CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: NATIONAL INTERESTS, RULES AND STRATEGIES __________________________________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board ________________________________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ________________________________________________________________________ by James A. Frick May 2021 Examining Committee Members: Roselyn Hsueh, Advisory Chair, Department of Political Science Mark Pollack, Department of Political Science K. Orfeo Fioretos, Department of Political Science Ayse Kaya Orloff, External Member, Swarthmore College © Copyright 2021 By James A. Frick All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT Just twenty years after its entry into the World Bank and IMF, China had joined over 50 international organizations (IO) and had become involved with 1,275 international non-governmental organizations (INGOS). Previously one of the least connected states in the world, China is now one of the most connected on the measure of IO membership. Importantly, China’s behavior within IOs has “varied from symbolic to substantive” at various stages in its global participation. Consequently, China has exhibited a dichotomy of puzzling behavior in its interaction in IOs. Sometimes it complies when doing so appeared counter to internal interests, while other times it has undermined organizations it has greatly benefited from. These patterns have not always been consistent either since its participation has varied over time within different organizations. Why does China’s behavior within these organizations vary? Why does China join or create new IOs when it is already a member of a similar organization? I build upon a diverse body of political science research arguing that China looks beyond the satisficing aspect of whether the IO is good enough, and more to how its behavior can optimize achieving its desired interests. My theory posits that in the context of relative shifts in power, variation in China’s IO behaviors is predicated by the extent to which IOs conform to China’s national interests. This rational behavior approach (RBA) outlines four strategies: rule-taking, rule-breaking, rule-changing, and rulemaking. Furthermore, I argue that as an emerging state’s relative power increases over time, so does its bargaining power, leading to a more assertive rule-changing behavior as it attempts to adapt the organization to allow its ascendancy as a rule-maker. My research iii explores 40 years of the PRC’s participation within the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund drawing from semi-structured, in-depth interviews with WB China directors, IMF China directors, the Chief Counsel for AIIB’s establishment, a WB president, Department of Treasury and State representatives, and Chinese nationals who have held key positions in both WB and IMF staff. This research also includes reviews of secondary literature exploring China’s interaction within these organizations and analysis of 40 years of annual reports, consultations, and transcripts obtained from archived organizational records. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I would like to thank Roselyn Hsueh, the chair of my dissertation committee. Rosie has been a great teacher, mentor, and advisor throughout my time at Temple University. Rosie sparked my intellectual curiosity into China’s internal management practices based on a Strategic Value Framework. She further opened my aperture for the many ways China has applied its foreign policies in the current Liberal International Order. Mark Pollack and Orfeo Fioretos provided essential feedback and insight into international organizations and political economy, and were instrumental in sharpening the arguments, theories, and conclusions within this work. Ayse Kaya’s research and feedback on formal power dynamics within the Bretton Woods organizations was also essential to the development of my theory. I could not have hoped for a better, more knowledgeable committee than this. I would also like to thank those members from the World Bank and IMF who so graciously gave of their time in helping me with my efforts. Specifically, I want to acknowledge a few individuals that made the breadth and depth of my research possible. I want to thank David Dollar for his guidance, for his introductions, and for his patience in responding to my follow-up questions. Likewise, I want to thank Pieter Bottelier and Steven Dunaway for taking the time to explain the innerworkings of the WB and IMF, for proofreading my drafts to assure accuracy, and similarly connecting me with valuable resources. Lastly, Robert Zoellick was also extremely gracious as he tutored me on WB strategic considerations and provided me with connections among key WB leadership. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Renata, who was always supportive throughout this long journey. Her love, encouragement and understanding allowed me to continue v pressing forward regardless of the obstacles I found myself against. She was my rock, and I will always be grateful. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... x LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xii ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................... xiii CHAPTER 1 CHINA’S BEHAVIOR IN IOS ................................................................................. 1 1.1 Explanations for Chinese Behavior...................................................................................... 12 1.1.1 What Is the Logic to China’s Foreign Policy? .............................................................. 12 1.1.2 How being a revisionist state might affect interaction in IOs ....................................... 16 1.1.3. A Constructivist Analysis of IO Participation ............................................................. 19 1.2. Conceptualization of State Behavior in IOs ........................................................................ 20 1.2.1 Rule-Taking Behavior ................................................................................................... 20 1.2.2 Rule-Making Behavior .................................................................................................. 22 1.2.3 Rule-Breaking Behavior ............................................................................................... 24 1.2.4 Rule-Changing Behavior .............................................................................................. 25 1.2.5 How These Behaviors Differentiate by Dimensions ..................................................... 31 1.2.6 What Explains Variation in China’s Behavior in IOs And Over Time ......................... 32 1.3. Research Design.................................................................................................................. 35 1.4. Plan for the rest of the dissertation ..................................................................................... 42 CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALIZING INTERESTS, RULES AND POWER IN IO BEHAVIOR ....................................................................................................................................................... 46 2.1. Primary Explanations for China’s Behavior in IOs ............................................................ 49 2.1.1 Extent IO Issue Areas Align to State Interests .............................................................. 50 2.1.2 Degree IO Rules of Control Allow State to Influence Interests .................................... 56 2.1.3 Conceptualizing A Model for Behavior-the Rational Behavior Approach ................... 62 2.2. Secondary Explanations for China’s Behavior in IOs ........................................................ 66 2.2.1 Relative Power and Its Influence on Behavior .............................................................. 67 2.3. Conclusion and Roadmap for The Empirical Analysis ....................................................... 73 CHAPTER 3 CHINA’S FAST START IN THE WB ................................................................... 74 3.1. State Interests and WB Structure ........................................................................................ 78 vii 3.1.1 How Chinese Interests Aligned to WB Issue Areas ...................................................... 78 3.1.2 Degree WB Rules of Control Allow China to Influence Interests ................................ 86 3.2. China’s Behavior in the WB After Membership ................................................................ 94 3.2.1 China’s Formal Power Arrangements at Membership .................................................. 95 3.2.2 The Impacts of WBG Design on Chinese Behavior ................................................... 102 3.2.3 Learning and Adapting to Institutional Norms ........................................................... 106 3.2.4 Project Implementation and Institutional Development ............................................