THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL The Nationale Volksarmee in German Reunification: Aspects of Policy and Process Being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the University of Hull By Ching Chang B.S., Chinese Naval Academy, ROC M.S., University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Diploma (PME), Naval Staff College, US Naval War College, USA Diploma (PME), Naval Command College, US Naval War College, USA February 2005 Abstract Disposing of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was viewed as the initial step of a comprehensive German post Cold War defence reform programme. The author of this study intends to challenge a generally accepted perspective originated by the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany and subsequently recited by many politico-military commentators that this effort of managing the NVA had significant positive impact on the overall German reunification process. The author assumed that such a political myth was caused by an insufficient basis of judgment, only focused on the initial stage of accommodating former NVA members into the Bundeswehr. Therefore, this study will re-examine the essence and significance of managing the NVA from two new angles, which received less attention from previous researchers. From a study of the negotiating process regarding the NVA in the last days of the GDR regime, the author proves that the future of the NVA never was the core issue to any party other than its military professionals. Hence, it could not be drastically elevated as a key factor in facilitating the post-reunification German national unity. Furthermore, re-visiting the process of disposing of NVA assets other than personnel proves that this had no effect on promoting national consolidation. On the contrary, many scandals that happened in transferring the NYA assets could have had the potential of undermining the national unity. At least, those problems caused numerous criticisms from the citizens of eastern Germany. By summarising the newly explored facts from these new angles, the author still genuinely believes that the Bundeswehr did positively contribute to the German national unity by appropriately managing the NVA thus defusing potential negative impacts on German post-reunification society. Nevertheless, the significance of their task should not be overrated in history. Contents Chapter One: Introduction 1 The Process 3 Previous Research 15 Scope 24 Chapter Two: Perceptions, Judgments, Decisions and Actions 28 Perspectives From Nations Other than Two German States 29 Consensus in Bonn? 36 Responses from the NYA 42 Unsettled Speculations in Moscow 43 Echoes from Parties Concerned 51 A Joint Statement But No Consensus 52 Misled by Perceptions or Convictions? 54 Not A Monologue by Eppelmann 66 The Rationality of the Political Arguments 70 Analysis of a Fruitless Endeavour 79 Chapter Three: Leadership and Decision-Making 82 Defence Summits 82 Political Miscalculations 90 Veto by Budget 93 Who Cared? 94 The Institutionalisation of Change 97 Systematically Engaged 99 Serving The Political Agenda 102 Media Relations 106 First to Know 108 Personal Image 109 Void Statements 110 Internal Unity 112 No Genuine Trust 114 Reliable Situation Reports 115 Rationality vs. Subjectivity 119 1 Chapter Four: Absorption, Demolition and Conversion 122 Coordination before Reunification 123 Farewell to Moscow 131 Predictions for Absorption 134 Influential Factors 137 Hardware and Employment 142 Case Study: the MIG-29 Fighter 147 Facilitating Cooperation 151 Swords into Ploughshares 153 Integrating with Western Technology 156 Realigning Cooperation 158 Demolition: An Expected Task 161 Muster Before Disposal 164 Influential Factors 165 Technology Developed 168 Impacts 171 Case Study: the SS-23 Missile System 174 Undiminished Legacies 178 Lesson Concluded 179 Chapter Five: Transfer, Donation and Analysis 181 No Volksmarine Vessels Wanted 183 Case Study I: Indonesia 190 Case Study II: Turkey 197 Case Study III: Croatia 199 Humanitarian Donations 204 No Guarantee of Diplomatic Return 206 Third Party Interests 209 Analytical Purposes 211 Understanding Adversaries 212 Another Beneficiary: the Defence Contractor 213 Extent of Historical Research 215 Case Study IV: Israel 216 Lessons Learned 221 Chapter Six: Land, Properties and Non-weapon Items 224 Unambiguous Basic Stance 224 Institutions, Mechanisms and Codes 226 11 Trophies for the Politicians 229 Further Investment Needed 234 Reconciliation with Local Communities 236 No Military Rationale 238 Non Land Properties 242 Reselling Non-Weapon Items - Massive Surplus of Vehicles 246 Everything for Sale 248 Hot Sale Item - the Berlin Wall 250 The Final Bill 252 Chapter Seven: Conclusion 254 Facilitating Overall Integration? 254 Wining the Hearts 259 Individual Excellence vs. Collective Accomplishment 262 An Unexpected Mission 264 Paradigmatic Experience? 267 Bibliography 272 111 Chapter One Introduction The Nationale Volksannee (NVA), the anned forces of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), was one of the best military forces in the communist bloc during the Cold War era. Its fighting capability was almost certainly better than their Soviet comrades and this was recognised by USA.· In 'spite of many constraints, the NVA successfully established its reputation through its long-time alert status and high military professionalism on military maneuvres within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). For many years, the military distinctiveness of the NVA was seen by western military professionals as based on German, or arguably Prussian, military traditions, Soviet and communist military teaching, and, most importantly, the political and military directives given by its leadership for securing military effectiveness and political allegiance. Like all the communist anned forces, its political masters tightly controlled the NVA through political officers within its force structure. An extremely high percentage of its members, especially the officers, would inevitably become members of the East German ruling party, Socialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED: Socialist Unity party).2 But the NVA's close association with the dominant ruling party did not improve its ability to determine political policies. Although the NVA consumed massive national resources, yet, the political influence of its military professionals on the national agenda was relatively weak because the NVA had not contributed to the nation-building process or gained any substantial military achievement through a war that defended its people from invasion. On the contrary, the NVA was generally viewed as a power apparatus of the dictatorship for suppressing the people or a tool to secure the relationship with its 1 Shalikashvili, John M. Forward, in SchOnbohm, J6rg 1Wo Armies and One Fatherland: The End of the Nationale Volksarmee, New York: Berghahn Books, January 1996, p.vi, translated by Johnson, Peter and Elfi Johnson from Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee. Berlin: Siedler, 1992. 2 Zilian, Frederick Jr. From Confrontation to Cooperation: the Takeover ofthe National People s (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr. Westport: Praeger, 1999, p.37, and Herspring, Dale R. Requiemfor 1 fellow socialist states, especially, the Soviet Union.3 Whether the NVA would remain loyal to the Soviet Union and attack its German brother force, the Bundeswehr, in a NATO-WTO conflict was questionable, but the NVA was seen as the only military force of the Soviet satellite states in East Europe that "might have been capable of effectively matching up against North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces".4 The GDR's political leadership used the NVA to secure political support from Moscow. In 1988, facing imminent Soviet conventional force reduction in Europe, it looked as if the NVA, despite its relative small size, would become even more important to the Soviet military strategy in the foreseeable future.s An article in February 1990 still focused on the military capability of the NVA to invade Western Europe although the author had already noticed the contemporary dramatic changes and uncertainties in East Europe.6 In 1990, when the Soviet Union decided to adjust its relationship with the West and thus concluded the Cold War stalemate on German soil, the NVA almost immediately became insignificant at the negotiation table. The NVA was important if, and only if, Cold War rivalry still existed and the Soviets needed its military excellence. Once the existing power structure needed to be reshaped and the mindset of antagonism was abandoned, the NVA was no longer so essential to Moscow. German unification became a central issue at the conclusion of the Cold War. Its implications can be identified as follows - "The emergence of a unified German state in the middle of a transformed Europe was a major, if not the major, turning point in the end of the Cold War". 7 Yet, given its insignificance in the GDR political decision-making process and relatively weak association with the population, the NVA could not influence public opinion or shape GDR politics before reunification. an Army: the Demise ofthe East German Military. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p.25. 3 Pfaff, Steven "Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989", Social Forces, Volume 75, Issue 1 (September 1996), p.108 4 Brooks, Stephen G "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest", Journal ofConflict