When the Kingdom of God Became the Kingdom of Ends: Altruism’s Development into a Normative Ideal A Senior Honor Thesis Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with distinction in Political Science in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences by Benjamin T. Jones The Ohio State University December 10, 2006 Project Advisors: John M. Parrish, Department of Political Science (Loyola Marymount University) Michael A. Neblo, Department of Political Science (The Ohio State University) Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction 1 The Paradox at the Heart of Altruism 4 Defining Altruism and Normativity 6 What Are We Looking For? 11 Roadmap of What’s to Come 14 Part I Towards a Problem: The Ancient Debate over Public Life 17 Eudaimonia and Ancient Ethics 18 Plato and Aristotle 24 Epicurus and the Stoics 40 A Solution from an Unlikely Source 47 Augustine’s Reconciliation of the Two Cities 55 Conclusion 63 Part II Self-Love’s Fall from Grace: How Normative Altruism Developed out of the Augustinian Tradition 65 Entangled in Self-love: Augustine’s Normative Argument 67 Augustine Goes Secular 75 Kant’s Problematic Solution 83 Reworking Kant—And Altruism 89 Conclusion 91 Part III The Problems with Normative Altruism 93 Two Conceptions of Altruism 93 Evidence for Altruism on a Descriptive Level 95 Motivational Barriers to Normative Altruism 113 Changing the Way We Talk About Altruism 121 Conclusion 126 Bibliography 131 i Abstract In contemporary moral philosophy, altruism holds a place of prominence. Although a complex idea, the term seeps into everyday discourse, by no means confined to the esoteric language of philosophers and psychologists. Altruism for many is synonymous with morality. Noble actions are carefully scrutinized to find evidence of self-interest and, in the rare cases where the hero’s motivations are pure, praise flows unchallenged. The current environment, so disposed to altruism, is peculiar when examined in the context of past moral debates. The concept of altruism would puzzle an ancient Greek or Roman, who understood morality as the highest form of self-interest. Ancient ethics’ inability to convincingly argue for self-sacrificing action, such as political service, illustrates the disconnect between ancient and modern moral paradigms. How, then, did this radical change come about? This work endeavors to trace, if not exhaustively, at least the major points along this development. To explain moral discourse’s shift in the direction of altruism, I focus on two ideas in particular: the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Ends. We find that, with the introduction of these concepts, there are growing misgivings about self-interest’s role as the basis for morality. Christianity, especially the Augustinian strand, breaks from ancient philosophy in saying that earthly well-being should be abandoned in pursuit of a higher goal—the Kingdom of God. Kant’s moral philosophy makes even further strides towards altruism. His moral kingdom does not depend, as does Christianity, on the hope of future rewards. Yet, despite the innovations in their approaches, Augustine and Kant fall short of what can be called true altruism. Ultimately, their normative arguments are unable to fully overcome self-interest’s influence. All of Augustine’s misgivings about self-love do not stop him from claiming that serving the Lord brings about great benefits. Although Kant never makes such an explicit concession to self-interest, his problematic account of pure reason’s ability to motivate moral action is an unsatisfactory alternative. Kant’s description of reason fails to achieve universality and objectivity, leaving it little hope of surviving the skeptic who questions reason’s moral authority. The only other option—allowing self-interest a motivational role in normative action—seems unavoidable. Augustine and Kant provide insight into the nature of altruism. In short, they show that the prospects of formulating a coherent, normative argument for altruism are bleak. Unable to appeal to self-interest, arguments for altruism have no motivational force on certain individuals and thus they fail. But though altruism proves untenable as a moral ideal, that does not in itself negate altruism’s existence. Evidence suggests that, for certain individuals, altruism constitutes part of their standard expectations about the world. They do not need to be motivated to act altruistically because for them such action is as natural as, say, driving on the right side of the road. Rather than denying altruism, I want to suggest that we should think about it in descriptive, not normative, terms. ii Acknowledgements The question that initiated this thesis project was whether or not altruistic motivation is a requirement of moral action. Although never under the illusion that finding an answer to such a question would be easy, I never could have imagined the sheer diversity and number of subsequent questions it would raise. Before everything was over, my research had taken me into fields as diverse as neurobiology and Jansenist thought. At numerous times I felt like I was in over my head. Fortunately, I had friends and mentors around me to offer encouragement and throw out a figurative life preserver when needed. I am grateful first of all to a number of friends who allowed me to try out arguments on them, and who never grew tired of hearing the word altruism (or at least never showed it). Through discussions with Charlene Chi, Kenny Ferenchak, and Laura Tompkins, I gained helpful feedback on which arguments of mine were effective and which were not. Kenny in particular would find holes in my views on altruism, and always would push me to evaluate them in an honest manner. I may have never convinced him that altruism fails as a normative ideal, but our conversations were nonetheless important for they helped me understand in a very real way the principled convictions of the opposing side of the debate. I also owe a big thanks to Taylor Nelms who, while working on his own thesis, took time out from his research to explain to me the art of making a poster in power point. Before receiving his detailed instructions, I was absolutely clueless on how to design a poster to present my project at the Denman Undergraduate Research Forum. The Denman Forum helped to further my project in various ways. I need to start off by thanking Richard and Martha Denman for sponsoring the event. The annual competition was an enjoyable experience, which brought me in contact with the research of my peers. It also gave me a venue to practice explaining my research to those outside of my field of study. My three judges for the competition—Professor Deborah Haddad, Professor Richard Herrmann, and Professor Katherine Meyer—all offered constructive criticism while at the same time being encouraging. I especially appreciated Professor Herrmann’s pragmatism, which forced me to reevaluate some of my theoretical positions on altruism. I am grateful for the prize I received at the competition, which went towards costs related to the thesis. Other sources of funding for the project came from the Honors and Scholars Program, the College of Arts and Sciences, and the College of Humanities. The internship I received from the Honors and Scholars program allowed me to spend the summer of 2006 writing the majority of my thesis. The scholarships from the College of Arts and Sciences and the College of Humanities paid for tuition costs during my final quarter, when I was finishing up the thesis. I generally would like to thank the Ohio State University for making these opportunities possible. More specifically, I would specifically like to thank Donald and Sidney Brandt, who funded the Humanities Scholarship I received. Throughout my work on the project, a number of professors in the Political Science and Philosophy departments took time out of their busy schedules to answer questions and read drafts iii of my work. I would like to thank Professor Allan Silverman for his help on the section on Plato, as well as for reading one of my many project proposals. I am also thankful to Professor Lawrence Baum, who met with me on a variety of occasions to discuss the topic of altruism and who also read drafts of the work. The faculty members who sat on my thesis committee were Professor Justin D’Arms, Professor Michael Neblo, and Professor John M. Parrish. These were the individuals most involved in critiquing my work and offering suggestions on how to improve it. Professor D’Arms’ and Professor Neblo’s comments on Part III were particularly insightful, and I only wish I had had more time to incorporate them into the final version of the thesis. As I continue to research the subject of altruism, I will keep their critiques in mind—they will certainly figure prominently in any future version of this work. Lastly, I owe a special thanks to the final member of my committee and the primary advisor for the project, Professor Parrish. Since the project’s nebulous beginnings my sophomore year to its completion two years later, he has constantly been there supporting me and offering invaluable guidance. Even after moving to Los Angeles, Professor Parrish continued to do the bulk of the advising for the thesis, though he was under no obligation to. I long ago lost count of the number of outlines and drafts he had read—suffice it to say, it was no small number. In his evaluations of my work, he invariably found the perfect balance between challenging and encouraging me. His overall influence on the thesis is difficult to overestimate, as so many of its ideas stemmed from his classes on political thought that I took or from work I did as his research assistant.