Diffuse Power as a Commodity: A Case Study from Gisaka (Eastern Rwanda)1 PIERRE BETTEZ GRAVEL Northern Illinois University, U.S.A. TO obtain the best possible results from an analysis of power in a primitive society, it is best to define power broadly. The idea of diffuse power is not a new one. It has had intermittent currency fromJohn Locke to Bertrand Russell. But the philosophers have not necessarily circumscribed the concept in the way that I wish to convey. Moreover, since the definition is a simple one, it is surely better to define the concept than to review the literature. First, we should exclude the sense given it by Meyer Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in the introduction of their book, African Political Systems ( 1940, xxiii), 2 in which they see power as the ability of individuals to control and regulate the use of physical force. This, incidentally, is the sense most often used in reference to primitive data, and is the meaning given to the word by H. Codere in her article on "Power in Rwanda."3 We should also exclude the definitions of the political scientists having to do with decision making. Power as used here will mean the ability to do, i.e. the faculty possessed by things, events, institutions, and men, of having the potential to move and alter. Although I want to use the definition of power as a modal proposition, nevertheless, in order to have the meaning of power grasped more firmly, it is best to think of it as a substance rather than as an activity. Such a concept will not be much different from the concept of power found in primitive society. Power seems to be conceived in the way we-in our modern society­ think of energy: as imponderable force that is inevitably associated with matter. It is universal and pervasive. It is diffuse but can occur in various degrees of concentration. It can, therefore, be accumulated. It can be released, but must The fieldwork upon which this article is based was carried out in 1960--61. It was made possible through a grant from Ford Foundation's Behavioral Science Fund of the De­ partment of Anthropology of the University of Michigan; a grant from the Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale, Brussels, Belgium; and a grant-in-aid of the Sigma Xi. The Ford Foundation furnished a Fellowship for library research and write-up. The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research aided the latter with a Fellowship also. 2 Fortes, Meyer and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems. Oxford University Press, London, 1940. 3 Codere, Helen, "Power in Rwanda," Anthropologica, n.s., IV, I, Ottawa, 1962. 164 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY always be under control or else it destroys, in the same manner that uncon­ trolled energy destroys. Control is not necessarily willful and it may be sufficient that each form of power has its own locus. A rock, for instance, may have, in its own way, power; words have power and so has an individual man. The power of an individual, however, must be kept distinct from that of his status1 in the community. That is, as an individual, he has a certain personality and he may have certain skills perculiar to himself. This distinguishes him from other individuals in the society, but as head of a lineage, for example, a man has the power of his status (or position in the corporate group) which he would not have if he did not occupy that position. He then represents power that goes much beyond the sum total of the personal power of each individual that compose the lineage. The power of this group is governed by a logic of its own, quite distinct from that of the individuals comprising the corporation. Although the use of such a diffuse concept yields satisfying results when applied, for analysis, to primitive society, there is nothing in it that should prevent us from trying out the concept on data from modern industrial society. The results here too may be surprisingly fruitful. Without attributing any moral value to the word, it may be said that political power in primitive society, even if not always physically coercive, is, nevertheless, harsh. Primitive life, in general, is obviously precarious when one thinks of the personal safety of individuals who are-to varying degrees-at the mercy of the elements, sickness, competition for food, and wild animals. They must constantly be on their guard against the evil wishes of other men {e.g. when sickness strikes), and against enemies in general. The tenor of conver­ sations shows a great awareness of this. This constant vigilance is reflected in the stance of men at home, among their own people and their neighbors, where every action, every move might be a test of power. The Case of Rwanda Rwanda has been an independent Central African republic since July 1962. As a kingdom, Rwanda had been under Belgian Trusteeship since 1921. The country, however, being difficult of access, Rwandese society had remained relatively unchanged, even as late as the early 1960's. This means that essenti­ ally, it was a stratified, hierarchic society, with a king at its head. There are several works one might consult for a general description of the kingdom. One is Jacques]. Maquet's The Premise of Inequality (Maquet, 1961).2 Others are Pages' Un Royaume Hamite, 3 de Lacger's Ruanda (de Laeger, 1940 I am using the term status in the legal sense used also by Ralph Linton in his book, The Study of Man, p. 113. "A status is a position in a particular pattern" (notice that there is no connotation of prestige). 2 Maquet,Jacquesj., The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda. Oxford University Press, London, 1961. 3 Pages, Albert, Un Royaume Hamite au Centre de l' Afrique Centrale: Au Ruanda, sur Les bords du lac Kivu. Institut Royal Colonial Beige, section des sciences morales et politiques. Memoires, Vol. I. Brussels, 1933. .