How to Properly Wear a Tin Foil Hat: A Call for Epistemic Humility in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence, in Applications of Neuroprosthetics, and in the Debate over Scientific Realism Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Schuler, Matthew Michael Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction, presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 01/10/2021 10:41:27 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/631278 HOW TO PROPERLY WEAR A TIN FOIL HAT: A CALL FOR EPISTEMIC HUMILITY IN THE CREATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IN APPLICATIONS OF NEUROPROSTHETICS, AND IN THE DEBATE OVER SCIENTIFIC REALISM by Matthew Schuler __________________________ Copyright © Matthew Schuler 2018 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2018 THE UNNERSI1Y OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Matthew Schuler, titled How to Properly Wear a Tin Foil Hat: A Call for Epistemic Humility in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence, In Applications of Neuroprosthetics, and In the Debate over Scientific Realism and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ______ Date: 9-26-2018 ) Stewart Cohen _________ Date: 9-26-2018 Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certifythat I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. --��- ---+--!]-��--------- Date: 9-26-2018 Dissertatio�ir€ctor: Terry Horgan 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost I wish to convey to Terry Horgan, my dissertation advisor, my gratitude for his work in helping me to improve the papers that eventually became chapters comprising this dissertation; his generosity and truly ingenious feedback – which I benefited from in our meetings for the last several years as part of his Work In Progress group – resulted in this dissertation (whatever merits it does, in fact, have) being significantly better than it otherwise would have been. (Here, as with everyone else acknowledged below, I feel compelled to point out that all shortcomings are – obviously – mine and mine alone; in some cases, I was simply unable to implement revisions, recommended by Terry and others, that would have adequately handled the preponderance of objections the reader may be inclined to raise – or so I’d wager.) I am also deeply appreciative of the time, effort, and contributions of my other committee members – Stewart Cohen, Shaun Nichols, and Joseph Tolliver. Interestingly, each of these philosophers has contributed to the improvement of this dissertation in entirely different ways, and I would like to take the time to acknowledge how they did so. Over the course of my graduate studies, I have probably taken more courses and participated in more Independent Study & Reading Groups with Stew than anyone else. And so although we generally work in different areas, nonetheless (especially during the first few years of the program), it was Stew (along with Juan Comesaña) who were most responsible for shaping my approach to the discipline as I began to mature philosophically. As for Shaun, I not only learned a great deal simply by being his TA on multiple occasions, but more importantly, it was Shaun who directed me to the work of John Bickle; this mad the dissertation far more interesting than it otherwise would have been (to the extent that the reader does indeed find it interesting to some degree). And finally, with regard to Joseph, I spent so much time with him (both in the classroom and outside of it) that I like to think that some of his incredibly rarely-encountered philosophical creativity has rubbed off on me; in any case, he is the philosopher who exposed me to Ted Sider, and helped me to make sense of Writing the Book of the World (though he 3 may disagree with the position I take with respect to Sider). Whatever grasp I do have of Sider’s metametaphysics, I owe to Joseph, and for that I am most grateful. I also owe an especially significant debt to the participants of Terry’s Work in Progress group, where I had the opportunity to present each of these papers several times and receive crucial feedback from its rotating members: included are not only Terry himself, but also Brandon Ashby, Oisín Deery, Matt DeStefano, Martina Fürst, Yael Loewenstein, Tyler Millhouse, Lucia Schwarz, Vojko Strahovnik, and especially Bryan Chambliss. I would also like to thank my doctoral student colleagues with whom I have had discussions about this material. Phoebe Chan, Tyler Millhouse, and Eyal Tal immediately come to mind, but it is inevitable that I shall have just now inadvertently omitted colleagues whose help was especially valuable. I hope such colleagues will accept my sincere apology. I would also like to thank my M.A. pals from Virginia Tech, Andy Creighton and Drew Valdespino, since this is when I first started thinking about the philosophy of science. And it was Daniel Parker, the Professor of my first philosophy of science course, who encouraged me to continue pursuing that work. But of even greater significance is the similar encouragement I received from the University of Arizona’s Richard Healey, who offered me crucial feedback on a paper that made its way into Chapter 3. I am also grateful to an audience at the 2016 Medical Humanities Conference at Western Michigan University, where I presented a paper that eventually became a portion of Chapter 1 of this project, and received challenging remarks and helpful feedback. Thanks also to William FitzPatrick, James Klagge, Douglas Langston, and Sandra Kimball. Importantly, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Yael Loewenstein – a debt I am unlikely to ever be able to repay. She is without a doubt the most talented student of philosophy (although now a professor!) I have ever personally known – and she has already gone on to do great things within the discipline, which fills me with pride. Frankly, our roughly six-year relationship while M.A. students at Virginia Tech and then Ph.D. students at the University of Arizona made me an immeasurably better philosopher than I otherwise could have been. Finally, I wish to thank my parents, who were there for me in ways I never could have anticipated needing (toward the end of writing this dissertation). I will be forever grateful. 4 DEDICATION For my mother and father, Brenda Cardella and Michael Schuler, and my step-mother and step- father, Donna Schuler and Ron Cardella, who truly were instrumental in the completion of this dissertation. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Abstract……….......................................................................................................................7 II. Introduction……………………….……………………………………………………………………………….8 III. Philosophical Implications of Recent Scientific Work on Hippocampal Prosthesis and the Ethics of it as a Potential Future Treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease……..….…14 IV. How to Create Artificial Intelligence – and yet the Moral Impermissibility of Taking Any Steps to Do So………………………………………………..…………………………….………58 V. A Naturalistic Argument against Scientific Realism and Implications of this Argument for Sider’s Metaphysics……………………………...………….…………………………………… 91 VI. References………………………………………….……………………………………………………….….146 6 ABSTRACT This dissertation consists of three (more or less) freestanding articles. The first two chapters are intended, nonetheless, to work in tandem to a significant degree. The third (and final) chapter is the most freestanding of the three, but it does have direct ties to the first two chapters; however, it takes a broader view of the philosophy of science and technology, and furthermore attempts to extend the results already obtained to metaphysics (actually, metametaphysics, to put it more accurately). In the first article, I discuss the philosophical import of recent scientific research on hippocampal prosthesis (HP), focusing on the handful of implications that seem to have the most direct philosophical relevance; of these, the one most fascinating is what the possibility of HP appears to be able to tell us about artificial intelligence. But because the principal (intended) scientific application of HP is its use in the treatment of Alzheimer’s Disease, I also devote considerable space to the ethics of using HP in this way. In the second article, I once again discuss HP, but here my focus is solely on using its advent as the basis for an inductive inference meant to establish the possibility of artificial intelligence. In fact, I believe it is possible to simply give a recipe for its creation. However, here too the second half of the article is devoted to the ethics of the practice in question – in this case, the use of Neuroprosthetics to create deep, genuine artificial intelligence. In the final article I develop a novel argument against scientific realism by exploiting one of the realist’s own, most fundamental, commitments: naturalism. I then show that this form of argument can be applied to cast serious doubt on the plausibility of Ted Sider’s metaphysics. 7 INTRODUCTION As an undergraduate (and as a complete philosophical novice) I once asked the philosophy department’s logician (of all people) what he thought of the work of Nietzsche. His response was something like, “I consider it reasonably entertaining bedtime reading, but that’s about it.” It turns out that this pretty accurately describes my own attitude toward Nietzsche’s work – except that I don’t even view it as worth my time as bedtime reading.