CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAVID KENYON BRITISH CAVALRY ON THE WESTERN FRONT 1916-1918 DEFENCE COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY Ph.D. THESIS i CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DEFENCE COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS Ph.D. THESIS Academic Year 2007-2008 David Kenyon BRITISH CAVALRY ON THE WESTERN FRONT 1916-1918 Supervisor: Professor E. R. Holmes, CBE, TD Submitted December 2007 © Cranfield University 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner. ii ABSTRACT This thesis examines the activities and effectiveness of the British, Indian and Canadian cavalry which formed part of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders (The ‘Western Front’) during the First World War. The study concentrates on the period from January 1916 to November 1918, focusing on four major Allied offensive battles; The Somme, July-November 1916 Arras, April 1917 Cambrai, November-December 1917 Amiens and the ‘100 Days’, August-November 1918 Other episodes of cavalry fighting associated with these offensives are also considered. It is argued in this study that the contribution of cavalry to the fighting on the Western Front has been consistently underestimated by historians, a trend which began with the Official History of the conflict and continues in even the most modern scholarship. The arm has been characterised as vulnerable to modern weapons, out of date, of little use in combat, and an unnecessary burden on scarce resources. Through analysis of the performance of mounted units in these battles, using data principally obtained from the unit War Diaries, as well as other primary sources, it is argued that cavalry were both much more heavily involved in fighting on the Western Front, and more effective, than has previously been acknowledged. The problems which constrained the performance of the cavalry are also examined. These included the limited understanding of their potential among senior officers, as well as command and control problems at lower levels. Issues concerning tactics, equipment, and interaction with other arms, (in particular tanks) are also examined. The evolution of the cavalry arm is also considered in the context of the evolution of the B.E.F. as a whole, and its part in the changing face of the conflict is examined, both as an agent of change, and as a beneficiary of wider developments in how the war was fought. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was supervised by Professor Richard Holmes, Cranfield University. Additional advice and support was provided by Prof. Gary Sheffield, Dr Stephen Badsey, and Mr Ian Kenyon. The assistance of the staff of the following libraries and institutions is also acknowledged; DCMT Shrivenham Library JSCSC Shrivenham Library RMA Sandhurst Library National Archives, Kew, London Gloucestershire County Library Service Bovington Tank Museum iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 ..................................................................................................................... 1 HISTORIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................ 1 Introduction- In Search of a Debate.............................................................................. 1 Existing Literature and Issues....................................................................................... 2 Cavalry Generals........................................................................................................... 4 The Last Machine-Gun.................................................................................................. 5 Fodder ........................................................................................................................... 8 Technology and Tanks................................................................................................. 10 Explaining the Cavalry................................................................................................ 12 Models for the Future.................................................................................................. 14 Research Questions..................................................................................................... 15 Methodology................................................................................................................ 19 References – Chapter 1 ............................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................... 25 THE SOMME BATTLES, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1916 ................................................. 25 Introduction................................................................................................................. 25 Background: 1914 - 1915............................................................................................ 26 The Cavalry in 1916.................................................................................................... 31 1916 – Four Battles..................................................................................................... 36 Planning for 1 July ...................................................................................................... 38 The 1 July Attack......................................................................................................... 46 Planning for 14 July .................................................................................................... 48 The ‘Battle of Bazentin Ridge’ .................................................................................... 54 The ‘History’ of 14 July............................................................................................... 62 An Opportunity Missed?.............................................................................................. 68 Planning the September Battles................................................................................... 71 Flers............................................................................................................................. 74 Morval ......................................................................................................................... 76 Assessment................................................................................................................... 80 References – Chapter 2 ............................................................................................... 85 v CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................... 92 THE HINDENBURG LINE AND ARRAS, NOVEMBER 1916–APRIL 1917........... 92 Introduction................................................................................................................. 92 Views of 1917 .............................................................................................................. 93 The Winter – Training, Reinforcements, and Fodder.................................................. 94 The Hindenburg Line: March 1917........................................................................... 100 Operations 23-28 March 1917 .................................................................................. 104 Lessons of the Spring Fighting.................................................................................. 108 Planning the Arras Offensive.................................................................................... 113 Arras: 9 April ............................................................................................................ 119 Arras: 10 April .......................................................................................................... 123 Monchy le Preux: 11 April........................................................................................ 128 Lessons of Monchy .................................................................................................... 135 References – Chapter 3 ............................................................................................. 146 CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................. 154 CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1917 .......................................................... 154 Introduction............................................................................................................... 154 Cambrai, A Tank Battle?........................................................................................... 155 The Background to Cambrai: Third Ypres................................................................ 157 Cambrai: The Plan.................................................................................................... 161 The Advance of 1st Cavalry Division: 20 November 1917........................................ 167 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions: 20 November............................................................. 173 Cantaing 21 November: Cavalry and Tanks............................................................. 184 The German Counter-stroke: 30 November.............................................................. 187 The ‘Battle of Epehy’: 1 December 1917 .................................................................. 192 The Failure of the Cavalry?.....................................................................................