1. Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research Theda Skocpol A sudden upsurge of interest in "the state" has occurred in comparative social science in the past decade. Whether as an object of investigation or as something invoked to explain outcomes of interest, the state as an actor or an institution has been highlighted in an extraordinary outpouring of studies by scholars of diverse theoretical proclivities from all of the major disciplines. The range of topics explored has been very wide. Students of Latin America, Africa, and Asia have examined the roles of states in insti- tuting comprehensive political reforms, helping to shape national eco- nomic development, and bargaining with multinational corporations.1 Scholars interested in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe, North America, and Japan have probed the involvements of states in developing social programs and in managing domestic and international economic problems.2 Comparative-historical investigators have examined the for- mation of national states, the disintegration and rebuilding of states in so- cial revolutions, and the impact of states on class formation, ethnic rela- tions, women's rights, and modes of social protest.3 Economic historians and political economists have theorized about states as institutors of prop- erty rights and as regulators and distorters of markets.4 And cultural an- thropologists have explored the special meanings and activities of "states" in non-Western settings.5 No explicitly shared research agenda or general theory has tied such diverse studies together. Yet I shall argue in this essay that many of them have implicitly converged on complementary arguments and strategies of analysis. The best way to make the point is through an exploration of the issues addressed in a range of comparative and historical studies - studies that have considered states as weighty actors and probed how states affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned re- lationships with social groups. First, however, it makes sense to underline 4 Theda Skocpol the paradigmatic reorientation implied by the phrase ''bringing the state back in."6 From Society-Centered Theories to a Renewed Interest in States There can be no gainsaying that an intellectual sea change is under way, because not long ago the dominant theories and research agendas of the social sciences rarely spoke of states. This was true even - or perhaps one should say especially - when politics and public policy making were at issue. Despite important exceptions, society-centered ways of explaining politics and governmental activities were especially characteristic of the pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives predominant in political science and sociology in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.7 In these perspectives, the state was considered to be an old-fashioned con- cept, associated with dry and dusty legal-formalist studies of nationally particular constitutional principles. Alternative concepts were thought to be more compatible with scientific, generalizing investigations.8 "Govern- ment" was viewed primarily as an arena within which economic interest groups or normative social movements contended or allied with one an- other to shape the making of public policy decisions. Those decisions were understood to be allocations of benefits among demanding groups. Re- search centered on the societal "inputs" to government and on the distrib- utive effects of governmental "outputs." Government itself was not taken very seriously as an independent actor, and in comparative research, vari- ations in governmental organizations were deemed less significant than the general "functions" shared by the political systems of all societies. As often happens in intellectual life, the pluralist and structure-func- tionalist paradigms fostered inquires that led toward new concerns with phenomena they had originally de-emphasized conceptually. When plu- ralists focused on the determinants of particular public policy decisions, they often found that governmental leaders took initiatives well beyond the demands of social groups or electorates; or they found that government agencies were the most prominent participants in the making of particular policy decisions. Within pluralist theoretical premises, there were but lim- ited ways to accommodate such findings.9 In the classic pluralist studies of New Haven politics, Mayor Richard Lee's strong individual initiatives for urban renewal were extensively documented but not grounded in any overall state-centered analysis of the potential for certain kinds of mayors to make new uses of federal funding.10 In major works about "bureaucratic politics" such as Graham Allison's Essence of Decision and Morton Halperin's Bureau- cratic Politics and Foreign Policy, government agencies were treated individ- ually, as if they were pure analogues of the competing societal interest groups of classical pluralism.11 The structure and activities of the U.S. state as a whole receded from view and analysis in this approach.12 Like the pluralists, yet on a broader canvas, when structure-functional- Bringing the State Back In: Current Research 5 ist students of comparative political development set out to "apply" their grand theories to Western European history or to particular sets of non- Western polities, they often found poor fits between historical patterns and sequences and those posited by the original concepts and assumptions. "Political development" (itself found to be an overly evolutionist concep- tion) ended up having more to do with concrete international and domestic struggles over state building than with any inherent general logic of socio- economic "differentiation." Most telling in this regard were the histori- cally oriented studies encouraged or sponsored by the Social Science Re- search Council's Committee on Comparative Politics toward the end of its life span of 1954-72.13 In many ways, the ideas and findings about states to be reviewed here grew out of reactions set in motion by such confron- tations of the committee's grand theories with case-study and comparative- historical evidence. Especially among younger scholars, new ideas and findings have also arisen from an alternative theoretical lineage. From the mid-1960s onward, critically minded "neo-Marxists" launched a lively series of debates about "the capitalist state." By now, there are conceptually ramified and empiri- cally wide-ranging literatures dealing especially with the roles of states in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, with the socioeconomic in- volvements of states in advanced industrial capitalist democracies, and with the nature and role of states in dependent countries within the world cap- italist economy.14 Neo-Marxists have, above all, debated alternative under- standings of the socioeconomic functions performed by the capitalist state. Some see it as an instrument of class rule, others as an objective guarantor of production relations or economic accumulation, and still others as an arena for political class struggles. Valuable concepts and questions have emerged from these neo-Marxist debates, and many of the comparative and historical studies to be dis- cussed here have drawn on them in defining researchable problems and hypotheses. Yet at the theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply embedded society-centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production.15 Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat. Furthermore, neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize - often in extremely abstract ways - about fea- tures or functions shared by all states within a mode of production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world capitalist system. This makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations in state structures and activities across nations and short time periods, thereby undercutting the usefulness of some neo-Marxist schemes for comparative research.16 So far the discussion has referred primarily to paradigms in American social science in the period since World War II; yet the reluctance of plu- ralists and structure-functionalists to speak of states, and the unwilling- 6 Theda Skocpol ness even of critically minded neo-Marxists to grant true autonomy to states, resonate with proclivities present from the start in the modern social sci- ences. These sciences emerged along with the industrial and democratic revolutions of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their founding theorists quite understandably perceived the locus of socie- tal dynamics - and of the social good - not in outmoded, superseded mo- narchical and aristocratic states, but in civil society, variously understood as "the market," "the industrial division of labor," or "class relations." Founding theorists as politically opposed as Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx (who now, not entirely inappropriately, lie just across a lane from one an- other in Highgate Cemetery, London) agreed that industrial capitalism was triumphing over the militarism and territorial rivalries of states. For both of these theorists, nineteenth-century British socioeconomic developments presaged the future for all countries and for the world as a whole. As world history moved