54th Session of the ISI, Berlin Aug. 2003 The Political Role of the Official Statistics in the former GDR Peter von der Lippe Nature of the present report on the GDR statistics Dcommissioned by a German Parliament's Commission in 1993, based on documents from archives, esp. of the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) Dfocus S not on organisational aspects, procedures, internal structure ... S but on relations between the CAS and political authorities (party leaders) Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 2 Standards D understand standards used in East / West D see mistakes made in the West, too D do not personalise, draw general conclusions Western standards micro data confidentiality (data protection) macro data to be published, made available to everybody In the GDR both principles were completely reversed Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 3 Statistics in a planned economy S Agitation and propaganda control of the implementation of plans S criteria of quality (quality standards, GDR) completeness accuracy (verification of micro data) speedy reporting and efficient processing of data S not important rights of the respondents information of the general public international cooperation Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 4 Conclusions, the West (German Fed. Republic) SStrong feelings against a census (protection of micro data) Sno appreciation of the danger posed to the common good by secrecy or manipulation of macro data and the positive critical role of statistics in a democracy 1. As with everything in life, it is the spirit from which some- thing arises that determines the outcome. Democratic stan- dards are the basis for everything 2. There can be no good statisticians without having a good (legal and political) constitution of statistics. Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 5 Power of SED over GDR Statistics Instrument of power of Limits of power: the SED over statistics the West Basis: Ideology, the Cold War, ‘Democratic centralisation’ Instrument 1 Instrument 2 Instrument 3 Integration of the Party monopoly on Control of statistical CAS in the party information ( 'distri- definitions and personnel policy, butor', secrecy, methods as well as inspections etc. publications, etc.) ‘findings’ (results) The result: confusion and deceit, manipulation, falsification Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 6 Ideological self - image 1 Partiality 2 Cold War S objectivity = relic of S Sun Tse burgeois consciousness " any military operation S propaganda takes deception as its " to make better use of basic quality " statistics as a weapon for S readiness among the rousing the public and people to consider statis- propaganda to inform tics in general as a state and rally party secret: vigilance towards organizations and all the class enemy workers ... " (Arno Donda S CAS an office almost like Sept., 1967) the intelligence service Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 7 Instrument 1: personnel policy, checks, bans (part 1) DStatus of CAS S officially organ of the council of ministers S spoon-fed by G.M. (Central Committee, CC) reports were appraised and criticised by the CC DPersonnel policy, political patronage (decided exclusively on the basis of political usefulness) S dismissal of leading personnel owing to contacts with relatives in West Germany S external contacts (Budapest) and data transfers (Gini) possible only with the party's consent Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 8 Instrument 1: press, adjustment to party figures (part 2) DDomestic appearances e.g. before the press S statisticians were suspected of being politically unreliable S they were required to comment on their figures in a constructive ('forward oriented') manner DIn the case of divergence CAS vs. CC S figures had to tally with assessment the party already had submitted S statisticians lead by political opportunism made relevant proposals themselves Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 9 Donda's proposal In 1988 some important targets of the law on the national economic plan for industry were not achieved ... We consider it necessary to pinpoint the main reasons for the non-achievement of performance and efficiency targets, as we can expect reactions on the part of our class enemies which could be misused as speculation against East Germany.’ (Letter from Donda 14th Dec. 1988) Donda proposed 4% growth (1988 I) instead of the 4.5% of CAS, not because of methodological doubts but since '... according to our calculations this pace of economic growth cannot be sustained in the second half-year' Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 10 Instrument 2: monopoly on information (part 1) DThe (flawed) position of the West S cover-up or dressing-up of statistics less critical than falsification; verbal comments harmless S the little in the way of data that was published was correct (because internally used in the GDR) " ... it says something for the correctness of sta- tistics however, that documents, models and fore- casts on economic policy decision- making in East- Germany were chiefly drawn up with the use of published material. Consequently, the use of official statistics seems justifiable." Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 11 Instrument 2: monopoly on information (part 2) DControl of the dissemination of statistics S public dissemination: 'forward oriented' comments S statistics for internal use: the instrument 'distri- butor ', material of different levels of secrecy (NFD = for official use only, ..., GVS = classified as secret) DHence it was not uncommon S even for state bodies to learn only 'half-truths' and use incomplete data S for the party to make use of double data collection (separate inquiries to check CAS) figures other than those that were published Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 12 Instrument 3: control of definitions and methods (part 1) DThe most spectacular intrusions in statistics S definitions (methods) S results (falsification) DDefinitions to get big (or small) figures S buildings (flats) S industrial robots, CAD/CAM systems D interventions of the party have gone back much further than previously assumed D misinformation established consciously was considerable (e.g. industrial robots 1:17) Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 13 Instrument 3: control of definitions and methods (part 2) DThe dilemma the more discernible it became that its great leap forward had not suceeded the greater the dilemma S the GDR wished to be seen as one of the most industrialised countries S it also wanted to play it close to its chest DThe consequences S the 'provision of figures' to international organisations was increasingly a thorn in the side of the political leadership S GDR became increasingly isolated even within the COMECON (esp. Soviet Union) Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 14 Result of wielding political influence The result: confusion and deceit, manipulation, falsification intentional effects unintentional effects Self deceit Cost of control Confusion + Manipulation Falsification selective 1. words (comments) Example: 'revisions' in publications 2. numbers the reports on foreign misleading • base period trade statistics to be terms: VM, • selection of goods submittted to the UN and NSW • "base adjusting" the COMECON Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 15 The result: confusing terms, manipulative tricks DTerms in order to create misunderstandings S non socialist economic territory (NSW) U hard currency countries S Valutamark (VM) 'exchange mark' Donda: 'intentional ambiguities in our foreign trade statistics' DProhibitions of publication S emigration, suicides, number of high school leaving certificates, employment in the 'x-field' S only exports plus imports ('turnover'), not balance Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 16 Proposals of statisticians Considerations that played a very important role S publish or not publish? S publish now or later (such that an 'adjustment' can be made if a drop is only temporary)? S report absolute figures or only rates of increase? S which base year? S Provide commentary or not if so how should it be worded 'forward-oriented' Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 17 "Forward orientated" wording Reality Written proposal Non-fulfilment of large ‘to be published, although in sections of the plan some cases we can expect reactions from the class enemy’ Drop in prime costs: plan it has ‘become apparent that 2.3% further provisions for actual only 1% reducing costs must be found’ Output in the chemical ‘Measures have been industry, plan: +11.9%, implemented ... to increase actual +2.6 % performance’ ‘The contribution of science ‘Returns from ... peak and technology ... has technical and scientific output diminished since 1986’ … can be further increased’ Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 18 Manipulative tricks: altering the choice of goods (part 1) The West did not believe in the newspaper "Neues Deutschland" but in the official statistics DExplanations intentionally omitted a footnote in 'the CAS' source documents' but not in tables for public relations work DAltering the choice of goods S in production statistics only goods where output had risen S in price statistics only if price had dropped or remained constant this could easily be verified by (Western) outsiders Aug. 15th 2003 Peter von der Lippe GDR Statistics 19 Manipulative tricks: choice of goods (part 2), base adjusting Examples for manipulative changes of the basket in yearbook 1987 but no in yearbook 1988 instead longer in yearbook 1988 of articles in 1987 men's casual suits men's short socks cardigans, pullovers adults' track suits small type writers plastic bins stereo audio systems matches D'Base adjusting' change of the previous year value xt-1 later in t when a growth rate is calculated (similar: 'plan reduction') S 'the scheduled base adjusting is no longer possible as the previous month's figures are already in Geneva' Aug.