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A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure Stuart E. Johnson, John E. Peters, Karin E. Kitchens, Aaron Martin, Jordan R. Fischbach Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Control Number: 2011930376 ISBN: 978-0-8330-5130-1 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2012 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface In 2003, the U.S. Army began implementing a set of ambitious changes to its force structure to address the challenges of waging war and conducting extended stabilization operations. It has done this while engaged in a multiple-theater war. One of the changes involved transform- ing the Army from its traditional, division-based force into a brigade-based force, a concept that has come to be known as “modularity.” Although it was the proximate focus of this study, this move was not made in isolation. It was accompanied by two other force structure change initiatives and a major force management change initiative, all of which were roughly concur- rent. The first force structure change was to “grow the Army” by raising end strength, thereby allowing the Army to add units. The second was to rebalance the force, moving some support- ing capabilities from the reserve component to the active component. The aim was to bring the reserve component force structure into closer alignment with that of the active component. This rebalancing also moved more manpower into the tactical part of the Army and reduced the size of the institutional Army—the sustaining base—to an unprecedented low percentage of the total Army. The major force change initiative occurred in 2006, when the Army Force Generation process moved the Army from a tiered readiness to a cyclical readiness model. Given the near-simultaneity of these events, it is not surprising that their effects have become inextricably entangled, limiting the ability to isolate cause from effect. Congress directed this study to determine whether, by converting to a modular force, the Army has improved its capabilities. In the move to the brigade-centric force structure, or modularity, the Army replaced its division-centric force structure with a force whose constituent building blocks are brigades and brigade combat teams (BCTs). BCTs were rebuilt by making proportionate combat, combat support, and combat service support, formerly provided by the host division, organic to the BCTs’ organization. In the process, the Army reduced the number of combat brigade types in its force structure, from some 17 individual types to three: infantry BCTs, heavy BCTs, and Stryker BCTs. The move to modularity provided the Army with a greater number of smaller, very capable force packages, making it easier to sustain the protracted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combat support and combat service support units and force structure were also redesigned to make the entire force more modular. However, the focus of this report is on the combat arms portion of the force structure and its operational command-and-control capabili- ties (or operational headquarters capabilities). The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Capability Assessment and Program Evaluation, and conducted within the Interna- tional Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of iii iv A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures ...........................................................................................................vii Tables ............................................................................................................ ix Summary ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgments ............................................................................................xiii Abbreviations ...................................................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Study Approach .................................................................................................. 2 The Army’s Capability to Contribute Land Power in Joint Operations ................................. 3 Options for Managing the Flexibility and Versatility of Army Forces Across the Range of Military Operations ...................................................................................... 3 Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Risks Associated with Brigade Combat Teams, Multifunctional Support Brigades, and Functional Brigades ....................................... 4 Required and Planned End Strength of the Modular Force .............................................. 4 Additional Considerations .................................................................................... 4 Data Sources ...................................................................................................... 5 Methods of Inquiry .............................................................................................. 5 CHAPTER TWO The Impetus for Modularity .................................................................................. 7 The Modular Force and Today’s Operational Concepts ....................................................12 Other Key Assumptions ........................................................................................13 Conclusions ......................................................................................................14