accountability 3 1.3.2 Purposes of accountability 4 1.3.2.1 Direct purposes of accountability 4 1.3.2.2 Indirect purposes of accountability 6 1.3.3 Three accountability stages 7 1.4 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE TO ACCOUNT BY CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS 8 1.4.1 Political accountability 8 1.4.2 The EU executive as actor and the European Parliament as forum 8 1.4.3 Parliamentary investigations as an accountability instrument 9 1.4.3.1 Accountability investigations 10 1.4.3.2 Non-accountability investigations 10 1.4.3.3 Object of research: accountability investigations 11 1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 11 2. INVESTIGATIONS BY TEMPORARY COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY 13 2.1 INTRODUCTION 13 2.2 THE RIGHT OF INQUIRY PRIOR TO MAASTRICHT 15 2.3 THE RIGHT OF INQUIRY SINCE MAASTRICHT; LEGAL FRAMEWORK 18 2.3.1 Article 226 TFEU 18 2.3.2 Interinstitutional Agreement 19 2.3.3 Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament 21 2.3.4 Legal status of the arrangements 22 2.3.5 Duty of sincere cooperation 23 2.4 PROCEEDINGS AND POWERS OF COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY 24 2.4.1 Chronological proceedings 24 2.4.2 Establishment and composition of committees of inquiry 26 2.4.2.1 Quorum 26 2.4.2.2 Formal requirements 27 2.4.2.3 Duration of inquiries 27 2.4.2.4 Composition of committees of inquiry 28 2.4.2.5 Staff of committees 28 2.4.3 Scope of the right of inquiry 29 2.4.3.1 Object of investigation 29 2.4.3.2