CHAPTER X “THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ‘FIFTH’ ARMY”1 IT is now time to lift the veil that hid from the arriving reinforcements the chain of events that had produced the situations into which they were flung. It may be taken as an axiom that, when an army is in the grip of a desperate struggle, any one moving in its rear tends to be unduly impressed with the disorganisation, the straggling, the anxiety of the staffs, and other inevitable incidents of such a battle; he sees the exhausted and also the less stubborn fragments of the force, and is impressed with their statements, while the more virile and faithful element, mainly fighting out in front, ignorant or heedless of all such weakness in rear, is largely beyond his view. It is undeniable that during and after their race to the Aniiens front the Australian divisions were witnesses of many incidents that impressed them with a lack of virility in a certain proportion of the British troops. Rumours depre- ciating the resistance offered by parts of the Fifth Army were widespread not only throughout the remainder of the British Army, but among the French population, and were even current in England. The Australian troops were the ctief reinforcement sent to that army by the British command in the later stage of the retirement, and eventually occupied the whole of its remaining front as well as part of the Third Army’s. The Australian soldier was not an unfair critic. If the Performance of a neighbouring unit excited his admiration, no one was so enthusiastic and outspoken in his praise; but, where performance fell short of its expectations, it was quite useless to attempt to gloss over to him such failure. He founded his opinion upon what he himself saw. and, whether ‘This chapter was writkn before the appearance of the authoritative account contained in Yolume 1918 (I) of the British Oficiol History; but much use has been made of that history in checking, correcting, and amplifying it. This general acknowledgmcnt is made in order to avoid troitbling the reader by constant reference to footnotes 236 Mar., 19161 I‘ TRUTH ABOUT ‘ FIFTH ’ ARMY ” 237 his view was favourable or unfavourable, he expressed it, whenever the subject arose, with the freedom that had been his right and habit from childhood. A considerable part of the Australian infantry had passed through the scenes of panic near Pas and HBbuterne on Match 26th, and in the home letters of Australian soldiers at this time the military censors found some statements so downright-and, probably, exaggerated-that the War Office telegraphed to the Common- wealth Government asking it to keep out of the newspapers these “ scurrilous and unfair allusions to the conduct of United Kingdom troops,” which were ‘I doubtless founded on isolated occurrences incidental to every retirement.” There was little danger of such letters passing the Aus- tralian press censor ; but a year later the troops themselves were returning to Australia, and their definite judgment of the differing qualities of those beside whom they had fought- English, Scots, New Zealanders, Americans, French-surprised and sometimes shocked their hearers, previously fed upon newspaper report. These judgments were largely formed in 1918, and they greatly influenced the opinion of most other Australians. At the same time many Australian soldiers- even among those who played a prominent part in the events --were too perplexed by the incidents of the German offensive to base upon them any firm judgment. This perplexity is evidenced in the question constantly asked at the time and still frequently heard where ex-soldiers meet : ‘I What was the truth about the Fifth Army’s retreat ?”-under which name many of them include the scenes witnessed by them at HBbuterne, Mondicourt, and Doullens, which, of course, were far within the Third Army’s area. The data available in Australia do not suffice to answer that question, but the following points now seem to be fairly clear. The breach into which the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was hurried at Hebuterne was a sudden development of one which opened between the flanks of the Third and Fifth Armies three days earlier, about the third night of the great offensive, and which appears to have been directly due to the previous policy concerning the salient of the British line, on both sides of which the German offensive was launched. This protuberance, around Flesquikes and VilIers 238 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [1917-18 Plouich, had been formed by the Cambrai fighting in Novem- ber 1917, and as early as December 13th Haig had recognised that, if the Germans attacked, it was “unsuitable to fight a decisive battle in.” He decided, however, to hold both this salient and that around Passchendaele if they are not attacked in great force; and, in the event of attack in great force, to use them to wear out and break up the enemy’s advancing troops as much as possible before these can reach our battle zone of defence, which will be sited accordingly as a chord across the base of each salient. When it became evident that an offensive would be launched against the front of the Third Army, whose right flank the Flesquicres salient formed, Haig ordered that the forward zone there should be held by a mere screen, sufficient to repulse raids, but that a determined resistance will be made in the Battle Zone in conjunction with troops operating on either flank. The reader will recall that, when the blow actually fell, on March zIst, the Germans did not attack the salient in strength, their operations there being confined March 21 to weak, shallow assaults designed solely to keep the divisions of the V British Corps in position; the real thrust was made on either side, falling with tremendous weight zrst Mar, 19181 ‘‘ TRUTH ABOUT ‘ FIFTH ’ ARMY ” 239 upon the IV and other corps of the Third Army to the north- west and the VI1 and other corps of the Fifth Army to the south. The first object of the Germans in this region was to drive in behind the divisions holding the salient, and, if possible, by closing in rear of them, to cut them off. The salient was held that morning by the 47th (London), 63rd (Royal Naval), and 17th (Northern) Divisions of the V Corps, with the 2nd Division, which had just been relieved after suffering 3,000 casualties through gas-shelling, and the 19th, in reserve. On the left the near flank of the IV Corps was held by the 5Ist (Highland) Division, and on the righl were (in that order, from north to south) the 9th (Scottish), 21st, and 16th (Irish) Divisions of the VI1 Corps. During the first day of the German attack some of the front- line commanders in the V Corps, finding the attack easy to deal with-and not knowing that it was only intended to hold them- were well satisfied with the situation; but on the left the Germans, here as else- where immensely helped by the fog, drove back the 5Ist Division; and, on the right, though the South African Brigade (9th Division) held out, Lhe enemy thrust back the 21st and 16th Divisions. Employing his newly practised method of penetrating and then spreading out behind the opposing defences, by the evening he was driving from the north towards Hermies, in the battle zone of the IV Corps, and on the south had seized Hargicourt and was pressing on EpChy. The reader will remember that Haig had long since recognised that the Fifth Army, if seriously attacked, would have to fall back on the line of the Somme, maintaining its connection with the French by holding the CroTat Canal, 240 THE A 1.F. IN FRANCE [21st-23rd Mar., 1918 and with the Third Army by taking up a line along the Tortille.* As the Fifth Army’s line had also heen thrust back near its southern extremity, in the sector of the I11 Corps (5Sth and 14th London Divisions)-where the fog was thickest and so strong an attack had not been expected-the army commander. General Gough, foresaw the likelihood of an almost immediate retirement to the Soninie line. He there- fore directed his corps commanders to fight a delaying action, and not allow their divisions to become entangled in a decisive struggle for any position. In the Third Army, as the German thrusts were threatening to close behind the Flesquihes salient-though not so quickly as Ludendorff had hoped-General Byng, on the night of March zrst, ordered the V Corps to draw back from the forward zone of the salient into the battle zone. But this zone was already being attacked in the left rear, and all next day the Highlanders of the 51st Division (IV March 22 Corps), together with the 17th Division (V Corps), had to fight off the enemy’s northern pincer. The danger on the southern side now began to increase. The Fifth Army had by March 22nd been forced to use all its three reserve divisions-the 39th, in trying to stop a thrust through the 16th and zIst Divisions, on the VI1 Corps front; the 50th (Northunibrian), farther south, in occupying the rear zone of the SIX Corps? allowing the other divisions of the corps to re-form Ixhind it; the 20th (Light) Division, farther south still, in taking up a line along the Sonime through which the XVIII Corps would retire. But the 50th Division, which was holding a line of 10,500 yards, was in the evening driven out of the rear zone at points near each flank.