No. 49 5 November 2008 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de/russland HOW RUSSIA WORKS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MEDVEDEV-PUTIN SYSTEM ■ ANALYSIS Tandemocracy in Today’s Russia 2 By Andrei Ryabov, Moscow ■ OPINION POLL Who Holds Power? 7 ■ ANALYSIS Russian Political System Faces Signifi cant Challenges Dealing with Economic Crisis 8 By Robert Orttung, Washington ■ OPINION POLL Trust in Government and Politics in Russia 12 Russians’ System Orientation 14 Research Centre for East Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 49/08 ddigestigest Analysis Tandemocracy in Today’s Russia By Andrei Ryabov, Moscow Abstract Tandemocracy is the best term to describe the evolving relationship between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin and his close allies decided that he should remain in power even if he did not want to change the constitution to give himself a third term as president. Accordingly, Putin chose to take the position of prime minister and selected Medvedev as the next president. Th e transition was carried out on the basis of informal agreements that preserve the personalistic nature of the regime estab- lished under Putin. Th ese arrangements continue to undermine formal institutions in Russia. Within the tandem Putin remains by far the most powerful player. Currently, the two leaders are cooperating, but ob- servers question whether this cooperation will eventually turn into competition. Th e global economic crisis makes relations more complicated than they have been until now. Th e Crux of the Problem confi guration of power is based only on the personal Six months have passed since a new system of pow- agreement between the president and the prime minis- er began to function in Russia, one in which there are ter. Making the transition from the presidential mono- two practically equal centers for making decisions in centrism to the Medvedev-Putin tandem does not re- the persons of President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime quire amending the constitution or revising any con- Minister Vladimir Putin. Th is system has been de- stitutional laws, such as the law on the Russian govern- scribed in various ways: “diarchy,” “dualism,” “duum- ment. Based on these considerations, we will use the virate,” and “bi-centered.” More recently, observers have term “tandemocracy” to describe the new confi gura- begun to describe the system as a “tandemocracy.” tion of power in Russia. Th is latter term has been gaining popularity for two Th e main questions which arise among political sci- reasons. First, traditionally in Russian, when you use entists and experts in regard to this political confi gura- the terms “diarchy,” “dualism” or “bi-centered,” you tion usually come down to: who is the chief in this re- a priori have in mind competition between two cen- lationship, how stable and long-lived will the relation- ters of power, even if only within a limited context. ship be both in and of itself and in the face of poten- Th e term “duumvirate” derives from classical history tial political challenges. Th e following article will ad- and is understood as something born of circumstanc- dress these questions. es and therefore unstable. In this sense, the concept of “tandemocracy” is a useful counterpoint since it em- Th e Origin of the Construction as the Key phasizes cooperation between the two centers of pow- to Understanding Its Nature er. Today, this concept is a better description of reality, Th e reasons for the appearance of the new power con- since until now the system for making decisions, at least fi guration, which is in no way based on the logic of the in the public sphere, strives for coordination between development of modern Russian statehood, can largely the two centers of power. Th is approach is particular- be explained through an understanding of the partic- ly obvious in foreign policy. While individual special- ular features of the transition in power from President ists have been able to discern some diff erences in the Putin to Medvedev in the spring of 2008. But, to start positions of Medvedev and Putin, in practice, their ac- at the beginning, it is necessary to point out that Russia, tions are well coordinated and it is diffi cult to see any like the majority of post-Soviet countries in the pro- diff erence in their international approaches. In domes- cess of post-Communist transformation, did not cre- tic policy, Medvedev and Putin have publicly disagreed ate stable rules for the transition of power. Moreover, only on rare occasions and analysts have to work hard the weakness and instability of the political institutions to fi nd these cases. became one of the defi ning characteristics of Russia’s Second, typically the Russian literature uses the post-Communist development. Accordingly, one of the fi rst four terms to describe systems in which the two most important tasks of the transition remained unful- centers of power are based on constitutional and oth- fi lled. Formally, the transition of power in Russia takes er legal norms or offi cial agreements. But the existing place on the basis of competitive presidential elections. 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 49/08 ddigestigest However, it is no secret that the name of the new head dependent on the will of the president and therefore is of state became known before election day. Th e previ- extremely vulnerable. Both Yeltsin and Putin replaced ous president appointed him, either on the basis of his their prime ministers without making any public ex- own view of the overall situation in the country and at planation to the country. Th erefore, in an eff ort to bet- the summit of power, or after informal consultations ter equalize the political infl uence of the president and with the most infl uential people and groups among prime minister, Putin offi cially took on the position of his advisors. In other words, in Russia’s political sys- heading United Russia, while not actually joining the tem the transfer of power depends on numerous fac- party. He apparently calculated that the offi cial support tors, most of which are in constant fl ux and therefore of the parliamentary majority, in case of a breakdown diffi cult to predict. in relations with the president, would provide addition- Th e contradictory situation before the elections al defense for the cabinet of ministers and the prime complicated the transfer of power in spring 2008. minister from his unexpected removal in the manner On one hand, President Putin, who according to the of his predecessors. Constitution should leave offi ce at the end of his sec- In order to work successfully in his new role, Putin ond term, enjoyed enormous popularity, both among needed to fi nd an appropriate candidate to succeed him the elite and the masses. On the other hand, there was as president. Th is person would have to be a member no one who could match Putin’s authority and infl u- of his ruling team who would be acceptable to most ence, while also serving as a consensus fi gure for the of the leading interest groups and, as a minimum, if majority of interest groups that make up the Putin elite. there were any objections, then from the smallest num- Th is situation created a feeling of uncertainty in Russia’s ber among them. Th e successor also had to be a politi- ruling circles and stoked fears about the threat that the cian capable of negotiating and fi rmly supporting the political situation would become unstable if Putin left agreements made during the transition of power and offi ce. Th erefore, several infl uential members of Putin’s carrying out the responsibilities that he had accepted. team suggested that he amend the constitution so that Th en First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev met all of he could serve a third term as president in the inter- these demands. In this regard, he distinguished him- ests of preserving stability at the highest level. Putin self from the other fi rst deputy prime minister Sergei rejected these recommendations. It is hard to say what Ivanov, who was long considered the most likely to suc- drove Putin to take this decision. Possibly, at that mo- ceed Putin. Ivanov, because of his arrogance and eff orts ment, he did not want to complicate relations with the to emphatically take the most important public roles, West. Or, feeling somewhat tired from the burdens of aroused doubts among many of the power elite that as power, he decided to take a pause, giving him a lit- president he would not break the agreements he had tle more time to decide if he wanted to continue his made with his predecessor about the division of pow- political career. Putin’s decision to leave the presiden- er and responsibility in his favor. One cannot exclude tial post forced the power elite to seek a confi guration that these considerations guided Putin in determin- of power that would maintain for the ruling team a ing his successor. dominant position in politics and simultaneously save them from internal divisions. Logically, this formula Tandemocracy as a New Version of a assumed preserving Putin’s role in politics. Th e ques- Personalistic Regime tion was what his status and place would be in the po- Th e majority of political observers in Russia are con- litical system. To resolve this problem, they proposed vinced that the transfer of the presidential post from that Putin serve as “national leader,” without holding Putin to Medvedev was carried out on the basis of in- any state position.