note n°13/11 Transatlantic Security Paper N.4 August 2011 JEAN- L U C M A R R E T Senior fellow, FRS and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Sais-Johns Hopkins University EMMANUEL CLAVAUD SDIS-04 Director, Firefighter, Associate fellow, FRS Oslo terrorist attacks: Analysis, consequences and lessons learned. The attack in Norway, like every attack with a tragic events cannot only be perceived in this major impact, should and will be carefully analy- way. Above all, the operational planning, as pre- zed, both by police and by terrorists. If the Nor- sented in the now famous book titled 2083 – A wegian authorities have officially called for a European declaration of independence, seems technical evaluation of Counter-terrorism (CT) unprecedented. It presents and analyzes in a and rescue national services, many sensitive as- particularly structured way, the protocol used by pects still remain unsure: Breivik to prepare his attack. This is displayed The profile and motivations of Anders Breivik from the initial idea, to the training, testing, the Behring will be highly debated, and almost sure- search for precursors (explosive, ammo, indivi- ly politically exploited. In particular, time will dual ceramic body suits), etc., and to the opera- tell, because this attack probably crystallized in tional phase itself, including elements of action Europe the first major violent answer to what vis-a-vis a possible SWAT team counter-strike. some people on the political fringes, among the The author very likely studied recent terrorist heterogeneous networks of the radical and non- events (cells dismantling and failed or successful democrat far-rightists, see as an existential attacks). Most impressive, the systematic way he threat – e.g. multiculturalism. However, these thinks about (and describes in his book) concre- te means to hide his preparatory activities will Communist Colonel Julius Louis Amoss, who, in most likely be seen as a sort of model for copy the early 1960s, defined the strategy as a defense cats („Stealthy process‟). Truly, the possibility to against a Communist takeover of the United Sta- reproduce such a terrorist attack seems to be the tes. most serious problem. In the late 1990s white supremacists Tom Metz- Lastly, the Norwegian police behaviour does not ger and Alex Curtis popularized the term „lone appear to have been particularly adequate. This wolf‟. They envisioned lone-wolf and small-cell country does not appear to have a strong opera- activism to be considerably more difficult to de- tional security culture. tect and consequently, to dismantle than other forms of terrorism. Curtis encouraged acting alo- Profile and motivations ne in committing violent and heinous crimes so This aspect is obviously the most interesting for that they would not incriminate others. Both the media. It is probable that there is not here men recognized the opportunities the Internet any simple answer. offered for the dissemination of information and the communication with fellow militants. Lone-wolf and Leaderless resistance? The most famous example of “leaderless resis- The solitary dimension of Breivik, if it is confir- tance”/”lone wolves attack," until Oslo attacks, is med, could be indicative of several aspects: First, certainly the attack perpetrated against the Al- an operational loneliness directly coming from fred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma white supremacists‟ practices. This aspect, which City on April 19, 1995, by T. McVeigh and Terry needs to be assessed in-depth, is rather a com- Nichols. It must be noticed that the explosive mon practice among violent supremacists' net- devices used in both cases are pretty much simi- works. Two concepts, defined in the U.S., sum- lar (ANFO based). Having said that, it is certain- marize this attitude: Lone wolf terrorism and « ly necessary to verify by a principle of precaution leaderless resistance » which underlines the if the entity that Breivik claimed to have created absence of pyramidal structure in a terrorist or- with others in 2002 throughout Europe and ganization, and implies autonomous cells (this North America, is a fantasy or something more can also be observed for jihadism). substantial. The “lone wolf” concept seems well-shaped for Unabomber type? representing white supremacist terrorism. It can The manifesto published by Breivik, is essential- be defined with four main criteria: ly a narcissist opuscule composed by a self- taught individual. It obviously, and a bit superfi- (a) Individual action cially, mimics the pamphlet made by another (b) No membership to an organized and terro- bloody individual, but from another political rist entity or network fringe - Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. „The Una- (c) No leader or hierarchy bomber„). Kaczynski, truly a very dissociated (d) Individual conception of planning, tactic personality, perceived as schizophrenic by many and attack authoritative experts, was responsible for plac- ing or mailing 16 package bombs and letter Some elements of « leaderless resistance » emer- bombs over a period of nearly 18 years. For six ged at the beginning of the 1970s. Joseph Tom- years, between 1987 and 1993, Kaczynski re- masi, founder of the National Socialist Libera- mained inactive. In June 1993 he restarted his tion Front (NSLF) in 1974, encourage people „to bomb campaign. His final attack came on 24 act resolutely and alone‟ against the state. This April 1995, when a package bomb sent to the of- contradicted the Marxist organizational model of fices of the California Forestry Association killed terrorist organizations at that time. The white the association‟s president. Such comparison has supremacist Louis Beam, a former Ku Klux Klan evident limits: the modus operandi and the se- and Aryan Nations member, popularised the lected targets are very different. concept. He published a book championing lea- However, both Unabomber and Breivik have pu- derless resistance as a tactic to countervail the blished and disseminated their manifesto. The destruction by law enforcement agencies of pyra- one made by Breivik is far more structured and midal American militias. His opinion was one ambitious, in particular, concerning ways and where „all individuals and groups operate inde- means. And once again, their vision (used here is pendently of each other, and never report to a a quasi-mystical sense) is very different, and central headquarters‟ or leader – single or collec- even opposed, Kaczynski being essentially a sort tive - for direction or instruction. For the lone- of green-anarchist. wolf concept, Beam credited Cold War anti- Breivik‟s manifesto is huge and according to his author, a compendium of references, articles and 2 opinions coming from various rightist / (neo-) The author also seems to be particularly sensiti- conservatives or nationalists authors or organi- ve to what he perceives as the decline of masculi- zations. Their analysis provides precious infor- nity in the Western man, due to feminism. mation on Breivik radical opinions. First, it must It is interesting to note that he appears less inte- be admitted that, among political pamphlets, rested by migrants and Muslims, than by those many that are disseminated among far-rightists he considers as responsible of the situation he networks and communities, are much less struc- denounces, e.g. leftist political parties, social- tured, informed, and are blatantly racist or plain democrats, « progressists » and « immigratio- insulting. 2083 is truly a naive book in many nist » intellectuals. That could largely explain, ways. It is also a symptomatic mix: it is indica- with operational necessities, Breivik‟s target tive of a post 9-11 vision of the world and of choice – a meeting of young social-democrat mi- Europe, based on an eschatological perception of litants rather than, let‟s say, a mosque. the Western world or civilization decline. Its ref- Breivik specific ideology is certainly representa- erences are essentially post-9-11, mostly neo- tive, at the end, of what radical and violent far- conservative, or even pro-Israel. It considers Is- rightism is: A heterogeneous mix of diversified lam as a religion that is, in essence, violent and beliefs and ideologies – Paneuropeanism, odi- expansionist (Daniel Pipes, the MEMRI and Ji- nism (the cult of Scandinanian gods), white su- hadwatch are largely quoted). Furthermore, premacy, anti-Marxism, anti-federalism, free- they also consider Europe as a decadent conti- masonry symbolism, anti-democracy, racism, a nent, overwhelmed by a radical and dynamic Is- surprising papism, coupled with typical neo-con lam (Bat Ye‟or Eurabia). For that reason, Breivik post 9-11 fears and perceptions and an obvious cannot be considered as a neo-nazi. He writes fetishism for weaponry and knights/crusaders somewhere else in his book that Hitler and Nazis aesthetic. can actually be criticized for what they did, and that forbids probably forever the Europeans to Suicide by cop? act vigorously against minorities. The motivations of terrorists are not easy to ana- 2083 is also full of anti-European Union, anti- lyze; the general and traditional reason being the federalist and anti-Brussels stances. For instan- word « terrorism » itself. This term can be pejo- ce, the EU is seen as a general and well- rative by defining and disqualifying these acts as orchestrated process of multiculturalization of the “violence of the other." Different researchers the Old continent: have tried to analyze terrorism, in particular Crelinsten, Crenshaw, Della Porta, Gurr, Ross “Why the EU needs to be and Sprinzak. Even though Gurr ignores psycho- destroyed and soon." logy and group dynamics, Crenshaw, in her in- troduction of Terrorism in Context, considers “The EU court of Justice in that the causal analysis of terrorist acts is com- Strasbourg is a cultural Marxist plex, and it implied psychological considera- Controlled political entity" ( p. 338). tions, internal bargaining inside and actors‟ inte- ractions inside or outside the terrorist organiza- Classically, for a far-rightist pamphlet, every- tion. Ross tries to link “structural causes” (i.e.