April 2000 Final Draft The Political Repercussions of Emergency Programs A Review of USAID's . Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1996) A Report to USAID/BHR/OFDA By John Fawcett and Victor Tanner Checchi Consulting and Co Washington, DC 2000 "OFDA is a tiny figure dancing as fast as it can on a very large stage." (former OFDA Director Nan Borton) vtanne4Jcompuserve. com [email protected] OFDA Fonner Yugoslavia Review Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Former Yugoslavia Review Table of Contents Table of Contents ........................................................... i Rationale for the Study .................................................. vi Scope of Work ........................................................ vii... The Review Team ..................................................... viii ... History of the Project ................................................... viii Methodology .......................................................... ix StructureoftheReview ................................................. xiv Note to the Reader: Getting the Chronology of Events Right .................... xvi The 'Philosophy' of the Study: Three Possible Sins and One Final Caveat ........ xvii Introduction Setting the Scene: America, Europe and Yugoslavia Prior to the Outbreak of War.. ......1 The Bush Administration's 'New World Order' ............................... .2 The Golden Age of Yugoslavia .............................................3 1989-1991: US Aid to Yugoslavia in a Bind .................................. .4 The EC's Economic Ties to Yugoslavia ......................................5 IL From Iraqi Kurdistan to Greater Serbia: Humanitarian Thinking in 1991-1992 ..... .7 The Legacy of the Gulf War and the Kurdish Emergency ........................ .7 Humanitarianism Triumphant ............................................. -7 UNHCR Under Attack ............ .I. ......................................9 Meanwhile, in Belgrade .................................................. .9 IIL Emergency Relief in Europe: A Long-Forgotten Concept .......................12 April 2000 Final Drop i Ignorance and the Overworked ............................................ 12 The Bosnian War. Too. Will Blow Over ..................................... 14 Conclusion: The Dangers of Familiarity .........................................16 Chapter One ODFA's Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia 1991-1992: From the Start of the War in Croatia to the Creation of the DART .... 17 I. A View from a Distance (July .December 1991) ................................18 OFDA in the Early 1990s: Problems Don't Happen in Europe .................... 18 OFDAin1992 ......................................................... 19 PressAccounts ......................................................... 21 ICRC and UNHCR: Public Reports to the End of 199 1 ......................... 23 I1 . OFDA Gets Involved (December 1991 .December 1992) ........................25 The US December Assessment ............................................ 25 The International rescue Committee ........................................ 25 TheApril1992USAirlift ................................................ 27 Macedonia ............................................................ 28 Bosnian War Spreads, OFDA Field Representatives Sent Out .................... 28 UNHCRinSummer1992 ................................................ 29 Conclusion: Genocide or 'Complex Emergency'? ..................................30 Chapter Two OFDA in Former Yugoslavia 1992-1995: From the Establishment of the DART to the Dayton Agreement .......33 Introduction ................................................................33 I. The Creation of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) ..................34 The Political. Military and Humanitarian Context (Mar-Dec 1992) ................ 34 The Humanitarian Response Background .................................... 36 The Role of a DART within OFDA ......................................... 37 April 2000 Final Drafr ii OFDA Former YugosIcrvia Review the DART: OFDA 'sjield projection how DARTS are perceived The Great Washington Maw . .39 Steps to the Establishment of the DART . .40 Original Objectives and Staffing of the DART . -41 objectives stafing the DART team-leader: God or peon? Summary: Creation of the DART . .43 IL The Twin Roles of OFDA: Donor and Reporter . .. .. .. .. .. .. .44 The Political, Military and Humanitarian Context (beg. 1993 - mid- 1994) . 44 Lack of Precedent for a Funding Strategy . .46 OFDA's Funding Strategy . .47 FY 1993: the first Congressional earmark FY 1994: introduction of cooperative agreements and the RRF FY 1995: diversrfication FY 1996: the Emergency Shelter Repair Program a reactive strategy The International Rescue Committee . 53 1992-1993: innovation and creativity 1993-1994: growth, expenditures and administrative muddles 1995: fears of donor fatigue OFDA in Kosovo . 56 Kosovo in the late 1980s, early 1990s the establishment of aid organizations in Kosovo OFDA 's involvement in Kosovi Sumrnary:OFDAasDonor ...............................................60 B. OFDA's Reporting Role .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .61 FieldReports ..........................................................61 DART Situation Report. (Sitreps) . .64 OFDA Washington Sitreps . .I. .64 Assessments ...........................................................65 the 1993 Interagency Humanitarian Assessment the UK-US Civil Planning Mission for Sarajevo: March 1994 April 2000 Final Draft iii OFDA Former Yngos1mOYtaReview LII. Relations with Other Organizations ........................................ .73 The Political, Military and Humanitarian Context ............................. 73 USAID ............................................................... 74 1993: OFDA and USAID/ENI 1994-1995: OFDA and OTI and new programs in central Bosnia USAID and OFDA institutional cultures USDepartmentofState .................................................. 80 State and OFDA 1993-1995 relations with RP/BPRM advocacy for the victims or foreign policy imperatives? The Department of Defense ............................................... 85 excess property: tires and pyres airdrops humanitarian advisors (humads) OFDAandUNHCR ..................................................... 89 PerceptionsofOFDA .................................................... 91 Summary: OFDA and Other Agencies ...................................... .94 Concluding Thoughts: The Outlook After Dayton (December 1995) ................. .94 Chapter Three The DART After Dayton: The Emergency Shelter Repair Program The Political Repercussions of Reconstruction Aid ................... .97 I. The ESRP: Review ........................................................98 The Initial Assessment Team ............................................. .98 Assessment Team Findings .............................................. 10 1 refugee Return reconciliation shelter and short term employment ESRPRationale .......................................................103 opening political space I showing movement the easy bite other factors April 2000 Final DraB iv OFDA Former Yu~oslaviaReview NATO the OTIpreview to the ESRP Selling the ESRP in Washington .......................................... 107 Department of State the Hill USAID the NGOs Rationale for Using the DART ...........................................1 10 Implementation .......................................................1 12 ESRP objectives choosing the NGOs OFDA measures selecting the villages selecting the beneficiaries monitoring the mini-infrastruc t ure program results The ESRP Rationale ................................................... 1 19 poor sense of context misreading Bosnians accepting the unacceptable reversing the domino efect: an incorrect assumption no advocacy ESRP Achievements ................................................... 124 From Return to Shelter: Focus Slippage .................................... 125 Ambitious Reporting, Ambiguous Returns .................................. 127 The Problem of Double Occupancy ........................................ 129 Glavati&vo (Konjic) &ielovo (Kiseljak) Jajce Encouraging the Partition of Bosnia .......................................133 The ESRP Message to National Leaders: We Won't Hold You to Dayton .......... 133 The ESRP Message to Local Hard-Liners: We Won't Take You On .............. 134 consolidating Nationalist Power working with the muni~ipalities.~cooperation or cooption? Sanski Most and Jajce: nationalist strongholds Kiseljak: undermining prior progress in cross-ethnic return Travnik: strengthening or weakening local moderates April 2000 Final Drrrf) v OFDA Fmmer Yugoslavia Review Ap&/ Begov Hun: unconditional surrender roah not taken: Stup and Brc20 The ESRP Message to the NGOs ..........................................143 The ESRP Message to Other Donors ....................................... 143 Setting the precedent magnet eflect The ESRP and US Policy: the Message to the Foreign Policy Establishment ........147 who was the audience? the ESRP and NATO the ESRP and the switch to cross-ethnic return the $25 million question: did the ESRP change USpolicy The Impact of the ESRP on USAID ....................................... 151 Changing the Relationship with the NGOs .................................. 152 Were There Alternatives to the ESRP ...................................... 154 Conclusions: Tough Questions ...............................................