tribal-based societies, he lambasts the was appointed the British Secretary of U.S. expectation that such a fractious War in December 1905, reformed the country would embrace American-style British army despite its well-established democracy and freedom. The author naval supremacy and significant spending details how the United States, in its at- restraints. After analyzing the strategic tempts at post-invasion order, simply environment, Haldane concluded he did replaced Iraq’s Sunnis with its Shia not know precisely which power or alli- population in the ruling structure, ance Britain would face in the next war. setting the stage for a sectarian govern- He asked first-order questions: Whom do ment, reprisals, and the eventual start we fight? Where do we fight? And how of Iraq’s brutal insurgency and civil war. do we fight? The reforms were nested Mandelbaum describes the Iraqi mission under the answers to these questions. as one doomed to fail from the start—a The subsequent battle of Mons in 1914 “struggle between American will and the would reveal that Haldane’s reforms laws of gravity of the region.” The U.S. served the British army well. The British involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Expeditionary Force proved to be stra- peace process is similarly described as an tegically decisive in protecting France attempt to force dissimilar cultures to until the Allied powers, which eventu- accept American concepts of negotiation, ally included U.S. forces, could defeat acceptance, and rule of law. Germany. The thread that ties together Mission Next, Macgregor details the Japanese Failure is the repeating theme of disin- rise to power and embrace of many terested, unfocused, and mismanaged Margin of Victory: Five Western ideas in the early 1900s. General foreign policy after the end of the Cold Battles that Changed the Ugaki Kazushige “embodied the fight War. Describing an American public and Face of Modern War for change inside the Imperial Japanese government apparatus eager to return to Army (IJA),” as the Japanese struggled by Douglas Macgregor domestic needs, Mandelbaum paints a with reform and balancing resources Naval Institute Press, 2016 picture of conflicts defined by ideology between the navy and army. Much like 288 pp. $34.95 and not interests; of interventions run Haldane, many of his reforms were ISBN: 978-1612519968 according to fickle domestic popularity; resisted, blocked, or ignored by some and, perhaps most damaging, of under- Reviewed by John Dethlefs military leadership. The subsequent battle resourced and mismanaged missions, of Shanghai in 1937 put these reforms from Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia to Iraq, to the test: “The disparity in Chinese Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian ouglas Macgregor’s newest book and Japanese losses highlights the impact peace process. In his closing chapter, offers a tutorial and blueprint for of Ugaki’s modest modernization ef- Mandelbaum describes a “restoration” D the strategically guided devel- forts and the high quality of Japanese of historic power politics and declares the opment of the U.S. military. This is troops and leadership, but the struggle end of the post–Cold War period of U.S. timely, as the Department of Defense for control of Shanghai was harder and preeminence in world affairs. Ironically, finds itself preparing for our future bloodier that it should have been. The Mandelbaum describes this return to national defense strategy, which in IJA had failed to change enough to form as an opening for the United States the Barack Obama administration was achieve a true margin of victory.” Herein to revert to its interest-based roots—a often referred to as the Third Offset. lies a subtle warning to U.S. planners that conclusion that may assure students of Planning for it should be nested within they must be ruthless with our reform as history but leaves us wondering, who will the current and anticipated strategic we adjust to the new strategic environ- fill that vacuum? JFQ environment, emerging technolo- ment and growing capabilities of possible gies, and how we intend to fight our adversaries. next war. Macgregor analyzes the The author next analyzes the Bruno Carvalho is a graduate student in the preparation for, execution of, and modernization of the post–World War School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He previously served 6 consequences of belligerence in five I Soviet and German forces and subse- years with the U.S. Army. significant battles. He also includes a quent destruction of the German Army chapter with recommendations (some Group Center in June 1944 by Soviet of which are quite controversial) for the forces in Eastern Europe. Macgregor U.S. military’s development. argues the German defeat was decided In the opening chapter, the author well before any German forces entered recounts how Sir Richard Haldane, who the Soviet Union. The difference was JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 85 ultimately how the Soviets and Germans concurs with that assessment at the of responsibility and lower echelons face approached military reform based on tactical level, he makes the argument even greater micromanagement. desired strategy. that the campaign was a lost strategic Macgregor recommends changing the Before the war, “the idea of wag- opportunity for the United States. While way we fight, stating that “full spectrum ing total war to make Germany a world successful, this battle did reveal flaws in military dominance on a global basis is power was absent from German strategic our strategic thinking and execution. both unaffordable and unnecessary,” thinking.” Macgregor goes on to explain Macgregor contends that “although the which directly challenges our past empha- Adolf Hitler’s demand that officers twentieth century closed on a note of sis on building global security. This makes obey orders without dissent and his unrivaled American superiority in military sense in the face of decreasing budgets replacement of very capable officers with affairs, the failure of policymakers and and changes in the strategic environment. obedient technocrats. Their efforts in military leaders in Washington to define Other recommendations include reduc- developing mechanized forces did not go the purpose, method, and end state of ing the number of light infantry forces far enough, as the Wehrmacht remained military operations robbed the United due to the increase in lethality of modern too reliant on horses and light infantry. States and its coalition partners of a de- weapons and replacing them with more The Soviets made many mistakes (includ- cisive strategic victory.” He argues that armored combat formations requiring ing their own purges of capable officers), U.S. aversion to risk allowed most of the fewer—but more mobile, protected, and but weather and distance granted them Republican Guard to escape, ensuring lethal—people. Hardening or expanding the time to recover and regenerate their Saddam Hussein would remain in power. intelligence, surveillance, and recon- officer corps. The Soviets ultimately From this, he claims that “the myth of naissance (ISR), communications, and learned from their mistakes more quickly the bloodless victory was born, and with space-based capabilities is important, as and developed more strategic agility it, the seductive promise of silver bullet our potential adversaries arguably see dis- wherein a Soviet marshal had more joint technology that encourages arrogance rupting these as the best method to gain command authority than General Dwight and fosters illusions of victory with zero parity with us. D. Eisenhower did or our current com- casualties was made.” Macgregor makes many profound batant commanders can. The subsequent Macgregor concludes by looking at recommendations based on significant warfare rewarded operational agility, America’s “margin of victory” for the 21st historical evidence. This is a must-read mobility, protection, and firepower—at- century. He is quite critical of the current for strategic leaders seeking ideas on tributes Macgregor contends are even strategic direction. He correctly warns military reform. In what I have read more important today. that “without effective strategic direction, about future strategy and the defense In assessing the Yom Kippur war in battles such as 73 Easting can be won, innovation (including the Third Offset), the Sinai in 1973, the success of Egypt’s but wars can still be lost.” few to none of Macgregor’s proposals reforms after its defeat in 1969–1970, His more detailed recommendations are being considered. The focus is on coupled with Israeli complacency, almost are quite controversial. The first discusses technology improvements—mostly in led to an overwhelming victory for the need for a change in U.S. national regard to ISR and autonomous sys- Anwar Sadat. However, Israeli culture, military strategy, contending that “the tems—and not the fundamental changes leadership, training, technology, and United States must act now to build the Macgregor champions. They deserve adaptability eventually turned the tide. means of commanding its armed forces serious consideration. JFQ Considering this battle, Macgregor and impose unity of effort across service contends that recent ideas to convert the lines,” which he finds currently lacking. Israeli army largely into a light force of He writes expansively about ruthless re- Colonel John Dethlefs, USAR, is the Commander of the 209th Digital Liaison Detachment and a riflemen that depends on airstrikes for form