17 AFGHANSTAN: Why Soviet Intervention? / > It': % By Denis Freney Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has led January 14 outlined his view in an interview to many conflicting views and stands. We with Pravda: “The unceasing armed must first ask why the Soviets intervened. intervention, the well-advanced plot by Yet much of the debate has taken place external forces of reaction created a real without any investigation or study of the threat that Afghanistan would lose its evidence. independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our The Soviet explanation has been given country’s southern border.” many times. President Leonid Brezhnev on 18 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 73 Pravda (January 19) spelt out that “in recent months, the (imperialist) aggression assumed such forms and scale as to jeopardise the very existence of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign state,” The Pravda article, by A. Petrov, defines this aggression as “tens of thousands of mercenaries, armed with foreign arms and trained by foreign instructors, who are sent into Afghanistan” . He claims that on June 20 and 21, 1979, two Pakistani vessels brought arms to Karachi for the Afghan rebels. The first brought 2,000 tons of US- made weapons from Britain and the second 8,000 tons of war materials from China. The material was allegedly taken to Peshawar. This operation was supervised by CIA agent Louis Dupree who, with a CIA team, was trying to force a united front of the rebels and a government-in-exile. Units of American-trained mercenaries were sent into Afghanistan and when they “were routed, proofs were obtained that confirmed the fact of external aggression”. One thing should be noted: Petrov speaks of aggression reaching a scale which would have endangered Afghan independence in “recent months” . challenging the “ communist” regime in This would therefore refer to the period Kabul. when Hafizullah Amin was president. Leaving aside the question, for the moment, Second, linked with the above point, we of whether Amin was a “ CIA agent” , let us must be cautious in estimating sources of examine the military position in information. The various Afghan rebel Afghanistan between September and groups are notoriously unreliable as sources December 1979. of information. They seek to promote themselves over their rivals, each claiming It is easily documented that the CIA, great victories. This was also part of the Pakistan and China were training and bidding for aid from imperialism and China. aiding the Afghan rebels. The question is rather how successful they had been in developing a force which would have One of the best examples of unreliable information was the claim that 10,000 Soviet been close to seizing power and which would, therefore, have required the presence of so soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan in many Soviet troops. one week after the Soviet invasion! It is also true that such stories were enthusiastically It must be noted, first of all, that both sides seized upon by the sensationalist western — the American and Soviet — have a clear media. The Americans, particularly the CIA, interest in showing that the rightist rebels also broadcast misinformation, as the media did indeed pose a real threat to Kabul. The have now discovered. Soviets need to show that there was a threat of a new "Chile” to justify their action. The The ABC’s Geoff Herriot has been Americans need to show it is true, to justify particularly strong in emphasising the their action. The Americans need to show it unreliability of guerrilla sources and US is true to justify their claim that the Afghan embassy misinformation (see Sun-Herald, people were valiantly and successfully January 27 for summary of these views). AFGHANISTAN: WHY SOVIET INTERVENTION? 19 Dr. Beverley Male, lecturer at Duntroon Economic Review (January 25) reports “The military college, an expert in Afghan affairs Afghan forces say they were not doing too who spent some months there in early 1979, badly against the rebels before the coup” . and who is certainly not pro-left, is even more Dr. Male The Age, January 21) speaks of definite. Dr. Male in a letter to The Bulletin the “effectiveness” of Amin’s policies. She (January 29) says that it was clear when she adds: “ and rebel sources admitted they were was in Kabul last year “many reports were effective” . based on unsubstantiated and unchecked rumors, the most vicious of which could Amin,after taking over from Taraki, she often, regrettably, be traced to US Embassy claims then, “had the authority to pursue a sources” . more vigorous campaign against the rebels and to press on with the economic and social “The Taraki-Amin regime was certainly reforms. He embarked on a successful no worse and probably much better than offensive against the rebels in Pakhtia many others that are not subjected to such a province and at the same time turned the sustained and savage media attack,” she religious propaganda against them.” writes in The Bulletin. In fact, Dr. Male claims, the very success of We must very strongly make the point that Amin’s policies “probably signed his death there was a CIA-sponsored “disinformation” warrant” , as “ once the rebellion was crushed throughout this period. As journalists have there would no longer have been any need for since found out, this disinformation was a friendship treaty (with a military co­ highly exaggerated then as it is now. We operation clause) with the USSR” . We shall must therefore sift our reports which return later to Dr. Male’s explanation of uncritically report rebel or US “information Soviet intervention, as we shall also to a service” sources, and to search for reports discussion of the nature of Amin’s repression which are either independent first-hand of the rebels. reports, or seriously try to evaluate reports. It is possible to also find references to the “tottering” Amin regime, but a close Military situation, September- examination of these reports finds almost no December 1979 reference (except in direct reports of highly doubtful rebel claims) of the danger to Amin Amin had, from the early ’seventies, been coming from an imminent rebel defeat of the the Khalq leader responsible for Afghan army. Rather, the danger referred to organisation within the army. When he is from mutinies in the army itself, and seized power from Taraki in September 1979, attempts to stage coups. There were, for it seems that the military operations of the example, coup attempts in Kabul in army improved and that, in fact, after Amin November and December and mutinies in took power the army broke the back of other centres. But such mutinies were not, of resistance in Pakhtia province, one of the course, new phenomena. main centres of the rebels. Certainly the position was better than six months In fact, successes gained by the rightist previously. Pakhtia province, like the other rebels were due almost entirely to army major centres of revolt, is on the Pakistani mutinies which, for example, allowed rebel border, was the subject of a major offensive tribesmen to capture part of Herat, the third by Amin’s army, and the rebels suffered a largest city, for four days in March 1979. major defeat there. The documentary by British TV man Nick Asia Week (December 14,1979) under the Downey, screened on ABC TV’s “Four heading “Amin hits Back” reported heavy Comers” (February 2), was ample evidence bombing of dozens of rebel villages in that defections from the army provided the Takhar province “ seemed to turn the course rebels with their strength — particularly in of the 14-month-old civil war in the arms. But the divisive tribesmen failed Government’s favor” . Rebels withdrew from because they did not use the army defectors. several key areas in Pakhtia and Downey also noted that the leader of the Badakhstan provinces. The government army defectors was, in fact, an officer who recaptured Taghab, Nejrab and Wardak, 40 was the dBn of one of the feudal chiefs of the kms from Kabul. Similarly the Far Eastern area. 20 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 73 Taraki Amm Karmal Within the army there were two factors engaged in operations against the guerrillas. operating to “purge it” . First, officers linked If they are not needed now, then they were with the feudal lords naturally were against not needed in December for such operations, the land reform, and led many of the particularly as it is the height of winter and mutinies. This was a “self-purge” of the old the rebel areas are snow-bound, removing feudal army of its counter-revolutionary the chance of any major rebel offensive. elements (many of whom were also eliminated,once discovered,before they could Dangers of foreign invasion of defect). The second factor was the division Afghanistan? among the different revolutionary officers, based upon their support for Khalq (and Was there then a danger of US, Pakistan within that Taraki or Amin), or Parcham, or andfor Chinese troops invading different bonapartist tendencies that Afghanistan? emerged. This is a separate question to that of well- There is no suggestion that the revolts in documented US, Pakistani and Chinese Kabul in November and December were suppun for and training of the rightist counter-revolutionary, pro-feudal revolts, rebels. When Azhar speaks of Soviet troops but, on the contrary, there is evidence that being present to “oppose any aggression they were launched by dissident Parcham from abroad” , we must assume he means and Khalq elements. actual invasion. Finally, it remains the Afghan army The allegations made by Petrov (quoted which is fighting the rebels today. Abdul earlier), the well-documented article by Sammat Azhar, head of the “ security Konrad Ege in CounterSpy (Vol.