NATIONAL REPORTS Nuclear verification in South Africa Verifying South Africa's declared nuclear inventory, and the termination of its weapons programme, was a complex task by Africa's accession to the Treaty on the terial involved in the programme had been recov- Adolf von Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on ered and placed under safeguards. Baeckmann, 10 July 1991 was promptly followed by the sign- Over the months that followed, the team Garry Dillon, and ing of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with thoroughly examined detailed records and veri- Demetrius the IAEA on 16 September 1991. Four days later, fied the inventories of nuclear materials in South Perricos the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolu- Africa. As a result, it was able to conclude that tion aimed at ensuring early implementation of there were no indications to suggest that the the • safeguards agreement and verification of initial inventory is incomplete or that the South the completeness of the inventory of South Af- African nuclear weapons programme had not rica's nuclear installations and material. been completely terminated and dismantled. In November 1991, a team of senior IAEA This article highlights the IAEA's verifica- safeguards officials specially appointed by the tion activities in South Africa and the main ac- Agency's Director General carried out the first tivities associated with its assessment of the ter- inspections under the comprehensive safeguards mination of South Africa's former nuclear weap- agreement. The activities to verify the correct- ons programme. ness of South Africa's declared inventory of nu- clear material extended over several months and involved long-established measures. These in- Verifying the correctness of South cluded the examination of contemporary operat- Africa's declared nuclear inventory ing and accounting records, and analysis of the nature and quantity of nuclear material. South As required under the comprehensive safe- Africa's extensive nuclear fuel cycle made the guards agreement, South Africa submitted to the task complex, requiring considerable inspection IAEA an initial report of its nuclear programme. resources and extensive co-operation from South The initial report is a comprehensive document and African authorities regarding the provision of includes quantitative data on all types of nuclear access to defunct facilities and historical operat- material, on a facility-by-facility basis. It is ex- ing records. panded by attachments which provide detail on the The task was further complicated when, on location and the number of items of nuclear 24 March 1993, State President de Klerk an- material contained in each respective facility. nounced that South Africa had developed and For the IAEA, it was therefore possible — on subsequently dismantled a "limited nuclear de- the basis of the data contained in the initial report terrent capability" involving the design and and subsequent inventory changes — to establish manufacture of seven gun-assembled devices. an itemized list of each facility' s nuclear material The news prompted the IAEA to augment its inventory. Verification of such itemized lists was safeguards team in South Africa with, among carried out during the first few months of the other specialists, nuclear weapons experts. The implementation of the comprehensive safe- team's assignment was extended to include as- guards agreement. This was done in accordance sessing the status of the former nuclear weapons with the requirements for physical inventory programme and ascertaining that all nuclear ma- verification (PIV) specified in the IAEA 1991-95 Safeguards Criteria, using established account- ancy verification measures. Mr, von Baeckmann is a former Director in the IAEA Depart- Unlike other States which had entered into ment of Safeguards. Mr. Dillon is a senior staff member of comprehensive safeguards agreements, South the Department now serving as Deputy Leaderof the IAEA's Iraq Action Team, and Mr. Perricos is Director of the Depart- Africa had been operating a number of nuclear ment's Division of Operations (A). facilities, of unique indigenous origin, that pre- 42 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 NATIONAL REPORTS viously had not been subject to safeguards. De- tails of their design and operation were thus rela- South Africa's nuclear installations tively unknown to the IAEA at the time the comprehensive safeguards agreement was con- cluded. (See box.) This situation made it necessary to devote Installations under IAEA safeguards which were formerly inspected in accordance with an considerable effort to understanding the facility INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement processes. This would enable establishment of workable safeguards approaches for interim im- • SAFARI-1 research reactor, Atomic Energy Cor- plementation during the period in which the fa- poration, Pelindaba cility attachment would be negotiated. This proc- • Hot cell complex, Atomic Energy Corporation, ess was facilitated through a joint seminar. The Pelindaba • Koeberg nuclear power reactor units 1 and 2, meeting provided the opportunity for the IAEA Electricity Supply Commission to explain the accountancy procedures appertain- ing to a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153-type) and for the South African Additional installations under IAEA safeguards State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC) since September 1991 in accordance with a and facility operators to provide insight into the comprehensive safeguards agreement facilities and their operating procedures. (INFCIRC/153-type) Since the time of the " initial inspections" in Uranium conversion.uranium hexafluoride (UF6) late 1991, verification activities carried out in production plant South Africa have continued to be based on the Pilot highly enriched uranium (HEU) enrichment IAEA 1991-95 Safeguards Criteria. In October plant (Y-plant), now defunct 1992, a near-simultaneous PIV, involving all South HEU storage facility HEU-UF6 and metal/alloy production plant African facilities, was successfully carried out. All HEU fuel fabrication plant quantity goals were attained during that first mate- Semi-commercial low-enriched uranium (LEU) rial balance period. Similar exercises were car- enrichment plant (Z-plant) ried out in August 1993 and October 1994. MLIS laser enrichment R&D facility As might be expected, it proved necessary to LEU fuel fabrication plant Natural uranium/depleted uranium metal plants ' make a number of corrections to the data in- Decontamination plants cluded in the initial report. This resulted from the Waste storage compound continuing efforts of the SSAC to ensure the Locations outside facilities accuracy of the data, errors identified during the inspection process, and corrections to estima- tions resulting from measurements made by fa- A practical basis was established through cility operators after issuance of the initial report. which the mutual consistency of the inventory This latter aspect was particularly relevant in the of nuclear installations and material — and case of material recovered as a result of decon- hence their completeness — could be deter- tamination of plant components. mined. The declared inventory was first evalu- At present, facility attachments are in force for ated with respect to production, imports, and six facilities and it is intended to complete negotia- usage. Then the isotopic balance of the inventory tions for the remaining facilities during 1995. was calculated and compared with its natural uranium origin. Through this process, the declared inventory Assessing the completeness of South was found to be consistent with the declared Africa's declared nuclear inventory production and usage data, but the calculated isotopic balance indicated " apparent discrepan- An important aspect of the IAEA's safe- cies" with respect to the highly enriched uranium guards implementation in South Africa was the (HEU) produced by the defunct pilot enrichment assessment of the completeness of the declared plant (called the Y-plant) and with respect to the nuclear inventory, which is extensive. The com- low-enriched uranium (LEU) produced by the plex task was carried out as a separate exercise semi-commercial enrichment plant (called the by a team of senior members of the IAEA De- Z-plant). The direction of these " apparent dis- partment of Safeguards specifically appointed crepancies" could be interpreted to indicate that for the purpose by the Director General. It re- an amount of uranium-235 was unaccounted for. quired considerable inspection resources and co- Having regard to the period of time involved operation from the State authorities regarding the (for the Y-plant in particular) and the absence of provision of access to defunct facilities and his- accurate accountancy of the depleted uranium torical operating records. waste stream, such "apparent discrepancies" IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 43 NATIONAL REPORTS As part of its assessment of the status of South Africa's former nuclear weapons programme, a team of IAEA inspectors were able to visit all facilities once connected with the programme. Shown here are the secured vaults at the ARMSCOR/Circle facility, where the weapons were produced and stored (top and below);the general purpose critical facility that was dismantled near the AEC Pelindaba site (lower left); and IAEA inspectors outside the building (left) over the Kalahari test shaft, which was rendered harmless (facing page). (Credits: v.Mouchkin, IAEA:AEC> 44 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 NATIONAL REPORTS were not