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Reconciling the Paradox: Non-Intervention and Collective Action in the OAS By Ra&l Gonz&lez Diaz Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs Signatures of Committee: Chair: ta lbajut> L0 ( J b - c . Dean of the School Date 1994 The American University ~Jhp5~l Washington, D.C. 20016 22E AMKBICIB UNIVERSITY LIBRAS? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1361750 Copyright 1995 by Gonzalez Diaz, Raul All rights reserved. UMI Microform 1361750 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "Non-intervention is a political and metaphysical term and means about the same as intervention” ______ Talleyrand ’Principles must be upheld, even i£ the Republic must drown” ______ Riego "The OAS couldn't pour --- out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel” ______ Lyndon Johnson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. RECONCILING THE PARADOX: NON-INTERVENTION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE OAS BY Radi Gonz&lez Diaz ABSTRACT This thesis discusses the inherent paradox in the mandate of the Organization of American States (OAS): while charged with protecting the members' sovereignty; the organization is also entrusted with the duty of promoting democracy and defusing threats to hemispheric peace, even if they spring as a result of a member's internal dynamics. The thesis will first trace the development of these two currents from the early 19th century, up until the establishment of the OAS (1943). Moreover, it will study two instances in which the OAS became involved in the internal affairs of a member in order to curtail a perceived threat to hemispheric peace: the Dominican Intervention of 1965 and the Nicaraguan Crisis of 1978-1979. Finally, the thesis will argue that ultimately the real contradiction afflicting the OAS is that between a rhetorical commitment to collective action and the members' reticence to exercise this authority except in cases where it would directly benefit their national interest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS ABSTRACT i PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 PART II: BACKGROUND TO INTERVENTION 4 PART III: BACKGROUND TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY 46 PART IV: THE CHARTER OF THE OAS 67 PART V: THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION 91 PART VI: INTERLUDE-THE BUENOS AIRES PROTOCOL OF AMENDMENTS 136 PART VII: THE NICARAGUAN CRISIS 142 PART VIII: QUO VADIS OAS ? 181 BIBLIOGRAPHY 195 • • li Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PART I: INTRODUCTION With most of the states in the Americas continually obsessed over the perceived and real threats to their sovereignty, it is no surprise that the principle of non­ intervention became the cornerstone on which the Inter- American System was built. In 1948, the American Republics met in Bogota in order to establish a strengthened regional organization that would supersede the largely powerless Pan American Union. The product of this meeting, the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), incorporated the principle of non-intervention in articles 15 to 17.' Articles 19 to 25, however, established that exceptions to the non-intervention principle could be made in cases where a country's political independence and/or territorial integrity were being compromised or when events in a given country threatened the "peace of America". In these instances, the principle of collective action was advocated as a solution to the crisis. The contradiction between the articles condemning intervention in specific, clear cut terms and the vaguely phrased articles defending collective action in special instances was to plague the OAS in the succeeding decades as its members disagreed over which circumstances constituted a threat to hemispheric peace. 1 The Charter of the OAS was amended in 1967 and 1985. The numbers of the articles cited throughout this thesis refer to the original charter, which was in effect from 1948 to 1970, unless otherwise noted. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Indeed, despite their agreement over the principle of non-intervention as an abstract term, there were considerable differences on how the concept was perceived in practical terms. The United States saw the non-intervention principle as a bulwark against penetration by extra- hemispheric states and ideologies. Thus, for the US, the OAS was part of its global system of anti-communist alliances, an attitude reflected in the US' use of the organization to take measure against the spread of communism (1951) and to isolate Cuba (1962, 1964). Meanwhile, the Latin American countries in general perceived the OAS as a barrier against both extra- hemispheric and US interventionism. For Latin America, the OAS, with its concept of one country, one vote was to be the perfect forum to counteract the overwhelming US superiority in financial and military resources. To further muddle the picture, on specific issues the Latin American position was far from monolithic. Some Latin American democracies (mainly Venezuela and Costa Rica) at times advocated intervention in order to overthrow oppressive regimes. Conversely, Latin American dictatorships (Trujillista Dominican Republic, Somocista Nicaragua) used the concept of non-intervention to neutralize destabilizing campaigns by their neighbors. Furthermore, the dictatorships developed a penchant for labeling any reformist movement as communist and demanding collective action to block its coming to power. Finally, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 some countries (mainly Mexico) refused to sanction under any circumstances the OAS* right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a country. This thesis will focus on the interplay between the concepts of non-intervention and collective action within the OAS. First of all, the thesis will document how the historical experiences and ideological underpinnings of the various member states shaped the relevant articles of the OAS Charter. Moreover, it will study in detail two instances in which the OAS became involved in the internal affairs of a member in order to curtail a perceived threat to hemispheric peace: the Dominican Crisis of 1965 and Nicaraguan Crisis of 1978-1979. The thesis will analyze the legal rationales for OAS action, the repercussions of the involvement and the reasons why the OAS' actions in the Dominican Republic could not be replicated in Nicaragua. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PART II: BACKGROUND TO INTERVENTION2 The Holv Alliance and the Monroe Doctrine The 19th century began with the U.S. as the only independent state in the hemisphere. Nonetheless, within a few years, the U.S. was joined by more than a dozen newly sovereign states. The achievement of independence, however, did not mean that the sovereignty of the new states was to be recognized or respected. Indeed, the American states had reasons to fear European intervention. In 1802, Napoleon attempted to reestablish French control over Haiti. By 1804, however, a combination of disease and fierce resistance forced the French to abandon their endeavor and Haiti