National Library BiMiothéque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Weilington Street 395. W WdlYighm OttawaON K1AûN4 WONKlAûN4 canada Canodo The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive Licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Libmy of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distnaute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfonn, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fÎom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othedse de ceiie-ci ne doivent êîre imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Bcfore you LOyC here, gou>n going to kmfhat one of tk most bm&i tlrirrgs in the world is your ornage nine--yar-udd. - quotcd in Samue1 Hyntr, Tiic SoUkr's T&: Beanhg Wimwr ro Modern Wur. (New York : Penyin, 1997) p. 192 This thesis examines the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlqùgend in an attempt to formulate a theory of combat motivation for fanatical soldiea. Chapter 1 of this thesis examines the history of the division, hmits inception to its virtual destruction in Normandy, and explains why the 12th SS can be classified as fanatical. Chapter 2 examines the histonography of combat motivation literature and explains the failure of this literature to provide an adequate explanation for the wmbat motivation of a fanatic. The wmbat motivation of the 12th SS, and for fanatical soldiers in general, can be broken down into two categones: I&oLogical Motivaton and Concrete Moîivators. Chaptea 3 and 4 deal with the Ideological Motivators, inciuding the nature of the Hitler Youth, the influence of Nazism, and the concepts of Volkrgmeùtschafi and religious belief in Hitler. Chapters 5 and 6 look at the Concrete Motivators, including weapons, training, and the leadership cadres of the division. This thesis concludes that the holistic application of both sets of motivators are essential for the successful combat motivation of the fanatical soldier. Acknowledgements 1 could not have accomplished this work without the help and support of many people. To begin, I owe a debt of gratitude to my supe~sor,Probssor Marc Milner, who steered me in the right direction from the start, thereby elirninating any problems that lack of focus can bring. 1 truly appreciated his advice and his suggestions, and 1cannot imagine an easier person to work with on a subject such as this. 1 also am thanlaul for the assistance of the two secretanes in the Department of History, Carol Hines and Elizabeth Hemngton, who helped me track down the right matenal and were always quite helpful (and cheerful) the tirnes when 1 had questions (which were many). 1 would like to thank Professor Steven Turner and Professor Barry Spimer for the tirne that the took on my behalf to examine my thesis, and to Professor Gary Waite who chaired the examination. Their critiques and their suggestions were greatly appreciated. The staff who 1 dealt with at the various archives that 1 visited, including Steve Hams at the Directorate of History and Hentage (Ottawa), and Ron Haycock at the Royal Military College (Kingston) were also quite helphil, and my task would have been much more difficdt without their assistance. On a more persona1 note, 1 would like to thank John Yahn for his assistance in translation and for his stories of his childhood in ocnipied Hungary and Nazi Germany. He aided me in putting this whole subject in a more human perspective. 1would also be remis if 1 did not thank my wife, Stacey, for a11 of iii her love and support during the writing of this thesis. 1 am quite fortunate that 1 have been blessed with the life-long companionship of such a wondefil person, and without her understanding and her assistance 1 would never have been able to complete this work. Al1 mistakes, whether in transiation or in interpretation, are entirely my TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction - Towards a Theory of Fanatical Chapter 1 - The Birth of a Fanatical Combat Division: The Origins, Actions, and Atrocities of the 12th SS Panzer Division HitIerj+ --------- 12 Chapter 2 - Chapter 3 - Blind Obedience and Unquestioning Faith: Ideoiogicai Indoctrination and the Quest for the Development of a Fanatic --------O 60 Chapter 4 - For the Führer and the Volksgemetnscehoft: The Importance of the Unquantifiable ---O----- 101 Chapter 5 - On Weaponry and Training: The Importance of the Quantifiable ----------- 121 Chapter 6 - Big Men, Draufgüngers, and Thugs: The Impact of Fanatical Leadership -----------140 Conclusion - Fanatical Combat Motivation and the Legacy of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend -----------O-- 156 List of Abbreviations Abt In - Operatiomabteilung (Chief of Operations) Abt IV - NationaLrozialficher FUhnurgso- (National Socialist Guidance Officer) DIV - Division HJ - HitIerjrrgimrd (Hitler Youth) LAH - Leibstandorre Adolf Hitler (Adoll Hitler's Bodyguard) NCO - Non-Cornmissioned Officer NSDAP - NarionaZsoziaZistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party) NSFO - NarionaIs~~alrStircherFuhmngsojJ&r (National Socialist Guidance Officer) NSLB - NationaLroziaILstirche Leherbund (National Socialist Teacheis Association) PZ - Panzer (Tank) RTF - Reichjugendfuhnuag (Reich Youth Leadership) SAAEF - Supreme Headquartea Allied Expeditionary Force SA - Sh~mabteilung(Storm Troopers) SS - Schutrstflel (Elite Guard) WEL - Wehrertc<cht&mgslager dcr Hider-Jugenà (Hitler Youth Military Instruction Camps) INTRODUCTION Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation SS-Unterscharfrihrer Emil mrr found himstlf in a serious predkamen~' As the rain feil dunng the moming of 26 June 1944, the sounds of an immense battle became progressively doser. As a member of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlejugend (Hitler Youth), DUrr could consider himself a member of a unique and highiy elite fighting force. This division, comprised entirely of seventeen and eighteen-year-old members of the Hitler Youth and whose officers and NCO's were either former members of the Hitler Youth or members of the elite 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Ahlf Hitler (LM): were quickly making a name for themselves as a formation fierce in defence, aggressive in counterattacks, and deadly to their pnsoners. It was a reputation that Dürr was undoubtedly proud of. Now in the third week of the AiLied invasion of Fortress Europe, British General Bernard Montgomery was launching an attack in an effort to capture the city l A list of comparative ranks for the Waffen-SS and the Canadian Anny can be found in Appendix 1. The background and story of Emil Dhr can be found in Chester Wilmont, The Smgglc for Europe. revised ed @ondon : Collins, 1965); Hubert Meyer, The Hirtory of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision Hitler@@. trans. by H. Ham Henschler. (Winnipeg : J. J. Fedorowia, 1994); Kurt Meyer, GmnadMs. trans. by Michael Mendé. (Winnipeg : J. J. Fedorowia, 1994); and Craig W. H. Luther, Blood Md Homnie Hdory of the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth," 1943-1945. (San Jose : R James Bender, 1987). Literally translated as "Adolf Hitler's Bodyguard." 2 of Caen, a D-Day objective that never materialized Operation EPSOM, developed to utilize General Miles Dempsey's Second Amy, was designed to envelop Caen from the west. The VI11 British Corps, with its force of 60,000 men, 600 tanks, 700 artillery pieces, and supported by three cruisers and a monitor. were to break through the German defences between Caen and Tilly, cross the Odon and Orne rivers, and establish its amour astnde the Caen-Falaise road. Directly in the path of this assault were Dürr and his comrades who made up the two available under-strength battalions of the 26th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment and the 12th SS Engineer Battalion, both attached to the 12th SS Panzer Division. The clouds and mist that covered the battlefield meant that the planned Allied air support for EPSOM did not materialue as Montgomery desired, but this fact was of little cornfort to Dürr and the crew of the gun that he commanded as a member of the 1st Battalion of the 26th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment (Y26). As the thunderous artillery barrage crept doser and closer, and the tmops of the VIIT Corps overran the first lines of defence, Dürr and his comrades rnust have been mindful of the imminent danger. They were no strangers to battle. In fact, in the days up to the commencement of EPSOM the 26th Regiment bad suffered approxbately 500 casualties, with no replacements in sight. It was already three weeks into the campaign but Dürr and the rest of the 12th SS were still faced with the daunting task of holding up the Ailied offensive until German reinforcements arrived. As the battle progressed it soon became clear that the battalion headquarters of the V26th, located on the Rots-Cheux road in St. Manvieu, would be overrun. 3 The only weapons available to the force defending the position were sub-machine guns, rifles, two mortars, magnetic explosives, and a handfd of Panzerfausts, which were hand-held anti-tank weapons, similar to the bazooka used by the Aiiied forces. Diirr and his crew were a part of the handful of men that were available to defend the pst Nready, fierce hand-to-hand fighîhg had developed in previous meetings of members of the Hitlerjugiend Division and the Ailied forces, and the defence of the command pst would be no different. 'Ihe ~Idiersknew that if the headquarters were taken, a clear hole would emerge that the British could break through and exploit. However, to stay and fight would also be suicidal, and in the unlikely event that the small group of defenders were successful in the short tem, there was no chance of holding the position for any significaat amount of time.