Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Beyond Afghanistan The New ISAF Strategy: Implications for Central Asia Andrea Schmitz SWP Comments NATO’s new Afghanistan Strategy, which provides for a step-by-step transfer of security responsibilities to the Kabul government starting in 2011, has been met with concern by the country’s Central Asian neighbours. Indeed, the relatively stable political en- vironment in Central Asia is largely thanks to the western presence in the Hindu Kush. With the new ISAF strategy, the responsibility for regional security will be transferred to the Central Asian partners over the medium term. These nations, however, are poorly prepared for these responsibilities and will continue to expect further assis- tance from the Europeans and their transatlantic allies to compensate for deficits in the region’s security arrangement. The EU should steer in a different direction by reassessing regional cooperation in the context of its Central Asia strategy and by demanding more initiative from its partners. A gradual strategic shift in American Afghanistan, which are currently con- military and security policy has pushed tained by the NATO presence, could spread NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan in a throughout the country’s northern reaches, new direction. Now the plan is that follow- exacerbate endogenous potential for con- ing a brief phase in which troop levels are flict, and destabilise the region. dramatically increased, responsibility for security can be handed over to the govern- ment in Kabul in a step-by-step process and War Profits support can be offered in building up the The five Central Asian nations – Kazakh- necessary capacities. In the medium term, stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan programmes for bolstering security forces and Uzbekistan – have been incorporated within Afghanistan should make it possible into the supply logistics of the NATO/ISAF for the ISAF to withdraw. troops in Afghanistan since the start of the These plans have caused great concern NATO mission. The former Soviet states in among the country’s Central Asian neigh- the region have become indispensible part- bours. They are justified in their fear that ners to the west by granting flyover rights with the withdrawal of western forces from and allowing military bases on their ter- the country, the hazards originating in ritories (in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Dr. Andrea Schmitz is researcher at SWP’s Russian Federation / CIS Division SWP Comments 10 April 2010 1 Tajikistan). The strategic importance of for gross human rights violations have been Central Asia to NATO has increased even essentially without effect is largely due to more since the northern supply route was Tashkent providing the Bundeswehr with a established, which runs across the Baltic military base close to the Afghan border for states, the Southern Caucasus and Russia, logistically supporting the ISAF. linking Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki- stan in the transport of non-military equip- ment for the war in Afghanistan. While this Repression and a cooperation comes at a high price, the West Return to Traditions has shown that it is prepared to pay it. An Not only in Uzbekistan, but also in the example of this can be seen in the negotia- other Central Asian nations, the increased tions conducted in early 2009 between the strategic importance of the region to the Pentagon and the Kyrgyz administration war in Afghanistan has had the side effect regarding the use of the Manas Air Base. of abetting the elites in these countries, The Kyrgyz owners of the base succeeded in who have only the vaguest hint of democ- increasing their annual rental income from ratic legitimacy, in expanding and con- 17.5 to 60 million dollars. solidating their power. The presidents of Kyrgyzstan, however, does not stand Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have ruled alone in profiting from the war in Afgha- without challenge since 1991, the Tajik nistan. The nations through which the head of state has been in power since the northern supply route runs are not opening first presidential elections in 1999 follow- up their streets and railways to the NATO ing the civil war, and the president of Turk- free of charge; they offer these services menistan has been largely following the within the framework of agreements with course set by his predecessor, who died in the US government that include commer- December 2006. The authoritarian build-up cial components. This cooperation is par- in the case of Kyrgyzstan, once the white ticularly advantageous to Tajikistan as well, hope of democracy in the region, has whose foreign debt – like Kyrgyzstan’s – is been particularly striking. Since President equal to roughly half of the nation’s GDP. Bakiyev assumed power following the Tulip In some cases, the transportation infra- Revolution of 2005, the country’s political structure first had to be built up to accom- system has become increasingly repressive. modate heavy vehicles, which led to new Just how fragile the country’s stability was, bridges and streets being constructed in however, became evident when riots broke the country and an associated increase out in early April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan and in the trading of goods. led to the ousting of President Bakiyev. Uzbekistan also has its cooperation with In all the Central Asian states, the con- NATO and the USA to thank for a moderni- solidation of power has run parallel to a sation of its transportation infrastructure, new nationalism, which links back to pre- as its geographic location makes it the most colonial traditions and constructs of iden- important junction along the northern tity, and rejects the paternalism of colonial supply route. Among other things, this Russia just as it rejects the liberal pathos profits Uzbek-Afghan trade relations and is of the Europeans. At the same time, Muslim enabling Uzbekistan to expand its energy ideas of political order are evidently at- supplies, which also includes the export of tracting more and more followers. This electricity into Northern Afghanistan. The is particularly true for the residents of political dividends for Uzbekistan arising the Ferghana Valley, which cuts through from cooperation with the NATO states are Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and of no less importance than the economic constitutes a historical centre of Islam in gains. The fact that the EU sanctions from Central Asia. In this traditionalist environ- November 2005 levied against Uzbekistan ment, it is primarily the younger genera- SWP Comments 10 April 2010 2 tion that is becoming increasingly receptive lateral lines as well as under the umbrella to conservative Muslim ideas. of regional programmes such as Border These developments do not yet pose a Management in Central Asia (BOMCA). threat to the regimes of Central Asia. They The fact that Central Asian elites tend to are aware, however, that this could change externalise the responsibility for regional – especially if a power vacuum opens up in security is a consequence of decades of Northern Afghanistan following the with- paternalism and external support – initially drawal of ISAF forces, which could be used within the context of the Soviet planned by militant organisations like the Islamic economy and later via western develop- Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to gain new ment assistance. The associated rent- centres of operation in Central Asia. In seeking attitude is further promoted by fact the IMU, whose activities are closely the strategic importance afforded to the associated with the Taliban and who geographical region not only by the USA operate out of locations including Kunduz, and Europe, but also Russia and China. The is primarily focused on combating the interest of these international powers in secular regimes of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan accessing regional resources, markets and and Kyrgyzstan, despite an increasingly trade routes allows the Central Asian na- international slant to its actions. tions to conduct a foreign policy balancing act, which guarantees a maximum amount of domestic autonomy, but doesn’t give any Externalising Responsibility incentive to the elites to pursue solutions to Instead of addressing these threats as conflicts that threaten the region’s stability. political challenges, which also point to This final issue is more pressing than ever corresponding deficits in the Central Asian considering the premise of a medium-term states themselves, the elites of these coun- withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghani- tries have grown accustomed to projecting stan. the causes for instability onto the outside world. Consequentially, they primarily follow a course of modernising their mili- Risks of Securitisation tary infrastructure and upgrading the The increasing militarisation of Central technical capacities of their security forces. Asia’s security policy, which comes as a In addition, they try to establish more direct consequence of the ISAF mission, effective border management in order to has bolstered the regional elites in their keep the potential infiltration of dangerous attitude that internal as well as supra- elements – Islamic extremists, drugs, national problems should be addressed organised crime – outside their borders. In primarily with security policy instruments. Uzbekistan’s case, this has caused a drift This securitisation policy may cause towards isolationism, which the country internal tensions to be contained over the can only afford due to external support.