The Politics of Prison Privatization: Political Strategies of Business and Labor By Thomas Michael Kelly A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Robert Van Houweling, Chair Professor Sarah Anzia Professor Ann Keller Professor Paul Pierson Professor Eric Schickler Summer 2019 The Politics of Prison Privatization: Political Strategies of Business and Labor Copyright 2019 by Thomas Michael Kelly Abstract The Politics of Prison Privatization: Political Strategies of Business and Labor By Thomas Michael Kelly Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Robert Van Houweling, Chair What is the political impact of prison privatization? Does prison privatization introduce a new political interest group into the criminal justice sphere? Do private prison firms have an incentive to push for increased incarceration and do they have the power to succeed? How similar, or different, are the political goals and strategies of private prison firms from other groups interested in the operation of prisons, such as corrections officer unions? I argue that the structure of firms sets them apart from other interest groups. The benefits of growth flow to all shareholders in a firm, and all shareholders have a stake in the increasing profitability of the firm they own. This aligns the concerns of shareholders and reduces conflict. In contrast, other groups often have constituents and stakeholders with conflicting interests. Labor unions, another politically influential type of interest group, have a fraught relationship with growth. If a labor union grows in size, many of the benefits flow not to the incumbent union members, but rather to new union members. I argue that this distinction between firms and labor unions should manifest in different political strategies where firms are more likely to adopt pro- active political strategies aimed at increasing market share and profit, whereas labor unions will adopt defensive political strategies aimed at safeguarding the position of their current members. This implies that private prison firms have much more to gain from increased incarceration than do corrections officer unions. I compare the political activities of private prison firms and corrections officer unions and show that private prison firms do appear to value increased incarceration more than corrections officer unions. Drawing on a time series cross-sectional model, I show that privatization appears to drive increased incarceration in states within the United States. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications. These results are not driven by political shifts, crime rates, or cost savings. This dissertation also describes the results of a series of interviews with state legislators and lobbyists. Across states, these subject matter experts believe private prison firms are more politically proactive, more politically sophisticated, and more supportive of increased incarceration than are corrections officer unions. 1 Acknowledgments In the process of writing this dissertation, I have been greatly helped by my mentors. I am deeply grateful for the guidance and inspiration I have received throughout the process. Rob Van Houweling was an invaluable mentor throughout the writing of this dissertation. He was an advocate for the theoretical and substantive importance of this dissertation. He challenged me to respond to counter-argument after counter-argument. He suggested many additions and improvements. And he was always patient with all of my questions. I am indebted to him. Eric Schickler supported me since the beginning of graduate school. I benefited from his careful reading of my work, as well as his insistence that I not neglect either the specifics of the particular case on which I was working, or the broader implications of the claim I was making. Paul Pierson pushed me to consider the wider scope of the project, and always reminded me to think about how the manifestation of political power can change over time. His insight into how interest groups mobilize and exercise power was a great inspiration throughout the process of writing this dissertation. Sarah Anzia encouraged me to think more clearly about the similarities and differences of private and public sector unions, and how that shapes union behavior. I also would like to thank her for the often difficult, but always helpful, questions she posed to me throughout this process. Ann Keller, who served as the outside member of my dissertation committee, shared her expertise on cooperation and competition between interest groups across different policy settings. For their support, conversation and assistance, I would also like to thank Terri Bimes, Alice Ciciora, Sue Kelly, Elizabeth Kelly, and Michael Klaeren. i Table of Contents Chapter 1: The Politics of Prison Privatization ………………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 2: Different Goals of Unions and Firms ………………………………………………………………………. 8 Chapter 3: Political Expenditures …………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 Chapter 4: Privatization and Incarceration …………………………………………………………………………... .25 Chapter 5: Political Strategies of Private Prison Firms and Corrections Officer Unions …………… 50 Chapter 6: Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 78 References …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 87 Appendix A: Dates of Privatization ………………………………………………………………………………………….95 Appendix B: Formal Model …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 104 Appendix C: Interview Questions ………………………………………………………………………………………… 109 ii Chapter 1: The Politics of Prison Privatization Since the early 1980s, use of private prisons in the United States has gone from a historical relic to a mainstream practice. By 2016, almost 1.5 million prisoners were held in private prisons. These prisoners comprised 18% of federal prisoners and 7% of state prisoners. Private prison firms also staked out territory in immigrant detention centers. By 2017, private prison firms held a majority of immigrants detained by the U.S government (Cullen, 2018). The spread of private prisons has been controversial, and critics have attacked prison privatization on a variety of grounds. Critics have accused private prison firms of not investing in reducing recidivism (Anderson, 2010). Dolovich (2005) argued that resorting to privatization to cut operational costs precluded the broader examination of the legitimacy of incarceration. Mukherjee (2014) claimed that private prisons are more likely to issue citations to prisoners, thus increasing the average length of sentence served by denying time off for good behavior. One of the common claims, and the one of particular interest to political scientists, is that the spread of private prisons has introduced a new and powerful pro- incarceration political interest into the policy sphere. This charge has been leveled by both scholars and activists (Anderson, 2010; Ashton & Petteruti, 2011; Gottschalk, 2008; Hartney & Glesmann 2012; Mattera, Khan & Nathan, 2003; Sarabi & Bender, 2000). If this charge is true, then it may be important to understand the political activities of private prison operators when studying criminal justice policies, across the United States. The use of private prisons is not restricted to a particular region, nor to states of a certain partisan orientation. By 1998 the majority of states held at least some prisoners in for-profit private prisons. 1 Figure 1.1 Number of States Utilizing For-Profit Private Prisons Over Time 1983-2014 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Author’s Calculation. Political Activity of Private Prisons In order to support these accusations, observers have tended to focus on either political expenditures by private prison firms or actions of their officers and founders. For instance, Sarabi and Bender (2000) described the participation of several Corrections Corporation of America (now CoreCivic) executives on the Criminal Justice Task Force of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), as well as ALEC’s past support of prison privatization, and suggested that private prisons used ALEC to push criminal justice policies that increase incarceration. Other critics such as Hartney and Glesmann (2012), and Ashton and Petteruti (2011) focused on the political expenditures on lobbying and campaigns that they argued are translated into political influence, that can be used to push pro-incarceration policies. Private prison firms, and others, challenge this characterization of private prison political activity. The largest private prison company in the United States, CoreCivic, unequivocally states that they do not “lobby for or against policies or legislation that 2 would determine the basis for, or duration of, an individual's incarceration or detention” (CoreCivic, 2015). Others who have rejected the claim that private prison firms are a source of pro- incarceration political pressure, emphasize that the most important pro-incarceration interest groups are corrections officer unions. Former New Mexico Governor, Gary Johnson, argues that: Never in that process did I experience any pressure to “fill beds” in the private prisons we built. And if I had, it wouldn’t have worked. It might happen elsewhere, but it absolutely did not happen in New Mexico when I was Governor. Anyone who has actually overseen a prison system and dealt with the