Nuclear capability, bargaining power, and conflict by Thomas M. LaFleur B.A., University of Washington, 1992 M.A., University of Washington, 2003 M.M.A.S., United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004 M.M.A.S., United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2005 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract Traditionally, nuclear weapons status enjoyed by nuclear powers was assumed to provide a clear advantage during crisis. However, state-level nuclear capability has previously only included nuclear weapons, limiting this application to a handful of states. Current scholarship lacks a detailed examination of state-level nuclear capability to determine if greater nuclear capabilities lead to conflict success. Ignoring other nuclear capabilities that a state may possess, capabilities that could lead to nuclear weapons development, fails to account for the potential to develop nuclear weapons in the event of bargaining failure and war. In other words, I argue that nuclear capability is more than the possession of nuclear weapons, and that other nuclear technologies such as research and development and nuclear power production must be incorporated in empirical measures of state-level nuclear capabilities. I hypothesize that states with greater nuclear capability hold additional bargaining power in international crises and argue that empirical tests of the effectiveness of nuclear power on crisis bargaining must account for all state-level nuclear capabilities. This study introduces the Nuclear Capabilities Index (NCI), a six-component scale that denotes nuclear capability at the state level. Through an annual, monadic examination of 193 states over 72 years, this study endogenously describes state-level nuclear capability and exogenously compares those results to dyadic conflict depicted in the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) and International Crisis Behavior (ICB) datasets, to determine whether a finer examination of nuclear capabilities would yield different results. This study found that higher NCI states, whether challenger or target, are victorious in four of every five conflicts and that higher NCI states are twice as prone to initiate conflict. Nuclear capability, bargaining power, and conflict by Thomas M. LaFleur B.A., University of Washington, 1992 M.A., University of Washington, 2003 M.M.A.S., United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004 M.M.A.S., United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2005 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Approved by: Major Professor Andrew G. Long Copyright © Thomas M. LaFleur 2019. Abstract Traditionally, nuclear weapons status enjoyed by nuclear powers was assumed to provide a clear advantage during crisis. However, state-level nuclear capability has previously only included nuclear weapons, limiting this application to a handful of states. Current scholarship lacks a detailed examination of state-level nuclear capability to determine if greater nuclear capabilities lead to conflict success. Ignoring other nuclear capabilities that a state may possess, capabilities that could lead to nuclear weapons development, fails to account for the potential to develop nuclear weapons in the event of bargaining failure and war. In other words, I argue that nuclear capability is more than the possession of nuclear weapons, and that other nuclear technologies such as research and development and nuclear power production must be incorporated in empirical measures of state-level nuclear capabilities. I hypothesize that states with greater nuclear capability hold additional bargaining power in international crises and argue that empirical tests of the effectiveness of nuclear power on crisis bargaining must account for all state-level nuclear capabilities. This study introduces the Nuclear Capabilities Index (NCI), a six-component scale that denotes nuclear capability at the state level. Through an annual, monadic examination of 193 states over 72 years, this study endogenously describes state-level nuclear capability and exogenously compares those results to dyadic conflict depicted in the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) and International Crisis Behavior (ICB) datasets, to determine whether a finer examination of nuclear capabilities would yield different results. This study found that higher NCI states, whether challenger or target, are victorious in four of every five conflicts and that higher NCI states are twice as prone to initiate conflict. Table of Contents List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. ix List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. x Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xii Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 - Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 11 Deterrence .................................................................................................................................. 11 The Role of Nuclear Weapons Deterrence ................................................................................ 13 Why States Choose to Develop Nuclear Weapons .................................................................... 17 Chapter 3 - Theoretical Approach ................................................................................................. 20 The Security Dilemma and Arms Races ................................................................................... 21 International Organizations and Nuclear Activity ..................................................................... 24 Signaling .................................................................................................................................... 26 Crisis Bargaining ....................................................................................................................... 28 Chapter 4 - An Index of Nuclear Capability ................................................................................. 37 Components of the Additive Nuclear Capability Index ............................................................ 38 International Nuclear Regimes .................................................................................................. 43 Chapter 5 - Quantitative Data ........................................................................................................ 50 Chapter 6 - Case Study: The Republic of South Africa ................................................................ 70 Phase I: Pre-Nuclear Weapon State (1945-1974) ...................................................................... 74 Phase II: Potential Nuclear Weapon State (1975-1980) ........................................................... 77 Phase III: Nuclear Weapon State (1981-1990) .......................................................................... 96 Phase IV: Post-Nuclear Weapon State (1991-Present) ........................................................... 110 Applied Qualitative and Quantitative Findings: South Africa Case Study ............................ 115 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 118 Chapter 7 - Case Study: Israel ..................................................................................................... 121 Phase I: Pre-Nuclear Weapon State (1945-1959) .................................................................... 123 Phase II: Potential Nuclear Weapon State (1960-1963) ......................................................... 132 vi Phase III: Nuclear Weapon State (1964-Present) .................................................................... 135 Qualitative Findings: Israel Case Study ................................................................................. 161 Chapter 8 - Case Study: India ...................................................................................................... 164 Phase I: Pre-Nuclear Weapon State (1945-1959) .................................................................... 166 Phase II: Potential Nuclear Weapon State (1960-1973) ......................................................... 178 Phase III: Nuclear Weapon State (1974-Present) .................................................................... 190 Qualitative Findings: India Case Study .................................................................................. 206 Chapter 9 - Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 209 Future Research