39202 2127 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, i3th APRIL, 1951 b? Registered as a Newspaper THURSDAY, 19 APRIL, 1951 AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA SRD MAY, 1945 TO 12TH SEPTEMBER, 1945 NOTE.—A set of maps for this despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Air and Army despatches of the Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following despatch was submitted to the 4. Instead, squadrons of the Royal Air Force Secretary of State for Air in August, 1946, re-directed their energies to the most extensive by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR KEITH mission of mercy by bringing relief and libera- PARK, G.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., Allied tion, in the initial stages, to tens of thousands Air Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia. of Allied prisoners-of-war and internees in the many Japanese prison camps scattered through- FOREWORD. out the vast territories of South East Asia. 1. Air Power's contribution to the overthrow 5. The successful accomplishment of this of Japanese land forces during the closing task made a fitting conclusion to Air Power's stages of the war in South East Asia, is re- participation in a war against a ruthless and viewed in this Despatch, which opens with fanatical enemy whose years of aggression in the period following the Allied Forces' vic- these territories ended with crushing and com- torious entry into Rangoon on 3rd May, 1945, plete defeat. and culminates in the official surrender of the Japanese Southern Army to Admiral The Lord PART I. Louis Mountbatten, at Singapore, on 12th RANGOON AND AFTER. .September, 1945. THE SITUATION IN MAY, 1945, AFTER THE 2. During this period, squadrons of the FALL OF RANGOON. Royal Air Force played a conspicuous role in 1. With unconditional surrender of Germany the last battle against the enemy land forces on 8th May, 1945, the conflict in South East on Burmese soil. More than ten thousand Asia and in the Far East against the last re- Japanese troops, ill-equipped, sick and maining of the Axis Powers took on a new demoralised, were annihilated by our air and significance, with the balance weighted heavily .ground forces while attempting a mass escape in favour of the Allies against Japan. from the Pegu Yomas across the Sittang River iand south to Moulmein. Their Air Force 2. The only outcome of -the war in the East, had already been eliminated from Burma. like the one prescribed for Germany, could 3. August 1945 brought with it Japan's be complete and unconditional surrender of realisation of defeat and her decision to sur- Japan. render. It forestalled by only a few weeks 3. Decisively beaten in Burma, and with the planned invasion of Malaya in which over Rangoon recaptured only five days before the 500 aircraft of the Royal Air Force and about surrender of Germany in Europe, Japan, fight- 200 carrier-borne aircraft of the Royal Navy ing alone, faced almost certain invasion of her would have demonstrated again the power of homeland hi the coming months. The system- .air superiority. atic loss of territories throughout South East 2128 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951 Asia which she had invaded during her orgy mainland, and one follow-up Division to con- of conquest some three years before, was now solidate the position. The Japanese garrison inevitable. of this island was reported to be approximately 4. A redeployment of manpower and one battalion, but other land forces could have material resources from Europe for .the war been assembled on the mainland once the against Japan was scheduled to begin, which attack was disclosed. would thus quicken the tempo of operations. ,10. Owing to the distance from our own But long before the collapse of Germany had mainland bases, air cover and support would taken place in Europe, the plans for the re- have to be given by carrier-borne aircraft conquest of Malaya and Singapore had been initially until the capture of the first airstrip, prepared. With the other Commanders-in- when the Air Forces would accept full respon- Chief in this Theatre, I shared the conviction sibility for all air operational requirements. I that the second halt of 1945 would bring the suggested that the Army demands, both in man- reinforcements promised by London. power and material, were excessive for so small 5. On the entry into Rangoon on 3rd May, an operation (the same opinion being expressed 1945, theatre strategy was directed -to the by the Supreme Allied Commander and the liberation of Singapore at the earliest possible Naval C. in C.). I felt that if such demands date with a view to opening up -the sea-route were persisted in, it might mean that the opera- to Indo^China and the East Indies, and to tion (whichi would have given vital air bases liberating enemy-occupied countries. There- to support a major operation) would have to after, strategy subsequent to the re-occupation be dropped. These fears were well-founded, of Singapore would depend upon the march as the proposed operation was subsequently of events in the Western Pacific Theatre. abandoned, mainly for this reason. .11. Development of the air base at Puket 6. It had been the contention, hitherto, that envisaged the completion of three runways to the capture of Singapore would involve at least all-weather standard, with an initial force of two intermediate operations before the final goal could be achieved. Firstly, it was con- three Single Engine Fighter Squadrons and an sidered that an initial operation would be ultimate build-up to: — necessary to establish an advanced air and 3 S.E.F. Squadrons. naval base. Through this base, aircraft and 1 Fighter/Recce Squadron. assault craft could be staged and operated in 3 Light Bomber Squadrons. support of the next operation for the seizure 2 Heavy Bomber Squadrons. and occupation of a bridgehead on the Detachments of Air Sea Rescue and Photo- Malayan Peninsula. Occupation and develop- graphic Reconnaissance Unit. ment of this bridgehead on the mainland was Staging facilities for air transport and other considered an essential prelude to the final types of air traffic. overland advance on Singapore itself. i!2. In addition to this, the base would also 7. Hastings Harbour was originally selected require to be capable of staging airborne opera- as the initial objective, but this was postponed tions in relation to future requirements of the to take place after the Monsoon. Further ex- campaign in Malaya. The air base, too, would amination by the Joint Planning Staff at Head- require to be fully operational by D plus 100 quarters, S.A.C.S.E.A., however, indicated that days, while its development to full capacity a stepping-stone still further south than was so tuned as to provide the necessary air Hastings Harbour was not only desirable in support and cover for the next stage of opera- relation to the time margin, but also a prac- tions comprising re-occupation of the Ports ticable proposition as regards the fly-in of Swettenham and Dickson areas, and a bridge- single-engined fighters and close support air- head for the final overland advance on Singa- craft. It was essential, however, from the pore. The occupation of this bridgehead was aspect of resources available, that such an planned to take place some four months after operation should be a limited commitment as the initial occupation of Puket with a view to a military operation and also as regards the the final assault for the capture of Singapore. shipping lift. These limitations, therefore, 13. Events in Burma, however, had forced narrowed down the selection of this objective a change of plan, which envisaged the neces- to a lightly defended island. Puket Island sity to capture Rangoon from the sea before the fulfilled this requirement. Its occupation was monsoon broke, and open it as a port to relieve therefore planned for June, 1945. the other overworked supply routes. Puket Operation or " Roger ". 14. In this connection, it can now be.put on record that a R.A.F. Mosquito aircraft, 8. The iPuket operation-^" Roger ")—was carrying Wing Commander Saunders, made a approved in'principle by the Chiefs of Staff low reconnaissance of Rangoon the day before in February, 1945, but they reserved judgment the British Armada disembarked. Finding the as to its timing in relation to the fall of city empty of Japanese, -and Allied flags flying Rangoon. A plan for the operation was never- over P.O.W. camps, he landed at the nearest theless prepared by the Joint Planning Staff airfield, hitchhiked into Rangoon and released and Force Commanders' Staffs were appointed. some of our P.O.W's. ,Wing Commander .9. Force Planning began in Delhi on Febru- Saunders then borrowed a native boat and ary 2nd, but it became apparent that the occupa- rowed down the river to tell the British Com- tion of an island so close to the mainland mander that Rangoon was unoccupied by the would involve a greater military commitment enemy, and offered his services as guide to than had been envisaged earlier. The Army the Expedition. This unusual incident revealed concept of this operation demanded one Divi- that the enemy forces in Rangoon itself had sion for the assault and initial occupation of departed between the times of departure and the island, including a small bridgehead on the arrival of the sea convoy. It was later revealed SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 APRIL, 1951 2129 that the Japanese Commander of the Burma lighter scale in relation to the next phase of Area Army had been ordered to hold Rangoon Malayan operations as timed.